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ABSTRACT 
The present investigation examined the role of cognitive interference in sport. In 
Study 1 an instrument to assess intrusive thoughts athletes experience during 
performance was developed (Thought Occurrence Questionnaire for Sport; TOQS). In 
the first part of the study, which involved modification of an instrument constructed in 
educational settings, three types of thoughts were identified. These were 'performance 
worries', 'situation irrelevant thoughts' and 'thoughts of escape'. In the second part of 
the study, which involved validation of the modified instrument, support for the 
psychometric properties of the TOQS was provided through tests of convergent, 
concurrent and discriminant validity. 
Study 2 examined situational antecedents of cognitive interference. Discrepancies 
between expected and actual performance was identified as the best predictor of 
cognitive interference athletes experience, whereas cognitive anxiety was found 
moderately related to cognitive interference. Finally, it was found that athletes 
experiencing their anxiety states as facilitative reported less cognitive interference 
than athletes experiencing their anxiety states as debilitative. 
Study 3 investigated possible effects cognitive interference has on aspects of sport 
performance based on athletes' perceptions. Participants reported cognitive 
interference to be detrimental to their concentration. Furthermore, it was revealed that 
different types of thoughts influence effort input in different ways. The relationship 
between 'performance worries' and subsequent effort depended on goal attainment 
expectancies. Athletes holding higher expectancies reported that their worries resulted 
in increased effort, whereas athletes holding lower expectancies reported their 
worries to result in decreased effort. 'Situation irrelevant thoughts' were reported not 
to have any effects on subsequent effort, while 'thoughts of escape' were associated 
with decreases in effort. 
Finally, Study 4 examined relationships between achievement goal orientations and 
cognitive interference. A negative relationship between task orientation and thoughts 
of escape was the only strong and consistent association that emerged. Goal profiles 
analysis revealed that, in contrast to athletes holding self-referenced goals, for those 
holding comparative goals outcome is an important determinant of withdrawal 
thoughts. The results of the present investigation are discussed in relation to findings 
in educational and sport settings, and a conceptual model regarding the role of 
cognitive interference in sport is proposed. Overall, cognitive interference is identified 
as a topic which requires further examination in the sport psychology domain. 
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Introduction I 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Concentration is a feature of sport performance whose importance is increasingly 
acknowledged. It is getting more common to hear athletes, coaches, and sport experts to 
attribute quality of performances to concentration, and also discuss the detrimental 
effects its momentary loss might have. In fact, it is very rare that sport programmes, or 
inter-views examining athletes' post-performance attributions, do not include references 
to concentration. Many examples of athletes' accounts regarding the importance of 
concentration can be found in applied sport psychology texts (e. g. Butler, 1996; Orlick, 
1990). 
Furthen-nore, its importance is recognised within the scientific spectrum. Sport 
psychology practitioners and theorists have demonstrated and supported the significance 
of concentration. For example, Nideffer (1993) stated that the ability to concentrate on a 
task is almost universally recognised as the most important key to effective performance 
in sports. Similarly, Singer, Cauraugh, Tennant, Murphey, & Lidor (1991) proposed that 
the ability to concentrate on the task without being distracted by irrelevant cues leads to 
better accomplishments. In a most emphatic fashion, Winter & Martin (199 1) suggested 
that without good concentration, no amount of skill, fitness, or motivation is going to 
get athletes to their peak, and Orlick (1990) stated that if there is one mental skill that 
distinguishes successful from less successful athletes, it is the ability to adapt and 
refocus in the face of distractions. 
Nevertheless, attention has captivated the interest of psychologists for almost a century. 
According to Moran (1996) three aspects of attention have been main areas of interest to 
psychologists. First, 'selective attention', which refers to the process by which an 
individual selectively attends to stimuli in preference to others (Kahneman, 1973); 
second, 'divided attention'. which refers to the ability of individuals to efficiently 
spread mental resources across several concurrent actions (Eysenck & Keane, 1995); 
and third, 'alertness', which refers to the ability to prepare and sustain a state of 
readiness to process certain signals (Posner & Petersen, 1990). 
Although attention has a relatively long research history, there are issues that have been 
neglected. Among these, one that seems of Particular importance 's individuals' 
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distractibility by self-generated thoughts. As Moran (1996) points out, despite its 
practical importance, athletes' vulnerability to such distractions have attracted relatively 
little attention within the cognitive psychology framework. Furthermore, from a 
methodological perspective, Eysenck & Keane (1995) reported that most of the research 
dealing with concentration has been concerned with attention to the external 
environment, ignoring athletes' tendency to allow their thoughts to wander in spite of 
their efforts to keep concentration high. Moran (1996) refers to these interfering 
thoughts as 'internal distractions' which disrupt individuals' attention from the task to 
be performed. 
Internal distractions and 'mind-wandering' has received considerable attention in 
educational settings. Klinger (1996) identifies that human thought shifts focus at a high 
rate. Stemming from research with individuals trained to estimate the duration of their 
thoughts, Klinger (1978) reports that the median length during which thought content 
remain on the same topic is about 5 seconds, with a mean of 14 seconds, which means 
that thought content on average people shifts about 4,000 times during a 16-hour day, 
that is approximately 4,000 distinct thoughts per day. Thus, rapid thought shifting is a 
normal phenomenon. 
This phenomenon, however, can become problematic when thoughts shift away from 
the individuals' immediate goals. Thus, when attempting to complete a task from which 
thought content keeps drifting away, thoughts that come to the fore are considered 
interfering and prevent effective accomplishment of the task. Recognising that what 
people think influences their behaviour (Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason, 1996a), 
psychologists have emphasised the need to empirically demonstrate the relationships 
between specific types of cognitive events and processes on the one hand and actions on 
the other. 
In educational psychology, where the quest regarding thought shifting during task 
performance initiated, the term cognitive interference has been used to describe such 
disruptions of concentration, and refers to thoughts that occur while executing a task, 
and are not related to the execution itself In this context, cognitive interference has 
been described as task- irrelevant, self-preoccupied thinking including components of 
worry about perfon-nance (Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990). The concept of cognitive 
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interference was generated through an attempt to investigate the relationship between 
test anxiety and cognitive performance. Thus, cognitive interference was introduced as 
an effect of test anxiety (Deffenbacher & Deitz, 1978; Wine, 1971) and was 
hypothesised to be the factor that resulted in impaired performance. According to 
Sarason's (1984) propositions, interfering thoughts lessen individuals' effective 
behaviour by diverting attention from task relevant cues and using cognitive resources 
which otherwise could be used for task-processing purposes. Thus, the importance of 
investigating cognitive interference during task performance is clearly evident in 
psychological research. 
As already stated, the interest in cognitive interference emerged from an attempt to 
explain relationships between anxiety and performance in achievement settings. In the 
field of sport psychology anxiety has always been one of the most widely researched 
topics (Biddle, 1997). However, considering the complexity of a phenomenon like 
anxiety and the fact that sport psychology is a relatively new scientific discipline, a 
great deal remains to be explored in this area. Hanin (1998) reviewing what is known 
and with regard to advances in sport anxiety research suggested that among the 
questions that have to be addressed in future research is how anxiety functions during 
competition. Cognitive interference which refers to the occurrence of intrusive thoughts 
athletes experience while performing can be described as one of the components of 
anxiety during competition. In reverse to the above proposition, it can also be suggested 
that the cognitive element of anxiety during competition can be described as one of the 
components of cognitive interference athletes experience while performing. 
Despite its apparent importance, cognitive interference has not been widely investigated 
within the sport context. The present investigation is an attempt to partially fill this gap 
in the literature by giving a preliminary insight on the role of cognitive interference in 
sport. In Chapter 2 the literature related to the purposes of the investigation will be 
reviewed. This includes references to theories and findings from educational settings 
where cognitive interference has been widely studied, and also research on sport 
anxiety, which has been the major focus of sport perforinance-related research, and has 
been identified in educational research to be closely related to cognitive interference. 
Chapter 3 describes the development of an instrument to assess cognitive interference in 
sport, based on the Thought Occurrence Questionnaire (TOQ; Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, 
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Hayes, & Shearin, 1986), an instrument developed and used in educational research. 
Chapter 4 deals with the first research question, that is situational determinants of 
cognitive interference athletes experience while performing. In Chapter 5 attention is 
drawn to whether and how cognitive interference might affect performance. Chapter 6 
investigates cognitive interference in relation to motivational issues, and in particular 
achievement orientations. Finally, in Chapter 7, an overview of the findings is made and 
the main points of the investigations are discussed. 
Review of literature 
Chapter 2. Review of Literature 
This review of literature consists of two parts. The first focuses on research in 
educational settings where theories regarding cognitive interference have been 
developed and tested, thus providing sound theoretical grounds on which the current 
investigation can be based. Considering that advances in cognitive interference theories 
were founded on anxiety-related research, the second part focuses on anxiety research in 
sport. Based on the developments in educational psychology and driven by current sport 
anxiety literature, the major research questions of the present investigation will be 
formulated. 
Cognitive Interference 
Several definitions regarding cognitive interference can be found in the various 
psychological textbooks, however they all are similar. For example, Sarason, Pierce, & 
Sarason 1996b, p. 139) states that "cognitive interference refers to intrusive thoughts - 
thoughts that are unwanted, undesirable, and perhaps disturbing". Sarason & Stoops 
(1978) describes cognitive interference as intrusive thoughts individuals experience that 
compete for attentional resources while performing a task. Finally, Yee & Vaughan 
(1996) refers to it as thoughts that detract from on-task activity. Put together in a more 
complete description, cognitive interference refers to thoughts individuals experience 
while performing on a task, which are not related to the execution of the task and 
therefore interfere with mental processes aiming at task completion. 
Going beyond defining cognitive interference Sarason et al. (1996b) argues that 
cognitive interference can be looked at as the loss of control over one's thoughts, and 
that it is a joint product of exposure to challenging or threatening situations and 
vulnerability to self-focused cognitions, such as worry and preoccupation. A more 
detailed account of the antecedents and consequences of cognitive interference will be 
presented throughout the literature review. 
As already stated in the introduction, cognitive interference emerged through research 
on test anxiety, which is one of the most thoroughly investigated areas in psychology 
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within the last century. In order to better understand how cognitive interference theory 
was developed references to test anxiety theory and research are essential. 
From test anxiety to cognitive interference 
Mandler & Sarason (1952), the originators of test anxiety theory, based their 
propositions on the assumption that in test situations two kinds of drives are evoked: a) 
learned task drives which are reduced by response sequences leading to the completion 
of the task, and b) learned anxiety drives which elicit two kinds of responses; those 
related to task completion, which are anxiety reducing, and those interfering with task 
completion, which can be manifested as feelings of inadequacy, helplessness, or 
anticipation of loss of status and esteem. The latter have been characterised as self- 
rather than task-centered responses. 
Subsequently, it was suggested (Sarason, 1960) that high test anxious persons are more 
self-deprecatory and self-preoccupied than persons lower in test anxiety. Evidence to 
support this proposition has been provided by a number of studies (e. g. Sarason & 
Ganzer, 1962; Sarason & Ganzer, 1963; Sarason & Koenig, 1965). In these, individuals 
with extreme scores on test anxiety were tested on unstructured verbal conditioning 
paradigms, after being assigned to non-reinforcement, positive reinforcement, and 
negative reinforcement experimental groups. Overall, the findings indicated that (a) 
regardless of experimental condition, highly anxious individuals generally described 
themselves in more negative terms than low anxious individuals, (b) high anxious 
individuals were extremely responsive to negative self-reference reinforcement, and (c) 
high anxious individuals did not produce more positive self-references when positively 
reinforced. 
Furthen-nore, it was hypothesised that these kind of reactions emerge especially under 
evaluative situations. As Sarason, (1960, p. 405) stated, "subjects scoring high and low 
in anxiety differ in the response tendencies activated by personally threatening 
conditions. Whereas low scoring subjects may react to such conditions with increased 
effort and attention to the task at hand, high scoring subjects respond to threat with self- 
oriented personalised responses. " Marlett & Watson (1968) found that post-test reports 
of high anxious individuals included more self-focused thoughts than those of low 
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anxious individuals, and Ganzer (1968) reported that test situations in the presence of an 
audience evoked more self-referenced, self-evaluative thoughts in high anxious 
individuals, than in low anxious ones. Accounting for the above findings, Marlett & 
Watson (1968) concluded that high test anxious persons spend a part of their task time 
doing things which are not task oriented. They worry about their performance and about 
how well others might do, ruminate over choices open to them, and are often repetitive 
in their attempts to complete the task. 
Consequently, investigations examined whether high test anxious individuals perform 
more poorly than low test anxious ones, under evaluative conditions. In general, 
experiments have involved task performance in the presence of an audience (e. g. Cox, 
1968; Ganzer, 1968) and test situations under instructional variation regarding the 
importance of the evaluation (e. g. Paul & Eriksen, 1964; Sarason & Minard, 1962). 
Studies utilising audience presence revealed that performance of high test anxious 
individuals was debilitated, whereas performance of low anxious ones was facilitated. 
With regard to the studies utilising instructional variations, results supported an 
interaction between anxiety levels and evaluation emphasis. In particular it has been 
found that (a) following highly evaluative instructions performance of high anxious 
individuals was lower than following non-evaluative instructions, while the opposite 
effects occurred for low anxious individuals, (b) high anxious individuals perfon-ned 
more poorly than low anxious ones under highly evaluative instructions, while under 
non-evaluative instructions the former performed better than the latter, and (c) following 
minimal task instructions high and low anxious individuals displayed similar levels of 
performance. 
Meanwhile, Liebert & Morris (1967) introduced a different conceptualisation of 
anxiety. They suggested that anxiety could be separated into two major components, 
worry and emotionality. Within this approach, worry has been described as cognitive 
concern about the consequences of failing (Liebert & Morris, 1967), preoccupation with 
performance (Doctor & Altman, 1969), or cognitive concern about one's performance 
(Spiegler, Morris, & Liebert, 1968), whereas emotionality has been described as one's 
perceptions of the physiological elements of anxiety, that is indications of autonomic 
arousal and unpleasant feeling states such as nervousness and tension (Morris, Davis, & 
Hutchings, 198 1). Research on the possible antecedents and the temporal patterning on 
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the two anxiety components supports the distinction (e. g. Morris & Liebert, 1973; 
Spiegler et al., 1968). 
Consequently, the relationship between worry, emotionality and performance was 
investigated. A number of studies (e. g. Doctor & Altman, 1969; Morris & Liebert, 
1970; Tyron, 1980) supported that worry was consistently and more strongly related to 
academic performance decrements than emotionality. Furthermore, Morris, Smith, 
Andrews, & Morris (1975), employing a motor task paradigm, found that worry was 
related to performance in one of the three experiments they conducted, whereas 
emotionality was not in any of them. 
Based on the above findings, Wine (197 1) suggested an attentional interpretation of the 
aversive effects of test anxiety on performance. Cognitive interference, being described 
as task-irrelevant, self-preoccupying thinking including components of worry over 
performance, was considered a product of test anxiety which was hypothesised to have 
detrimental effects on performance by diverting attention from the task at hand and 
using up resources that otherwise could be used for task-processing activities. Based on 
the assumption of Wine (197 1) and further suggestions by Deffenbacher & Deitz (1978) 
and Marlett & Watson (1968), cognitive interference began to be investigated as a 
mediator of the relationship between test anxiety and performance. Sarason & Stoops 
(1978) examined the relationship of test anxiety and cognitive interference with subjects 
performing a task presented as an intelligence test. Their results indicated that high test 
anxious subjects experienced more cognitive interference. Moreover, the results were 
enlightening about the nature of the thoughts people have while performing. In 
particular, high test anxious individuals during task performance were preoccupied 
about how poorly they were doing, how other people were coping, and what the 
examiner will think of them. 
Sarason (1984), testing a new instrument (Reaction To Test), examined the correlation 
of its four subscales, namely worry, tension, test-irrelevant thinking, and bodily 
symptoms, with cognitive interference. He found that worry had the highest correlation 
with cognitive interference. Furthermore, the fact that the thoughts individuals have 
when expecting to be evaluated were more consistently related to performance than the 
test anxiety measures which include emotional reaction was attributed to that worry 
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over performance is specific to evaluative situation, while emotionality is not. He 
concluded that high tension combined with worry might have debilitating effects, while 
high tension alone might have neutral or even facilitative effects, by increasing 
motivation, especially when the person has overlearned appropriate responses. 
Furthermore, a number of studies has provided support for the relationship between test 
anxiety and cognitive interference. Zatz & Chassin (1983) reported that during an 
anagram task high test anxious children experienced more negative and task-irrelevant 
thoughts than moderate and low anxious children, while in similar tasks, Arkin, 
Detchon, & Maruyama (1982), Bruch, Juster, & Kaflowitz (1983), Defenbacher (1978), 
Deffenbacher & Hazaleus (1985), Gallassi, Frierson, & Sharer (1981), and 
Hollandsworth, Glazeski, Kirkland, Jones, & Van Norman (1979), found that high 
levels of test anxiety were associated with more frequent negative and interfering 
cognitions during performance. 
Thus, it can be supported that research on test anxiety has progressively moved towards 
the formulation that test anxiety impairs performance through interference of self- 
preoccupying task worries and task irrelevant thoughts. Paulman & Kennelly (1984), 
examining information-processing deficits in a dual-task paradigm related to cognitive 
interference, found that elevated cognitive interference scores were associated with 
lower test performance. Miculiner (1989), in a study concerning learned helplessness, 
reported similar results. Examining performance differences between high and low 
cognitive interference scorers in a memory and visual search task following unsolvable 
problems, he reported that the more frequent the subjects' mind-wandering, the less 
accurate their performance. He supported that excessive engagement in self-concerned 
thoughts and in off-task cognitions are important antecedents of performance deficits. 
Seibert & Ellis (1991), examining the relationship between task-irrelevant thoughts, 
which they described as thoughts that did not facilitate successful task performance, and 
performance on a memory task, found that the more irrelevant thoughts participants 
reported the worse their performance on the task. Finally, Hoffman (1993) reported that 
in a computer-based task cognitive interference, and in particular task-related worries, 
was a significant predictor of performance. 
Based on findings linking test anxiety to performance deficits which were attributed to 
cognitive interference effects, treatment programmes directed towards anxiety reduction 
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were designed and applied to test anxious individuals. Such programmes, if effective, 
should result in anxiety reduction and performance improvement, thus confirming the 
hypothesised detrimental effects of anxiety on performance. However, results from 
studies examining treatment effects were not fully supportive of the hypotheses (e. g., 
Allen, 197 1; Kirkland & Hollandsworth, 1980; Mitchel & Ng, 1972; Tyron, 1980). In 
particular, despite the fact that treatments have been successful in reducing anxiety, 
their effects on academic performance has not been equally impressive, thus further 
questioning the causes of performance decrements. 
Attempting to explain the failure of treatment programmes and based on findings 
supporting significant associations between test anxiety and study skills (e. g. Culler & 
Holahan 1980; Paulman & Kennelly 1984; Witmaier, 1972) Culler & Holahan (1980) 
stated that test anxiety represents a problem of broader behavioural scope. Offering a 
somewhat different approach to the issue of test anxiety they suggested that the 
relationship between test anxiety and academic performance is at least partially a 
function of differential study-related behaviours between high and low anxious persons. 
Thus, poor performance of high test anxious individuals should be, at least partly, 
attributed to inadequate study skills, resulting in poor knowledge of the tested material, 
which also suggests that test anxiety might be a result of knowledge of inadequate 
preparation. 
Benjamin, McKeachie, Lin, & Holinger (198 1) attempting to account for such an 
approach, tested the applicability of an information processing model that combined the 
originally hypothesised interference explanation (Sarason, 1984; Wine, 1971) with the 
study habits hypothesis (Culler & Holahan, 1980). They concluded that worry reported 
by test anxious individuals may not be entirely a personality characteristic, but also a 
result of inadequate knowledge of the subject matter. 
Concerns regarding the study-skills deficits model were expressed by Tobias (1985) 
who suggested that the model could not entirely explain performance disadvantage of 
high anxious individuals. He argued that such an explanation makes it difficult to 
understand findings showing skilled students to be highly anxious (Culler & Holahan, 
1980). If the skill deficits hypothesis is correct, these students should have little reason 
to be anxious, as their anxiety scores cannot be explained by deficits in study skills. 
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Furthermore, Tobias (1985) suggested that the study skills deficits hypothesis also 
makes it difficult to understand how anxiety reduction treatments can succeed in 
reducing anxiety, but not performance. If anxiety is caused by awareness of inadequate 
preparation, reductions of anxiety through treatment cannot be justified, because if 
anxiety is considered as lack of preparation, students should continue being anxious 
after the treatment, since no improvement on that matter has been achieved. Although it 
is possible that the treatment effect might be that individuals learn to feel better about 
the situation, those positive feelings cannot be attributed to perceived mastery. 
In relation to this particular conflict and based on findings revealing different 
performance characteristics for anxious individuals with different study skills Paulman 
& Kennelly (1984) and Naveh-Benjamin (1991) proposed that two different types of 
anxious students may exist. Those with effective study skills and sufficient knowledge 
of the subject, but who fail to use their efficiency due to task-irrelevant responses 
(interference) occurring during a test situation, and those with insufficient study skills 
for whom increases in anxiety represent awareness of inadequacy. Naveh-Benjamin 
(199 1) and Naveh-Benjamin, McKeachie, & Lin (1987) provided support for this kind 
of distinction by testing performance of high anxious students in evaluative and non- 
evaluative situations. In particular, he found that anxious students with good study skills 
performed well in the non-evaluative condition, whereas those with poor study skills 
performed poorly on both the evaluative and non-evaluative conditions. He found that 
students with good skills and knowledge of the tested material were able to perform 
when not evaluated, as irrelevant responses did not interfere with task relevant cues, 
which should be the case under evaluative situations when anxiety levels rise. In 
contrast, those with poor study skills performed poorly on both occasions due to 
learning/knowledge deficits. Despite the fact that a cognitive interference interpretation 
of the test anxiety/performance relationship was supported, the above conflict 
contributed to a better understanding of the test anxiety responses and the way these are 
related to performance. 
Further research on cognitive interference has tried to identify factors other than test 
anxiety that generate, or interact with test anxiety contributing to the appearance of 
interfering thoughts. Arkin et al. (1982) found interactions between test anxiety and task 
difficulty and also reported perceived ability as another factor predicting cognitive 
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interference. Zatz & Chassin (1985) reported classroom environment to be a factor 
influencing the appearance of negative thoughts. Previous performance, examination 
importance, perceived preparation, grade expectation, were reported by Hunsley (1987) 
to predict negative internal dialogue on at least one of five examinations. Finally, 
Seibert & Ellis (199 1) found increases in frequency of thoughts that were not related to 
the task at hand under conditions of happy and sad emotional mood states. Taken 
together the above findings suggest that despite the fact that anxiety seems to be the 
most reliable predictor of cognitive interference, other factors can contribute in 
explaining the generation of interfering thoughts either independently or by interacting 
with anxiety. 
Cognitive interference theory, as originated by Wine, Sarason and colleagues, and 
subsequently researched within educational contexts, represents a personality/social 
psychology approach to the issue of cognitive activation that occurs during performance 
(Yee & Vaughan, 1996). Within this approach, the key elements in the definition of 
cognitive interference are that thoughts individuals experience (a) occur at the conscious 
level, (b) are mainly related to worries, and (c) are internally generated. In relation to 
these principles, assessment of cognitive interference is based on self reports which 
allows an insight to individuals' experiences and conscious thoughts. Despite the appeal 
arising from its face validity, this approach in not free of problems. People are not 
always aware of the processes in their own minds, and in addition retrospective self 
reports cannot always be considered accurate, since they are dependent on memory. 
Thus, even though a personality perspective may uncover relationships between 
psychological constructs, it is unlikely that this approach alone can produce a thorough 
understanding of the mechanisms by which cognitive interference exerts its effects on 
performance. 
In an attempt to examine cognitive interference from a different perspective, and 
following advances in psychological thinking, a cognitive psychological approach to 
test anxiety was subsequently developed. In contrast to the personality/social 
psychology perspective, the cognitive approach is also concerned with how people deal 
with external events the environment thrusts upon them. Within this approach, the 
definition of cognitive interference is based on the assumptions (a) that distractions 
arise from both the conscious and the unconscious level, (b) that distractions can often 
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arise from the task itself, that is they are features of the task, and (c) that the origins of 
the distractions are mainly external to the person. Consequently, to identify how 
cognitive activation is related to performance, the cognitive approach relies on 
performance measures in tasks varying in attentional demands, after manipulating the 
nature of the task and the distractors. The merits of the cognitive approach lie in the 
development of a paradigm more able to examine the processes through which 
interference occurs. 
Initial research conducted within the cognitive paradigm gave indications that anxiety is 
not necessarily detrimental to performance. For example, Eysenck (1985) reported 
anxiety to be related to performance decrements in 3 out of 12 component processes 
included in a letter transformation task performed under stressful conditions. Calvo 
(1985) in a nonverbal reasoning task performed by high and low anxious individuals 
under test conditions, reported that the low anxiety group outperformed the high anxiety 
group in the presence of reward incentives, but the two groups performed similarly in 
the absence of rewards. Similar results were also reported by Calvo & Ramos (1989) 
and Calvo, Alamo, & Ramos (1990). Furthermore, in relation to motor tasks, research 
has revealed that anxiety not only might have no detrimental effects on performance, 
but also that some times it might have positive effects (Calvo & Alamo, 1987; 
Weinberg, 1990). 
The processing efficiency theory 
Following the cognitive paradigm and based on findings like those presented above, 
Eysenck & Calvo (1992) objected to the generalisability of test anxiety theory, 
suggesting alternative explanations to account for findings that could not be interpreted 
through the cognitive interference hypothesis. They suggested that the problem with test 
anxiety theory's predictions might lie in the conceptualisation of worry as a factor that 
influences performance in only one way, namely attentional interference. In their 
attempt to account for this proposition, and based on earlier suggestions by Sarason 
G 960,1984), they suggested the processing-efficiency theory. 
According to their hypothesis, worry has two major effects on performance. Similar to 
the cognitive interference interpretation, the first effect is attentional, that is worry about 
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task performance pre-empts some of the processing resources of the working memory 
system. The second effect, which is the new proposition, is that worry serves a 
motivational function. 
"In order to escape from the state of apprehension associated with 
worrisome thoughts and to avoid the likely aversive consequences of 
poor performance, anxious subjects try to cope with threat and worry 
by allocating additional resources (i. e., effort) and/or initiating 
processing activities (i. e., strategies). Such attempts, if successful, 
increase available working memory capacity. As a consequence, 
potential performance impain-nents caused by the utilisation of 
working memory resources can be compensated for by the allocation 
of additional resources or activities. " (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992, p. 
415). 
Subsequently, they proposed a fundamental theoretical distinction between performance 
effectiveness and processing efficiency. Accordingly, performance effectiveness refers 
to the quality of task performance, while processing efficiency refers to the amount of 
processing resources invested, that is performance effectiveness divided by effort. Thus, 
in contrast to the cognitive interference theory, Eysenck and Calvo suggested that worry 
has detrimental effects on processing efficiency, but not necessarily on performance 
effectiveness, since the processing deficits may be balanced or overpowered by 
motivational effects. 
Calvo & Ramos (1989) and Calvo et al. (1990) found that during difficult experimental 
tasks individuals high in anxiety reported having significantly higher worry scores than 
those low in anxiety, however performance of the two groups did not differ. In terms of 
the processing efficiency theory, it could be suggested that higher levels of worry 
experienced by high anxious individuals led to the allocation of additional effort which 
compensated for processing efficiency losses, thus resulting in similar performances by 
the two groups. In an attempt to account for this proposition, Dornic (1977,1980) 
compared performance and subjective effort between individuals high and low in trait 
anxiety. Performance of the two groups did not differ, but the high anxiety group 
reported expending significantly more effort than the low anxiety group, thus providing 
support for the hypothesis. 
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Based on such findings Eysenck (1985) hypothesised that motivational factors 
enhancing effort will benefit the performance of low anxious individuals more than high 
anxious individuals. For the former, additional available resources that are not used can 
be activated, whereas for the latter such resources are not available since they are 
already activated due to increased worry. Comparing performance of high and low 
anxiety individuals under conditions of high and low monetary incentives he found a 
significant interaction. In particular, the low trait anxiety group performed much better 
under the high incentives condition, whereas performance of the high trait anxiety group 
remained unaffected. 
A similar experiment was performed by Calvo (1985) under evaluative and non- 
evaluative conditions. In the evaluative condition with reward the low anxiety group 
performed better than the high anxiety group, but both groups performed similarly in 
the evaluative condition without reward. Moreover, high anxious individuals did not 
perform better in the reward condition compared to the non-reward condition, whereas 
low anxious individuals did. These results are in accordance with the hypothesis that 
motivational incentives would increase effort for low anxious individuals but not for 
high anxious ones, and therefore provide indirect support that worry is detrimental to 
processing efficiency, but not necessarily to performance. 
Further evidence that worry limits processing efficiency was provided by Calvo, 
Ramos, & Estevez (1992), who found that high anxious individuals required additional 
processing time to acquire amounts of information equivalent to that acquired by low 
anxious ones. In relation to that, Calvo & Carreiras (1993) used a reading task under 
evaluative conditions to examine the effects of test anxiety on comprehension. Although 
comprehension performance was not affected by test anxiety, moderate increases in 
reading times as a function of anxiety were detected. They concluded that although test 
anxiety may reduce working memory capacity available for reading (as also identified 
by Calvo et al., 1992) due to task irrelevant responses, i. e. interference, the amount of 
information acquired is not affected under self-paced conditions. Thus, in accordance 
with the processing efficiency hypothesis, at the cost of slower processing, 
highly 
anxious individuals can compensate for the capacity reduction and achieve equivalent 
comprehension to low anxious individuals. Finally, using psychophysiological 
measures, Weinberg & Hunt (1976) reported that although performance of 
high and low 
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anxiety groups in a motor task was similar, the high anxiety group was using more 
energy and over a longer period of time than the low anxiety group. 
In summary, the processing efficiency theory introduced the notion that worry might 
have motivational effects, in addition to the already identified attentional effects, and 
consequently the effects of worry on performance might differ from those on efficiency. 
In relation to performance deficits related to anxiety, Eysenck & Calvo (1992) agreed 
that these represent the result of cognitive interference produced by task irrelevant 
responses. Furthermore, they argued that such effects are not a product of reduced 
working memory, but rather are associated with the tendency to employ working 
memory to sustain certain thoughts, thus leaving less capacity available for the 
execution of the task. 
The reliance on behavioural measures used within the cognitive paradigm approach, 
rather than self reports used within a personality/social psychology approach, allowed 
investigation of mental operations that are not accessible through introspective recall. 
The nature of this paradigm made it possible to explore the role of cognitive 
mechanisms in dealing with interference in the performance of various tasks. However, 
this approach is limited by its focus on distractions that are presented through 
experimental manipulations. Since distraction is introduced rather than assessed, 
cognitive models fail to explain why some individuals experience more cognitive 
interference than others and under what circumstances such interference appears. 
Subsequently, even though such a perspective allows for examining and analysing 
processes, it is not applicable when the interest focuses on what is going on in the field 
rather than in the laboratory. 
The control process theory 
Carver & Scheier (1988), based on research conducted over a decade (Carver, 1979; 
Carver & Scheier, 1981,1984,1986; Carver, Scheier, & Klahr, 1987), proposed a 
somewhat different interpretation of the anxiety-performance relationship. They 
suggested that human behaviour is regulated in a system of feedback control. People 
establish goals in relation to certain values and use these goals as reference points. 
When intentional behaviour is displayed they monitor themselves with regard to the 
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goals and accordingly adjust their actions in the direction of the reference value, i. e. the 
behavioural standard. When, during this process, discrepancies between intended and 
actual behaviour are detected Carver and Scheier postulate that whether the individual's 
response will be adaptive or not in terms of subsequent effort depends on the 
expectancies of the individual of being able to complete the intended action. 
"The person who expects to be able to cope, who is sufficiently 
confident of being able to complete the action, responds to anxiety 
arousal with renewed effort. When this person's attention is self- 
directed, the result is enhanced persistence and even enhanced 
performance. The person who has serious doubts about being able to 
cope, who has the expectation of bad outcome, is likely not to persist 
in the face of anxiety arousal. This person is more likely to experience 
an impulse to disengage... This impulse sometimes results in overt 
withdrawal from the behaviour setting. It is sometimes expressed 
more subtly as disengagement of effort toward goal attainment. These 
responses, in turn, can result in impaired performance when attention 
is self-directed. " (Carver & Scheier, 1988, p. 19). 
Although Carver and Scheier's approach, as originated by Carver (1979), focused on 
behavioural consequences of self-directed attention and was not developed to deal with 
issues related to test anxiety and cognitive interference literature, later writings (Carver 
& Scheier, 1984) linked this theoretical model to test anxiety. The rationale behind this 
connection was that under stressful situations, such as examinations, self-focusing 
tendencies of individuals are activated. Consequently, their model of self-attention 
could be applied in anxiety evoking environments. 
They argued that when people high in test anxiety are placed in a stressful situation they 
are more likely to have doubts about their adequacy. Because of these 
doubts any 
interruptions from task efforts these people experience during a test situation are likely 
to result in impulses of disengagement. Despite that such impulses may 
be restrained 
from overt expression, the subsequent off-task thinking, psychological 
disengagement 
and the self-deprecatory rumination accompanying unfavourable expectancies are 
likely 
to result in impaired performance. Though less anxious 
individuals also get stressed 
Review of literature 18 
during difficult test situations, they presumably have more favourable expectations of 
being able to successfully complete the task. Thus, despite the fact that frustrations 
these individuals experience produce interruption in ongoing effort, the sense of 
confidence to complete the intended action leads to renewed efforts. Subsequently, 
performance is less likely to be impaired among those individuals. 
In accordance with other theorists they accept that it is not the physiological aspect of 
anxiety, that is emotionality or somatic anxiety, but the cognitive one, that is worry or 
cognitive anxiety, which impairs performance. While test anxiety theorists (e. g. Wine, 
1971; Sarason, 1984) have attributed the dysfunctional effects to self-focus, Carver and 
Scheier suggest that it is not the self-focus per se, but the process taking place in the 
person. When having favourable expectancies, the person remains engaged to the task, 
even when highly anxious. Therefore, it could be argued that the phenomenology of this 
person can be described as 'task-focused' rather than 'self-focused', since the person 
remains focused on the comparison between the intended goal and the present state, in 
the attempt to move from the former to the latter. In contrast, the response is 
maladaptive when the focus is on the perceived deficits of the self, salient self-doubts, 
and doubts over goal attainment. 
Carver, Blaney, & Scheier (1979) conducted an experiment involving anagrams, during 
which participants' self-attention was enhanced, and expectancies were manipulated 
through verbal feedback participants received after an initial set of tasks. The group 
provided with poor outcome expectancies withdrew from attempts to solve the anagram 
more quickly than the group which had been provided with positive outcome 
expectancies. Furthermore, within the two groups differences in persistence emerged in 
the presence or absence of self-focus. For the high expectancy group persistence was 
increased when self-focus was enhanced, whereas for the low expectancy group 
persistence was decreased when self-focus was enhanced. Consequently, they suggested 
that, given a state of self-awareness, individuals having favourable expectancies 
perceive that more effort can result in accomplishment of the attained goal and therefore 
more effort is applied. In contrast, when expectancies are not favourable and individuals 
perceive they have no control over the outcome, worry discourages further effort and is 
connected with disengagement from the activity either physically or mentally, 
depending on the value that is placed on continuing or discontinuing. 
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In an experiment involving anagrams under moderately stressful conditions Carver, 
Peterson, Follansbee, & Scheier (1983) examined relationships between test anxiety, 
self-directed attention and thought content during task performance. High, in contrast to 
low, levels of self-focus were associated with greater intrusion of task-irrelevant 
thoughts among individuals high in test anxiety, but less intrusive thoughts among low 
anxious individuals. In a subsequent experiment, where no time limits were imposed for 
anagram solution in order to test persistence, self-focus interacted with test anxiety, 
leading to greater persistence for the low anxiety group and reduced persistence for the 
high anxiety group. Carver & Scheier (1984) also tested interactions between self-focus 
and test anxiety in relation to performance and persistence. High levels of self-focus 
facilitated performance and enhanced persistence among low anxious individuals, 
whereas among individuals high in test anxiety both performance and persistence were 
impaired. 
The role of goal attainment expectancies was investigated by Rich and Woolever (1988) 
by manipulating expectancies in two groups of highly anxious students. Performance of 
students led to hold favourable expectancies was facilitated by self-focus, whereas 
performance of those in the unfavourable expectancies condition was impaired. 
Manipulated expectancies in a more elaborate way, Duval, Duval, & Mulilis (1992) 
examined the way effort was influenced by self-focus in relation to expectancies. In 
particular, they initially created conditions of small and large discrepancy between self 
and standard performance and subsequently they let participants working on the task in 
order to reduce their deficits while they (participants) were able to observe their rate of 
progress towards the standard, which was also manipulated. Within participants who 
were informed they had small discrepancy between self and standard, those making 
moderate progress towards eliminating the deficiency persisted more on the task than 
those informed they were making no progress towards discrepancy reduction. 
Furthermore, within participants informed they were making no progress towards the 
standard those in the large discrepancy condition persisted less than those in the small 
discrepancy condition. In a subsequent experiment where the dependent variable, of 
persistence was replaced by a measure of task-approach/avoidance similar results were 
obtained. 
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In their final experiment, Duval et al. (1992) reported that increasing the rate of progress 
for individuals in the large discrepancy condition resulted in increased effort towards 
deficiency reduction. The researchers concluded that 'self to 'standard' discrepancy is 
crucial in moderating the extend to which individuals seek to conform 'self to 
'standard' or withdraw from their attempts. Furthermore, they stressed the importance 
of the rate of self-standard discrepancy reduction, suggesting that when the rate of the 
deficiency reduction is adequate, in relation to the magnitude of perceived incongruity 
between self and standard, efforts to reach the standard will occur. In contrast, when the 
rate is viewed as inadequate avoidance behavioural patterns will dominate. 
Although Carver's (1979) theory was not originally developed within the test anxiety 
framework, Carver & Scheier (1984) adapting their model to anxiety research tried to 
further explain the motivational effects, both positive and negative, that worry can have. 
Overall, Carver and Scheier's propositions are in accordance with Eysenck's hypothesis 
that worry might have motivational effects and therefore is not always detrimental to 
performance. In addition, in an attempt to identify when worry can serve motivational 
purposes, they introduced the notion of goal attainment expectancies as an important 
moderator of the relationship between worry and subsequent effort. 
Their approach focuses on behavioural measures rather than self-reports, thus adopting 
a cognitive perspective which further tries to explore mechanisms through which 
anxiety might influence performance. Considering the context of sport, where goal 
directed behaviour is displayed under achievement environments which elicit stressful 
responses, it remains of interest to investigate the applicability of the control process 
model of anxiety in naturalistic settings. 
Concluding the first part of the literature review, referring to three major theories (the 
cognitive interference theory, Sarason, 1988, Wine, 1971; the processing efficiency 
theory, Eysenck, 1992, Eysenck & Calvo 1992; and the control process theory, Carver 
& Scheier, 1984,1988) and psychological research conducted in educational settings 
regarding the role of thoughts that interfere with task execution, it becomes apparent 
that their role in relation to task performance has received considerable attention. 
Moreover, research on the topic of cognitive interference has been regarded as 
important in identifying how relationships between anxiety and performance can be 
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explained. In the second part of the review, theories and findings within the sport 
psychology discipline will be presented in order to identify whether and how 
approaches from the two areas of research can be integrated in a constructive way to 
enhance our understanding of the role of cognitive interference in sport. 
Sport Anxiety 
Sport anxiety, or competition anxiety, is one of the most extensively researched topics 
in sport psychology. However, considering the relatively short history of sport 
psychology as a distinct area of psychology, a great deal remains to be investigated. 
Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that because of the conceptual framework that general 
psychology has provided, advances in sport anxiety have been and remain rapid. Most 
of the research on sport anxiety has focused on identifying the relationship between 
anxiety and performance. A number of theories have been proposed, supported, 
criticised and modified or rejected, but they have all contributed significantly to our 
understanding of this relationship. 
Early approaches 
The relationship between sport anxiety and performance has, until recently, been 
dominated by general arousal-based explanations. Within this approach two were the 
most influential approaches, the Drive Theory (Hull, 1943; Spence & Spence, 1966) and 
the Inverted-U theory (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908; Oxendine, 1970). According to the 
Drive Theory increases in 'drive' (a term used interchangeably and rather unclearly to 
describe arousal, stress, or anxiety) are related to linear increases or decreases in 
performance, depending on the individual's dominant response. It was proposed that in 
the early stages of learning the dominant responses would be the incorrect ones and 
therefore performance would be impaired with increases in drive. In contrast, at the later 
stages of leaming and mastery, the dominant responses would be the correct ones and 
therefore performance would be enhanced with increases in drive. Within the sport 
psychology literature, drive theory has usually been employed to indicate a positive 
linear relationship between arousal and performance. Drive theory eventually received 
considerable amounts of criticism. As Jones (1995) surnmarises, the major criticism 
referred to the failure of findings to provide consistent support for the hypothesis, the 
difficulty in determining a habit hierarchy of correct and incorrect responses in motor 
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skills, the inadequacy of the theory to accommodate effects of task complexity, and, 
from a cognitive perspective, the failure to consider cognitive appraisals. 
Subsequently, the inverted-U hypothesis became more popular and dominated sport 
psychologists' thinking. The theory postulated that for every type of behaviour an 
optimal level of arousal exists. In particular, it was suggested that performance 
improves with increases in arousal up to a certain level after which further increases in 
arousal result in impaired performance. The inverted-U hypothesis had intuitive appeal, 
however contemporary advances in the area resulted in serious doubts over the validity 
of the hypothesis in sport. Summarising the main criticisms, Fazey & Hardy (1988) 
stress (a) the lack of consistent evidence to support the predictions of the theory, (b) the 
failure of the theory to justify why arousal beyond the optimal levels results in impaired 
performance, (c) the unrealistic assumption of the hypothesis, as represented by the 
curve, that once individuals become overaroused and performance deteriorates, 
reductions in arousal would result in increases in performance, and (d) the 
unidimensional conceptualisation of anxiety the hypothesis adopts in relation to 
contemporary evidence indicating that anxiety is a multidimensional concept that 
includes both physiological and cognitive components. 
Multidimensional anxiety theory 
Following advances in anxiety research in other areas of psychology, sport psychology 
researchers moved, somewhat belatedly, towards a multidimensional approach of 
anxiety. In accordance with Liebert and Morris's (1967) conceptualisation, anxiety was 
described as having two components, namely cognitive and somatic. Martens, Vealey, 
and Burton (1990), based on advances in the conceptualisation of anxiety and extensive 
research, developed the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory -2 (CSAI-2), an 
instrument to evaluate state sport anxiety as a multidimensional construct. Evidence 
regarding the validity of CSAI-2 supported the distinction of anxiety into somatic and 
cognitive components which revealed moderate inter-correlations. Furthermore, factor 
analysis revealed a third component, self-confidence, which was negatively related to 
both somatic and cognitive anxiety. 
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Even though the dimension of self-confidence was not anticipated, this subscale was 
retained and established as one of the questionnaire components. However, its 
atheoretical nature has been criticised as a limitation of the instrument (Lane, Sewell, 
Terry, Bartram, & Nesti, 1999). Further discussion regarding limitations of the CSAI-2, 
especially in relation to discrepancies that were eventually identified between the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of sport anxiety, will follow the presentation of 
research lines and findings of contemporary sport anxiety research at the end of the 
section. 
Since the development of the CSAI-2 research has consistently shown moderate 
correlations between the three CSAI-2 components (e. g. Gould, Petlichkoff, & 
Weinberg, 1984; Jones, Cale, & Kerwin, 1988). More convincing evidence regarding 
the relative independence of the anxiety components emerged through examination and 
identification of different antecedents. Antecedents of cognitive anxiety are 
hypothesised to be related to athletes' expectations of success and perceptions of their 
own and their opponents' abilities, while antecedents of somatic anxiety are 
hypothesised to be non-evaluative and consist mainly of conditioned responses to 
envirom-nental stimuli (Martens et al., 1990). 
Jones, Swain, & Cale (1990) attempting to operationalise the theoretical predictions 
regarding anxiety antecedents constructed the Pre-Race Questionnaire (PRQ), an 
instrument evaluating factors thought to be related to competitive anxiety. Using a 
sample of middle distance runners, they found cognitive anxiety related to perceived 
readiness, attitudes towards previous performances, and goal difficulty, self-confidence 
related to perceived readiness and external environment, whereas no significant 
relationships emerged for somatic anxiety. However, it should be noted that the 
development of the PRQ was based on sport-specific sample (male, middle-distance 
runners). 
Using a modified version of the PRQ adapted for duathlon, Lane, Terry, & 
Karageorghis (1995a) found all anxiety components related to goal difficulty and 
perceived readiness, while self-confidence was also related to attitudes towards previous 
performances. In a subsequent study, where the PRQ was adapted 
for triathlon, Lane, 
Terry, & Karageorghis (1995b) found athletes' perceptions of race-goals difficulty 
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positively related to both cognitive and somatic anxiety and negatively related to self- 
confidence, which was also positively related to perceived readiness. In each of these 
occasions, despite similarities in the samples (all samples consisted of male athletes 
competing in endurance sports), evaluation of the factor structure of the PRQ revealed 
results different to the original validation (Jones, Swain, & Cale, 1990), which verified 
the sport-specific nature of the PRQ. 
Also using a modified version of the PRQ on a swimming sample Hanton & Jones 
(1995) found cognitive anxiety significantly related to perceived readiness and 
environment, somatic anxiety significantly related to environment and goal difficulty, 
and self-confidence related to perceived readiness. Once more, the factor structure of 
the PRQ was different, which in combination with the results revealing different 
predictors of anxiety in different sports, indicates the need for sport-specific 
measurements of anxiety antecedents, and also supports the notion that different sports 
may involve different stressors. 
Taken together the above findings indicate that research on situational antecedents of 
anxiety has not shown consistent results. However, having shown that cognitive and 
somatic anxiety share some antecedents, but also that there are factors which are unique 
to each of the anxiety components, support for the multidimensional conceptualisation 
of sport anxiety was provided. 
Further support regarding the multidimensional nature of anxiety has been provided 
from research on the temporal patterns the two anxiety components follow. In general, 
findings have been fairly consistent suggesting that cognitive anxiety remains relatively 
stable prior to competition, whereas somatic anxiety tends to increase rapidly close to 
the start of the competition (Gould et al., 1984; Jones & Cale, 1989; Parfitt & Hardy, 
1987). As it is the case with antecedents of anxiety, evidence suggests that the temporal 
patterning of anxiety components differs as a function of sport (Martens et al., 1990), 
but also depending on individual characteristics, such as skill level (Martens et al., 
1990), gender (Jones, Swain, & Cale, 199 1), and competitiveness (Swain & Jones, 
1992). However, the fact that temporal patterns of anxiety components differ between 
them further supports the multidimensional nature of sport anxiety. 
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Following this new research line regarding the conceptualisation of anxiety, an 
increasing number of studies have examined the relationship between performance and 
the different components of anxiety. Initial theoretical predictions (Martens et al., 1990) 
suggested that cognitive anxiety is negatively related to performance, while the 
relationship between somatic anxiety and performance takes the shape of an inverted-U. 
Preliminary research to investigate the hypothesised relationships has been equivocal. 
Gould et al. (1984) tested relationships between anxiety components and performance 
based on points scored in the first period of a wrestling match and match outcome over 
two games. For the first game, no significant relationships emerged. For the second 
game, a marginally significant multivariate relationship between anxiety and 
performance was revealed, with the cognitive component predicting match outcome. 
Evaluating performance in relation to previous performances in a sample of swimmers, 
Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, & Plake (1986) found cognitive anxiety to be a significant 
predictor of performance. Increases in cognitive anxiety were associated with decreases 
in performance, while somatic anxiety and self-confidence could not add to the 
prediction of performance variance. 
Relationships between multidimensional anxiety and performance were examined in 
golfers and gymnasts by McAuley (1985) and golfers by Krane & Williams (1987). In 
neither study were anxiety components significantly related to performance. Bird & 
Horn (1990) examined the relationship between cognitive anxiety and mental errors, 
which were evaluated by coaches, in a softball sample. After dividing participants into 
high and low mental errors groups they reported that the group displaying more errors 
scored significantly higher on cognitive anxiety compared to the low mental errors 
group- 
Thus, initial research has failed to support the predictions of multidimensional anxiety 
theory regarding the anxiety/performance relationship. However, examination of 
methodological issues identified several weaknesses concerning the research 
designs 
that have been used. For example Gould et al. (1984), after failing to find support 
for 
the hypothesised relationships using absolute levels of state anxiety, suggested that 
intraindividual. analyses considering relative levels of anxiety, a technique initially used 
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by Sonstroem & Bernardo (1982), should be more appropriate in order to examine 
relationships between anxiety and performance. Performance measurement has been 
another point of criticism regarding early research designs. Measures such as 
competition outcome (win/loss), or other measures involving comparisons between 
participants have been inadequate in controlling for skill levels, and therefore less 
accurate than intraindividual measures (Burton, 1988; Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, & 
Vevera, 1987). Finally, as Jones (1995) indicates the lack of analysis in investigating 
non-linear relationships has been another methodological shortcoming. 
Subsequently, further research on the anxiety/performance relationship attempting to 
account for the detected problems was conducted. Burton (1988) used Sonstroem & 
Bernardo's (1982) intraindividual assessment of anxiety and performance together with 
polynomial trend analysis, which can identify curvilinear in addition to linear effects, on 
a sample of swimmers. Their analysis revealed a linear negative relationship between 
cognitive anxiety and performance, an inverted-U shaped relationship between somatic 
anxiety and performance and a linear positive relationship between self-confidence and 
performance, thus providing support for the multidimensional anxiety theory 
predictions. 
However, research employing similar research designs has not confirmed the expected 
relationships. Gould et al. (1987) used the same design on a sample of pistol shooters. 
In accordance with the predictions of multidimensional anxiety theory, they found an 
inverted-U relationship between somatic anxiety and perfon-nance, but no effect was 
found for cognitive anxiety. Furthermore, an uninterpretable negative effect between 
self-confidence and performance was revealed. The fact that in this particular study 
somatic anxiety accounted for more performance variance than cognitive anxiety was 
attributed to the nature of the sport. Caruso, Dzewaltowski, Gill, & McElroy (1990) 
using also an intraindividual assessment of performance on students competing on a 
bicycle event found no significant relationships between components of anxiety and 
performance. 
Despite advances in anxiety and performance assessment findings on the relationship 
under investigation remained equivocal. Based on this inconsistency and further 
suggestions by Gould et A (1987) that there is a need to examine the way components 
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of anxiety affect performance on tasks varying in neuromuscular and attentional 
characteristics, Parfitt, Jones, & Hardy (1990) suggested that performance measures 
tended to be rather global in nature and therefore insufficiently sensitive to detect 
anxiety effects. In accordance with this proposition research should focus on the effects 
of anxiety on subcomponents of performance. 
Following the above suggestions, Ussher & Hardy (1986) attempted to investigate 
whether the cognitive and somatic components of anxiety have differential effects on 
cognitive and motor processes involved in rowing. Results revealed that increases in 
somatic anxiety were associated with impaired hand grip strength, while increases in 
cognitive anxiety were not related to any of the performance subcomponents. Parfitt & 
Hardy (1987), using a similar approach on a variety of cognitive and motor skills, 
reported that cognitive anxiety was related to positive effects, while somatic anxiety 
was associated with both positive effects on a sargent jump (motor) task and negative 
effects on a short-term memory (cognitive) task. 
Jones et al. (1988) tested a sample of cricketers one day, one hour and immediately 
prior to participation on a simple reaction task and on a discrimination reaction task 
which were regarded as relevant to the participants. In all testings anxiety was also 
assessed. Cognitive anxiety remained relatively stable across the three time periods, 
whereas somatic anxiety was higher immediately before competition than it was for the 
other two measures. Although reaction times for the two tasks did not differ 
significantly between the three measures, in the last testing, when somatic anxiety was 
increased, participants made significantly more errors on the discrimination reaction 
task. 
Following a similar paradigm, Jones & Cale (1989) examined the relationship between 
anxiety components and cognitive (digit span) and motor (perceptuo-motor speed) tasks 
during a period leading up to an important hockey competition. Increases in somatic 
anxiety 20 minutes before the event were accompanied by improved motor task 
performance. Furthermore, somatic anxiety was a better predictor of performance 
for 
both tasks. Parfitt & Hardy (1993) tested a sample of basketball players on a short 
memory task (letter span) and a low memory, motoric- sustained 
information task 
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(rebound shooting) I hour before competition. Cognitive and somatic anxiety negatively 
related to the letter span task, but positively related to rebound shooting. 
Although this latest approach may be critisised for not examining in vivo performance, 
it allowed a more sensitive investigation of the relationship between anxiety and 
performance. In particular, three important issues emerged from this line of research. 
First, somatic anxiety, which was originally thought to have a weaker relationship to 
performance than cognitive anxiety, appears to play an important role in influencing 
performance at least in the case of motor tasks; second, cognitive and somatic anxiety 
might have mode-specific effects on cognitive and motor subsystems; third, anxiety is 
not always detrimental to performance. 
Catastrophe theory 
One of the latest approaches concerning the anxiety/performance relationship is the one 
involving catastrophe models (Fazey & Hardy, 1988). The results of the previously 
presented studies indicated mixed positive and negative effects associated with elevated 
somatic anxiety and physiological arousal. Based on such findings and having identified 
certain limitations regarding multidimensional anxiety theory and research, Hardy and 
his associates (Fazey & Hardy, 1988; Hardy, 1990; Hardy & Parfitt, 1991) in an attempt 
to clarify the relationships between cognitive anxiety, physiological arousal and 
performance adapted, based on models developed and applied in behavioural and 
natural science (Zeeman, 1976; Thom, 1975), a three dimensional catastrophe model of 
anxiety and performance. 
A serious weakness in the way researchers operationalise multidimensional anxiety is 
that the effects of the different components of anxiety have been examined in isolation 
(Hardy, 1996a). Therefore, it is unjustifiably assumed that the effects of cognitive and 
somatic anxiety upon performance are additive rather than interactive. What is wrong, 
according to Hardy (1996a), is that researchers try to explain a three-dimensional 
relationship (cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, performance) in terms of a series of 
two-dimensional relationships. Instead, he proposes that research should consider the 
interactive effects of cognitive and somatic anxiety. 
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The basic characteristics of a catastrophe model in sports and how it is different from 
multidimensional anxiety theory were outlined by (Hardy, 1996b). The catastrophe 
model proposes that when cognitive anxiety is low, changes in physiological arousal 
lead to small and continuous changes in performance. When cognitive anxiety is high, 
changes in physiological arousal result in small and continuous changes in performance 
when physiological arousal is low or high, but in large and discontinuous changes in 
performance when physiological arousal is at intermediate levels. 
An important distinction between the multidimensional anxiety theory and the 
catastrophe model is that the latter uses physiological arousal rather than somatic 
anxiety in order to explain effects on performance. Although research has shown that 
physiological arousal and somatic anxiety follow similar temporal patterns, Parfitt et al. 
(1990) and Hardy (1996b) argues in favour of the former suggesting that arousal can 
affect performance by two means, that is directly by altering the availability of cognitive 
and physiological resources to performers, or alternatively via performers' positive or 
negative interpretation of physiological symptoms. In contrast, somatic anxiety has been 
hypothesised to affect performance when the intensity of the somatic response is such 
that individuals become preoccupied with their physiological symptoms. Another 
fundamental difference from multidimensional anxiety theory is that according to the 
catastrophe model, the effects of cognitive anxiety on performance can be either 
positive or negative, thus encompassing existing evidence reporting positive 
relationships between cognitive anxiety and performance (Hardy & Parfitt, 199 1; 
Hardy, Parfitt, & Pates, 1994). 
One of the major points of the model involves the hysteresis hypothesis. According to 
Hardy (1996b, p. 72) "under conditions of high cognitive anxiety, hysteresis, will occur; 
that is to say, the point at which performance suddenly drops from the upper 
performance level to the lower performance surface when physiological arousal is 
increasing, is different from the point at which performance suddenly jumps from the 
lower performance surface to the upper performance surface when physiological arousal 
is decreasing. Under conditions of low cognitive anxiety hysteresis will not occur; 
changes in performance will be smooth and follow the same path, whether physiological 
arousal is increasing or decreasing. " 
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Applying catastrophe theory in sports using a three-dimensional model Hardy (I 996b) 
summarised some of the currently testable predictions of the catastrophe theory as 
follows: (a) when cognitive anxiety is high, performance improves with increases in 
physiological arousal up to a critical threshold, after which further increases in arousal 
result in a fatal drop in performance (the point at which performance will jump back to 
the higher surface when physiological arousal is decreasing is different than the point 
when the fatal drop occurs); (b) when cognitive anxiety is low, changes in performance 
will be smooth and follow a similar path, whether physiological arousal is increasing or 
decreasing; (c) when physiological arousal is high, increases in cognitive anxiety should 
result in impaired performance; (d) when physiological arousal is low, increases in 
cognitive anxiety should result in improved performance. 
The interactive effects of anxiety intensity on performance were examined by Edwards 
& Hardy (1996) on a sample of netball players. Their results provided support for the 
catastrophe model of performance. In particular, when physiological arousal was high 
participants with lower cognitive anxiety performed better than those with higher 
cognitive anxiety. In addition, under low Physiological arousal, players with high 
cognitive anxiety performed better than those with low cognitive anxiety. Thus, in 
accordance with the catastrophe model it was indicated that cognitive anxiety can have 
either positive or negative effects on performance depending on levels of physiological 
arousal. 
The hysteresis hypothesis has been tested by Hardy and colleagues on two occasions. 
Hardy & Parfitt (199 1) tested the hypothesis on a sample of basketball players who 
were asked to perform a shooting task, whereas Hardy et al. (1994) tested the 
hypothesis on a sample of bowlers who were asked to perform a bowling task. On both 
occasions, participants were tested under conditions of high and low cognitive anxiety, 
while in each of these conditions physiological arousal was manipulated by means of 
physical work, so that participants were tested with physiological arousal increasing and 
decreasing. Examination of the hypothesis that the performance by heart rate interaction 
graph would follow a different path for heart rate increasing compared to heart rate 
decreasing, was supported in the high but not in the low cognitive anxiety condition. 
The analysis supported the predictions indicating that the interaction was due to 
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hysteresis occurring in the high cognitive anxiety condition but not in the low cognitive 
anxiety condition. 
The catastrophe model, even though still in its infancy, seems to account for some of the 
previous inconsistent findings, and preliminary research seems promising, despite the 
fact that the model has been criticised as overcomplicated and difficult to be tested 
(Gill, 1994). However, considering the need for explicitly understanding the nature of a 
phenomenon as complex as anxiety, it seems justifiable that complex models have to be 
encountered. As Jones (1995) concludes, unraveling the precise details of the 
catastrophe model approach presents a major challenge in contemporary sport 
psychology. 
Direction of anxiety 
Findings from research investigating the effects of anxiety on subcomponents of 
performance, but also evidence emerging from examination of the catastrophe model 
indicating that anxiety effects are not always detrimental to performance, provided the 
impetus for researchers (e. g. Jones, 1991) to question the adequacy of anxiety 
measurements, and to point out that dimensions other than anxiety intensity should be 
considered in order to better understand and evaluate anxiety responses. 
Based on research evidence indicating that cognitive and/or somatic anxiety might be 
either positively or negatively associated with performance or components of 
performance, Parfitt et al. (1990) introduced the notion of direction of anxiety. In 
particular, they suggested that intensity of anxiety symptoms can be perceived by 
performers as either helpful or detrimental to performance. Thus, different performers 
experiencing symptoms similar in intensity may interpret these symptoms differently on 
a debilitative-facilitative continuum. Moreover, it might be also possible that an 
individual interprets similar anxiety symptoms in different ways depending on 
situational factors. Considering such an approach, Parfitt et al. (1990) suggested that 
investigating intensity of anxiety alone probably offers a limited view of the anxiety 
picture. Consequently, they speculated that the direction of anxiety might prove a 
better 
predictor of performance and contribute to the understanding of the 
anxiety/performance relationship. Since the above propositions are relatively new, 
few 
investigations have examined the role and usefulness of the direction of anxiety. 
Review of literature 32 
In an initial attempt to provide support for the importance of anxiety direction, Jones, 
Hanton, & Swain (1994) and Jones & Swain (1995) examined differences in anxiety 
intensity and direction between elite and non-elite swimmers and cricketers 
respectively. In both studies the results revealed that the elite and non-elite athletes did 
not differ in intensity of cognitive and somatic anxiety, whereas significant differences 
were found in the way participants interpreted the anxiety symptoms. In particular, in 
both studies elite athletes reported their anxiety states as being more facilitative to 
performance than non-elite athletes. 
Relationships between intensity and direction dimensions of anxiety and performance 
were examined by Jones, Swain, & Hardy (1993) in a sample of gymnasts competing on 
the beam. Results reveaied that the higher performance group interpreted their anxiety 
symptoms as being more facilitative and less debilitative than the lower performance 
group. Analysis conducted to examine whether intensity and direction of anxiety could 
predict performance revealed no significant results, however the correlation between 
cognitive anxiety direction and performance was higher than the correlation between 
cognitive anxiety intensity and performance. In a similar fashion, the correlation 
between somatic anxiety direction and performance was higher than the correlation 
between somatic anxiety intensity and performance. 
Accounting for criticism that between- subjects comparisons have received, Swain & 
Jones (1996) applied an intraindividual design to assess the relative contribution of 
intensity and direction of anxiety in predicting performance variance. They found that 
the relationship between cognitive anxiety intensity and performance was best predicted 
from an inverted-U relationship which accounted for 18.4% of performance variance. A 
positive relationship between cognitive anxiety direction and performance which 
accounted for 23.4% of performance variance was also identified. Somatic anxiety 
intensity and direction were positively related to performance but while intensity 
accounted for only 2% of the variance, direction explained 17%. 
However, in contrast, Edwards & Hardy (1996), also using an intraindividual design 
with netball players, found performance more strongly related to anxiety intensity than 
anxiety direction. In addition, contrary to expectations, anxiety direction scores were 
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negatively related to performance. Thus, despite its initial appeal, the notion of anxiety 
direction has produced equivocal results. 
Moreover, the assessment of anxiety direction has received critisism since the modified 
version of CSAI-2 (Jones & Swain, 1992) used for that purpose has not been validated. 
Further research is required to examine whether direction of anxiety is a better predictor 
of performance, however, this particular approach brought to the fore questions 
regarding the operationalisation and measurement of anxiety. 
Critique of anxiety measurement in sport 
Objecting to the latest advances regarding anxiety conceptualisation, i. e. the anxiety 
direction dimension, Burton & Naylor (1997) and Burton (1998) questioned whether 
anxiety can really be facilitative. Burton focuses his reaction on the way anxiety is 
being measured within the last decade by means of the CSAI-2. In particular, he argues 
that many of the symptoms listed in the anxiety scale (especially in the cognitive 
anxiety subscale) are worded neutrally, a strategy originally employed by the 
constructors of the questionnaire (Martens et al., 1990) in order to avoid social 
desirability effects when completing the questionnaire. Consequently, some of the 
described symptoms are not necessarily characteristics of anxiety but may also be 
representative of other more positive affective states such as excitement and challenge. 
Thus, if athletes indicate experiencing such symptoms intensively, the result would be 
high anxiety scores even though responses might actually reflect positive emotional 
states athletes experience which can facilitate performance. 
Considering evidence that anxiety can be perceived by athletes as facilitative, Burton's 
(1998) question whether anxiety can really be facilitative, is actually questioning 
whether researchers really measure anxiety or simply mislabel other positive affective 
states such as excitement. In relation to Burton's propositions, Swain & Harwood 
(1996) found that intensity of cognitive and somatic anxiety was more closely related to 
negative affect, whereas direction of anxiety symptoms were more strongly associated 
with positive affect, thus further supporting the hypothesis that current sport anxiety 
measurement needs reconsidering. 
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Finally, latest evidence regarding the construct validity of CSAI-2 support the limited 
efficiency of the instrument. Lane et al. (1999), assessing CSAI-2 through Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis, a more powerful method to examine construct validity (compared to 
exploratory factor analysis), and based on sample sizes considerably larger than those 
used in the original validation of the questionnaire, revealed several weaknesses. Lane 
et al. (1999) firstly expressed methodological concerns regarding the initial validation 
of the instrument. They pointed out that (a) the samples that were used were rather small 
when considering the length of the questionnaire versions that were tested, (b) that 
several data sets were factor analysed more than once, a technique accused of being data 
driven, instead of using different samples for each analysis, and (c) that for some of the 
data sets the collection of anxiety scores were based on hypothetical rather than on 
actual competitions. 
Subsequently, confirmatory factor analysis failed to provide strong support for the 
hypothesised factor structure of the CSAI-2, thus bringing in to question the validity of 
the three factor model proposed by Martens et al. (1990). Lane et al. (1999) focused 
their criticism on the fact that in the cognitive anxiety scale the item 'I have self doubts' 
which theoretically represents the construct of anxiety stronger than the rest of the items 
in the scale (which refer to feeling concerned) had the lowest loading on the factor. This 
seems to suggest that the scale actually assess a construct slightly different from the one 
it is supposed to assess (cognitive anxiety). They argue that athletes who are about to 
compete are likely to report feeling concerned about performance, even though they 
might remain confident in their beliefs to meet their goals. Thus, being concerned does 
not necessarily mean that individuals experience negative thoughts (a typical anxiety 
symptom), but maybe acknowledge the likely importance and difficulty of the 
competition. Therefore, they suggest that Martens et al. (1990) by replacing the word 
'worry' (used in the initial versions of the scale) with 'concern' in their attempt to 
reduce social desirability bias may have hampered the conceptual integrity of the 
cognitive anxiety construct. Finally, Lane et al. (1999) expressed concerns regarding the 
structure of the self-confidence subscale suggesting that four of the items included in 
the scale (e. g. 'I feel comfortable', 'I feel at ease') seem to assess what could better be 
described as a sense of calmness. 
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Therefore, Burton's concerns regarding the operationalisation of anxiety seem to be 
justified. Just as anxiety theorists discriminate between cognitive and somatic anxiety 
because the two components have different antecedents and temporal patterning, it 
seems ("conceptually explicit" to also differentiate negative, debilitative symptoms from 
positive affective states that might facilitate performance. Stemming from the above 
arguments, it becomes apparent that it would be more appropriate to deal with intensity 
and direction of anxiety separately. If these measures represent separate affective states, 
then the two dimensions of anxiety need to be combined in one instrument that can 
accurately describe the nature of the emotion as well as the intensity at which it is felt. 
Integrating Cognitive Interference and Sport Anxiety 
As it becomes apparent from the above critique of sport anxiety literature, a vast amount 
of research has been dedicated to the identification of the anxiety/performance 
relationship which, however, is far from conclusive. In addition to the methodological 
considerations presented, there are at least two characteristics for which anxiety 
research in sports could be criticised. 
The first characteristic is that research has focused solely on pre-competition anxiety. 
Even though researchers have tried to assess anxiety as close to the competition as 
possible, it is reasonable to assume that psychological and physiological states of 
athletes change, some times dramatically, once a competition is under way. Jones 
(1995) states that it seems over-optimistic to expect that performance can be predicted 
satisfactorily by measures acquired as much as 30 minutes before the start of a 
competition. Hardy & Jones (1994, pp. 70-71) identified this problem and attributed the 
lack of such research to methodological limitations. "Due to the obvious practical 
constraints on testing performers during performance, there is a dearth of knowledge 
concerning during-performance psychological states. The vast majority of research 
work has examined pre-competition anxiety, and this has tended to predict only a 
relatively small amount of performance variance. Consequently, there is a need to 
develop the means whereby athletes' psychological states can be examined during 
actual performance. " 
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The second is that research has focused on what is the relationship and has almost 
totally ignored asking how the hypothesised relationships are formed, that is the 
mechanisms through which anxiety influences performance. It is only during the last 
decade that some researchers have tried to explain results concerning the 
anxiety/performance relationship based on theoretical grounds developed in educational 
psychology. Some of these studies (also cited in previous sections of the review) will 
now be revisited. 
Jones et al. (1993) found cognitive anxiety intensity unrelated to performance and 
reported that successful performers perceived their cognitive anxiety symptoms as more 
facilitative than non-successful performers. Furthermore, no significant relationship 
emerged between cognitive anxiety intensity and direction. They went on to explain 
these results based on Eysenck & Calvo's (1992) propositions that cognitive anxiety can 
be helpful to performance. They suggested that this type of positive effect may be a 
result of additional effort applied to the task which serves a compensatory role for the 
decreases in processing efficiency due to the allocation of additional attentional 
resources. According to Eysenck, anxiety reduces working memory capacity due to 
worry thus impairing processing efficiency. However, such deficits can be countered by 
increases in effort. Thus, performance levels can be maintained or even enhanced under 
conditions of high anxiety at the expense of utilising extra resources. 
Similar reasoning was presented by Parfitt & Hardy (1993) who found cognitive anxiety 
positively related to rebound shooting before a basketball competition. In this study it 
was also found that cognitive anxiety was negatively related to a letter span task. This 
finding, in combination with the previous one also seems to fit well with Eysenck's 
propositions. In particular, performance on the short memory task (letter span) was 
hindered by elevated cognitive anxiety, but enhanced on the low memory motor task. 
According to Eysenck, anxiety may result in the allocation of additional effort. If it is 
assumed that physical effort is more controllable and thus effective, it could be 
justifiable to argue that in the case of the low memory motor task physical effort might 
have stronger positive effects than mental effort in the short term memory-cognitive 
task. 
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Testing the catastrophe model, Hardy et al. (1994) and Edwards & Hardy (1996) found 
that high levels of cognitive anxiety were associated with improved performance when 
physiological arousal was low, but with impaired performance when physiological 
arousal was high. Combining Eysenck's processing efficiency hypothesis and Carver 
and Scheier's control model they suggested that under high cognitive anxiety and low 
arousal, performance was maintained due to the compensatory mechanism of effort. In 
contrast, as arousal increased and expectancies over goal attainment decreased, the 
demands of the task (increasing cognitive anxiety) possibly began to outweigh the 
effects of effort and subsequently performance was hampered. Furthermore, Edwards & 
Hardy (1996) found self-confidence related to a more facilitative interpretation of 
anxiety intensity symptoms. They suggested that this finding is in line with Carver and 
Scheier's proposition that expectancies of goal attainment, and therefore confidence, 
facilitates performance due to renewed efforts resulting from beliefs that the goals can 
be attained. Similar reasoning has been provided by Hardy (1996a) and Swain & Jones 
(1996) in attempts to explain findings suggesting that anxiety might facilitate 
performance. 
As it becomes apparent, Sarason's (1984) and Wine's (1971) cognitive interference 
interpretation, Eysenck's (1992) processing efficiency hypothesis and Carver & 
Scheier's (1988) control process model of anxiety have been cited in paper discussions 
in order to explain findings, however, to date, no attempts have been made to test these 
hypotheses. Although results of research in sport anxiety seem in line with the view that 
cognitive interference approaches act as exploratory mechanisms, it would be useful and 
important to assess as directly and accurately as possible the role of interfering thoughts 
athletes experience while performing. This particular question has been largely 
neglected within sport psychology. As Swain & Jones (1996) state, a great deal can be 
learned from advances in the test anxiety literature. Guided from the literature just 
reviewed the research questions of the investigation have been formulated. 
Key Research Questions 
The purpose of the present investigation was to explore the role of cognitive 
interference in sport. Stemming from research lines in educational psychology where 
cognitive interference was introduced as a result of test anxiety (Sarason, 1984; 1988; 
Review of literature 38 
Wine, 197 1), but also considering the identified need to extend sport anxiety research to 
anxiety symptoms during competition (Hanin, 1998), the first issue to be examined was 
the relationship between precompetition anxiety and cognitive interference athletes 
experience during sport performance. Furthermore, regarding Carver and Scheier's 
(1984,1988) control process model of anxiety, cognitive interference was also 
examined as a function of discrepancies between expected and actual behaviour. 
Accounting for calls in sport psychology to explore possible mechanisms through which 
anxiety affects performance (Hardy & Jones, 1994), and based again on findings (e. g. 
Naveh-Benjamin, 199 1; Naveh-Benjamin et al. 1987) and theories (Eysenck & Calvo 
1992; Sarason et al. 1990) in educational psychology manifesting the importance of 
thought content in determining cognitive performance, the next issue to be examined 
involved the relationship between cognitive interference and performance. 
More specific hypotheses emerged as the investigation progressed and those will be 
presented in the individual studies. However, in order to test the research hypotheses, an 
instrument to assess cognitive interference was required. Considering the relative 
absence of research regarding cognitive interference in sport, it is not surprising that 
such an instrument was not available. Therefore, the initial study deals with the 
development of a sport-specific instrument to assess cognitive interference. 
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Chapter 3. Questionnaire Development 
Study 1: Assessing cognitive interference in sport: The development of the Thought 
Occurrence Questionnaire for Sport 
Within the broader sphere of cognitive psychology assessing cognitions has been a 
critical issue for the development of cognitive-behavioural theories and interventions. 
The process of cognitive assessment is not at all simple and as Klinger (1978) identifies 
cannot be error-free due to the covert and inaccessible nature of individuals' thoughts. 
However, in order to progress in any kind of cognitive, behavioural or clinical analysis 
assessment will always be the starting point. Throughout the years, several 
methodologies and techniques have been developed and used to assess thought content 
in different settings (Kendall & Korgeski, 1979). However, considering the focus of the 
current project, techniques regarding thought content during task performance is the 
major focus. 
One way used to assess thought content while performing on experimental tasks has 
been the 'think aloud' procedure, where participants, after receiving relevant and 
adequate training, are required to verbally express all the thoughts that come to their 
mind during performing on the experimental task. Another 'in vivo' (Kendall & 
Korgeski, 1979) technique has been the use of a beeper. For this kind of assessment, 
trained subjects are asked to record their thoughts along with information such as 
duration, vividness, or controllability regarding these thoughts on the sound of a beeper 
that goes off during experimental tasks. Retrospective reports after the conclusion of a 
task has also been a method to assess cognitive activation while performing at a task 
where participants are asked to report their thoughts either verbally or on paper. Finally, 
another retrospective method to assess thought content involves the use of 
questionnaires after the completion of the task, where participants are required to 
indicate occurrence of certain thoughts that are listed on scales. 
Although in vivo techniques can be said to be more accurate since they rely on 'live' 
transmission of thought content and are not dependent on memory, their use requires 
extended training. Furthermore, due to the nature of the assessment such techniques can 
only be used in experimental tasks. Due to the increased need for more convenient 
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methods to assess cognitive activity during task performance, and the desire to test 
hypotheses in field settings rather than in experiments, the use of questionnaires has 
been the most widely used method. Considering the nature of sport, the desire to study 
thought content in real competitive situations without interfering with performance and 
the need for quantitative data sets, the use of questionnaires was considered the most 
appropriate method for the purposes of this project. 
In educational settings, Sarason and his colleagues developed instruments to assess 
cognitive interference (Cognitive Interference Questionnaire, Thought Occurrence 
Questionnaire; Sarason et al., 1986). The instruments have received adequate 
psychometric support and have been used extensively to assess thought content in both 
experimental tasks and classroom environment, such as examinations. 
Because of the relatively scant attention that has been directed towards cognitive 
interference in sport, instruments to measure cognitive interference within the physical 
domain are not available. In sport, measures that have been developed to assess mental 
skills and coping behaviour include scales to evaluate the ability of athletes to 
concentrate. However, they mostly are measures of general abilities and are not focused 
on the content and nature of the specific thoughts that might go through athletes' minds. 
Such measures are the 'concentration' scale in the Psychological Skills Inventory for 
Sports (Mahoney, Gabriel, & Perkins, 1987; example items: "I often have trouble 
concentrating during my performance", "When I make a mistake, I have trouble 
forgetting it and concentrating on my ongoing performance"), the 'concentration' and 
the 'freedom from worry' scales in the Athletic Copying Skills Inventory (Smith, 
Schutz, Smoll, & Ptacek, 1995; example items for the 'concentration' subscale: "When 
I am playing sports, I can focus my attention and block out distractions", "It is easy for 
me to keep distracting thoughts from interfering with something I am watching or 
listening to"; example items for 'freedom from worry' subscale: "While competing, I 
worry about making mistakes or failing to come through", "I put a lot of pressure on 
myself by worrying how I will perform"), the 'concentration disruption' scale in the 
Sport Anxiety Scale (Smith, Smoll, & Schutz, 1990; example items: "During 
competition, I find myself thinking about unrelated things", "My mind wonders 
during 
sport competition"), and the 'negative thinking' scale in the Test of Performance 
Strategies (Thomas, Murphy, & Hardy, 1999; example items: "During competition I 
Questionnaire development 41 
have thoughts of failure", "I imagine screwing up during competition"). Considering 
evidence in educational psychology suggesting that cognitive interference is a key issue 
of performance, and the lack of sport-specific instruments, the development of a 
questionnaire to assess cognitive interference in sports seems important and might prove 
useful in enhancing our understanding of how cognitive activity during sport is related 
to performance. The present investigation is an attempt to develop such an instrument. 
Given the more extensive research into cognitive interference in educational settings, 
the use of the Thought Occurrence Questionnaire (TOQ; Sarason et al., 1986) modified 
or not, seemed warranted in sport from an exploratory viewpoint. Hatzigeorgiadis & 
Biddle (in press) assessed the validity of the TOQ in sport by means of confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA). The TOQ (Appendix A) is a questionnaire including three 
subscales, namely 'task-related worries' (TOQ-W; example items: "While performing I 
think about what someone will think of me", "... how difficult what I am doing is"), 
'task- irrelevant thoughts' (TOQ-1; example items: "... members of my family", "... 
personal worries"), and 'thoughts of escape' (TOQ-E; example items: "... quitting", 
how I cannot stand it any more"). The analysis revealed questionable validity 
indicating, in particular, that the construct of 'task-related worries' was poorly defined. 
For this subscale the analysis revealed that most of the items (seven out of nine) had 
low loadings and relatively high errors, which in addition were correlated to each other, 
indicating that these items measure something else or something in addition to the 
construct they are supposed to measure (Joreskog, 1993). Results regarding the TOQ-1 
subscale were better, however not satisfactory, indicating that some items (four out of 
seven) had their error variance correlated. Finally, regarding the TOQ-E subscale the 
analysis revealed quite satisfactory structure, indicating that only one item was 
problematic. Therefore, modifications seemed appropriate in order to make the 
instrument applicable to sport situations. This led to the belief that a more thorough 
investigation of the measurement of cognitive interference in sport was warranted. The 
current investigation, therefore, involved four stages. In the first stage, interviews with 
athletes were conducted. In the second, the face validity of the items that emerged 
through the interviews was assessed by individuals from the sport psychology field 
using a content analytic method. Third, the factor structure of the instrument was tested 
by means of exploratory factor analysis and, finally, in the fourth stage, the results of 
Questionnaire development 42 
the exploratory factor analysis were re-tested through CFA, while at the same time 
discriminant and concurrent validity were assessed. 
Stage 1: Interviews 
The purpose of the interviews was to identify inappropriate items and wording of the 
TOQ, and to explore how the questionnaire could be modified to be more appropriate 
for sport. 
Method 
The sample consisted of seven athletes (five males and two females) who represented 
different sports and levels of competition. The mean age of the interviewees was 27.4 
years. Five of them were individual sport athletes, while two were team sport athletes. 
Three athletes were competing at international level, two at national level, one at county 
level and one at club level. 
The interviews were semi-structured, that is they were based on some specific 
questions, in particular regarding thought content during competition, however, athletes 
were allowed to talk about matters they perceived as important regarding the interests of 
the discussion. The duration of the interviews was between 60 and 90 minutes. Initial 
discussion was centered around the nature of each athlete's sport, and his/her 
involvement with it. Subsequently, athletes were asked to evaluate the extent to which 
concentration in their sport is important and why. To follow that discussion, athletes 
were asked to recall cognitive activation during their most recent competition, and also 
their most intense in terms of cognitive interference experiences in their competitive 
sport career. This procedure involved retrospective recall based on meta-cognitions. 
Finally, a detailed report on the TOQ was conducted where athletes were asked to 
assess each item of the TOQ and comment on its applicability in their sport. Interviews 
were recorded and subsequently transcribed. 
Results 
All the thoughts athletes quoted having during competitive sport performances were 
extracted from the transcripts and listed. Although athletes were asked to focus on 
reporting thoughts not related to the task they were performing, during the recall 
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process some of the athletes described in full details their thought content during 
competitions. As a result, a number of task related thoughts were also evident in the 
thought-list. Subsequently, thoughts were divided into task-related, that is thoughts 
related to the execution of the task, such as strategy related thoughts (e. g. "get behind 
that ball", or "avoid that part of the track"), and task-unrelated, that is thoughts that 
were not related to the execution of the task in a constructive way. Since the interest of 
the investigation was focused on the latter, all the thoughts identified not to be related to 
the task were listed separately. 
Content examination of the latest thought-list revealed that the patterns of thoughts were 
similar to those identified by Sarason et al. (1986). In particular, athletes admitted 
having thoughts that could be described as 'Performance/competition worries', thoughts 
not related to the performance or the competition, and finally thoughts of withdrawing 
from a competition. Concerning the content of the thoughts, those listed in the 'task- 
irrelevant thoughts' and 'thoughts of escape' categories were quite similar compared to 
those in the TOQ, while thoughts concerning 'worries' were different in the sense that 
they were more competition oriented. 
All thoughts that could be described as interfering with task execution, that is not task 
processing, not related to elements of execution, techniques or tactics, were further 
examined. Concerning perfon-nance worries, some statements were more specific than 
others to the character of the specific sport, while others were more general. However, 
they all were of a similar nature mostly self-evaluative, related to performance or 
outcome. S ituation- irrelevant thoughts and thoughts of withdrawing from the task were 
very similar across individuals and sports. Subsequently, items that would be considered 
to be included in the modified questionnaire were selected. The statements that were 
more frequently cited were all chosen to be processed further. These statements were 
the ones that were applicable across sports (for example, "I am performing poorly", I 
am not going to achieve my goal"). From the statements that were more sport specific, 
and therefore less frequently reported, some were reworded to become applicable for 
most sport situations, however in a way that did not alter the meaning (for example 
statements like "the water is too rough" or "this hill is very steep" were changed to "the 
conditions are not good"). Statements that were very specific to situations were not 
further examined (for example "I am in pain"). The reason for dropping such items 
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despite their likely importance in certain sports and situations, was that the purpose of 
the questionnaire construction was to develop an instrument that could have broad 
applicability. Inclusion of such items would improve content validity, but would also 
hamper the construct validity and reliability of the instrument, when applied in a mixed- 
sport sample, since such thoughts would be relevant in a limited range of sports. From 
the transcription of the interviews a pool of items was selected that would be further 
tested in the subsequent stages of validation. 
In the latest part of the interviews athletes were asked to comment on the applicability 
of the TOQ in sport and discuss possible shortcomings they could identify. With respect 
to the first subscale of the TOQ, (TOQ-W), the interviews revealed that individuals had 
different perceptions on whether the items (thoughts) were negative, positive or neutral 
in nature. Thus, some items were described as either positive or negative thoughts from 
different individuals (e. g. "I think about how I should be more careful", "I think about 
how difficult what I am doing is", "I think about the purpose of what I am doing"), 
while others were described as positive, negative or neutral by the same individual. This 
depended on the perception of the individual during the competition and the quality of 
the individual's performance (e. g. "I think about what someone will think of me", 41 
think about my level of ability", "I think about how I would feel if I were told how I 
performed"). Finally, some of the interviewees found certain items to be unclear in what 
they were asking, or 'not to make sense' (e. g. "I think about how often I feel 
confused"). Overall, it can be concluded that different interpretations are possible for 
most of the subscale items, depending on the individual's mood and perceptions at the 
time of the competition. 
Discussion concerning the second subscale, (TOQ-1), revealed one reason for which 
some of the items were problematic. In general, it seemed that athletes discriminated 
between the items according to how 'close' or 'distant' these thoughts were in relation to 
the time of the competition (in terms of environment and time). Thus, athletes reported 
their irrelevant thoughts to be related to situations and persons that could be more easily 
recalled. Therefore, items such as "I think about members of my family", "... 
friends", 
it... other activities", or "... something that happened earlier in the day", were more 
likely to appear in individuals' minds in relation to items such as "... something that 
happened in the distant past", or "something that might happen in the future". In 
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addition, confusion emerged for some of the items (e. g. "I think about something that 
makes me feel angry", "I think about something that makes me feel tense"). Individuals 
reported that thoughts that generate feelings of anger or tension do appear, but they are 
not irrelevant to the event itself 
For the last subscale (TOQ-E), the interviews revealed a satisfactory structure. In 
particular, with the exception of one item ("I think about how hard what I am doing is"), 
all the rest were identified as negative and debilitating thoughts. The item that appeared 
to differ was generally characterised as not so negative (in intensity), while two athletes 
reported that it can also be perceived as positive in the sense that such a thought might 
make you feel stronger or proud for being able to perform such a 'hard' task. Thus, it 
seemed that this particuiar thought was characterised as more similar to the ones in the 
'task relevant worries' subscale and, moreover, as one that sometimes might be 
perceived differently by individuals. 
After the conclusion of the interviews, possible sources of the problems were identified. 
For the first subscale substantial changes seemed to be required, while for the second 
and third subscales minor modifications seemed appropriate. For an initial preliminary 
analysis, therefore, some of the original items were retained, some were modified, while 
items which emerged from the interviews were added. In particular, for the 'task-related 
worries' subscale one item was retained, three were modified, and 16 were added. For 
the 'task- irrelevant thoughts subscale, four items from the original subscale were 
retained, one was modified, while one was added. Finally, for the 'thoughts of escape' 
subscale three items were retained, two items were slightly reworded to become more 
sport specific, while seven items that emerged from the interview were added. The 
overall list included 38 items (20 representing task-related worries, 6 representing task- 
irrelevant thoughts, and 12 representing thoughts of escape). These items were included 
in the next stage of the investigation which involved a content analytic assessment. 
Stage 2: Assessment of face validity through content analysis 
The 38 items that were selected through the interviews were tested for face validity 
through a structured content analytic method (Weber, 1990). Face validity refers to the 
degree to which scales appear to measure what they claim to measure (Kline, 1993). For 
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that purpose, items were listed in an instrument (Appendix B) and distributed to fifteen 
individuals from the field of sport psychology, including established academics, 
research students and Masters' degree students from the field of sport psychology. 
Individuals were asked to classify the items into three given categories of 'performance 
worries', 'situation- irrelevant thoughts' and 'thoughts of escape' for which definitions 
were provided. The categories were selected in accordance to the original TOQ, but also 
in relation to the interviews analysis regarding the nature of the interfering thoughts. A 
fourth category was labeled 'none' which would indicate whether items were not 
adequately described by any of the factors. The participants were also advised to include 
the items in more than one category if they thought this was appropriate. The purpose of 
this analysis was to reveal the items that would have the larger percentage of expected 
classification, that is classified in the expected factor and not in any other factor. A 
baseline of 80% was set for an item to be appropriate for further analysis. 
From the 20 statements described as perforinance worries 11 were classified 80% or 
more in the respective category. Two statements were classified into both 'performance 
worries' and 'situation- irrelevant thoughts' ("The weather is too bad", "I am very 
unlucky"), while the rest were not adequately classified (most individuals classified 
them into more than one category). All 6 statements included in the 'situation-irrelevant 
thoughts' were classified above 80% in the respective category. Finally, from the 12 
statements referring to 'thoughts of escape', 7 were classified in the respective category, 
while the remaining 5 were also classified in 'performance worries' (for example, "I 
hate this competition", "This is a horrible experience"). All items having 80% or more 
of expected classification were retained to be analysed further. 
Stage 3: Test of factor structure 
Method 
The 24 items that were selected were subsequently factor analysed. The questionnaire 
(Appendix Q was distributed to 157 athletes (93 males and 64 females; mean age 21.4 
SD 4.1) representing different sports and levels of competition. Ninety nine of the 
participants were team sport athletes, and 58 were individual sport athletes. 12 athletes 
were competing at international level, 21 at national level, 50 at regional or county 
level, 18 at university level and 56 at club level. The participants were informed that the 
Questionnaire development 47 
form they were going to complete was anonymous and they were asked to assess the 
frequency of interfering thoughts they experience during competitions. A seven-point 
scale was used from almost never (1) to very often (7). 
Results 
Principal components analysis was computed in order to identify the number of factors 
to be retained. Five factors emerged having eigenvalues greater than 1, which explained 
66.5% of the variance. However, the scree test indicated that only the first three factors, 
which accounted for 56.4% of the variance, were meaningful and should be retained. 
Subsequently, factor analysis using maximum likelihood extraction and varimax and 
oblimin rotations were computed. These two methods of rotations yielded similar 
results. The factor loadings that emerged from the varimax rotation are displayed in 
Table 3.1. 
Factor one included all items intended to form the thoughts of escape subscale, having 
loadings between . 60 and . 78. From those, 
items 13 and 16 also loaded on Factor two 
(. 42 and .33, respectively). 
Items 4,8, and 11 also loaded on this factor, however their 
loadings were relatively low (. 30,38, and. 34 respectively) and in addition these items 
had similar loadings on Factor three. The second factor included 5 of the 6 items 
intended to form the situation irrelevant thoughts subscale having loadings between . 60 
and . 
90. Item 13 also loaded on this factor, however its loading was lower compared to 
the others (. 43) and also this item had a higher loading on Factor one. Item 3, the sixth 
item expected to load on this factor, did not load on any of the factors above . 30. 
Factor 
three included 9 of the II items intended to form the performance worries subscale with 
loadings between .35 and . 
65. Items 7,12,17,19,2 1, and 23 loaded on this and no 
other factor. Items 4,8, and II had loadings between .35 and .37 but also 
loaded on 
Factor one. Finally, items I and 15 did not load on any factor above . 30. 
On the evidence of the factor structure and loadings, and considering our intention to 
minimise overlap between factors, it was decided that the cross-loading 
items would be 
dropped along with the items that had loadings lower than .30. Overall, out of the 
24 
items initially included in this stage of the analysis, 17 were retained. These items were 
tested in the next stage of the investigation. 
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Table 3.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis (varimax rotation). Bold characters indicate 
factor loadings above . 30. 
During competitions I have thoughts FI F2 F3 
that I cannot stand it any more . 78 . 23 . 17 
that I do not want to take part in this competition any more . 77 . 19 . 19 
that I want to get out of here . 75 . 19 . 20 
that I am fed-up with it . 71 . 23 . 29 
that I want to quit . 69 . 10 . 00 
about stopping . 67 . 33 . 23 
that I'm not interested in this competition any more . 60 . 42 . 28 
about what I'm going to do when I go home . 21 . 91 . 15 
about other activities (e. g. shopping, having tea, TV) . 22 . 81 . 00 
about what I'm going to do later in the day . 19 . 75 . 00 
about friends . 25 . 63 . 19 
about personal worries (e. g. school, work, relations) . 21 . 60 . 18 
about members of my family . 12 . 23 . 00 
that I'm not going to win . 24 . 19 . 66 
that I'm not going to achieve my goal . 00 . 00 . 64 
that other competitors are better than me . 28 . 00 . 63 
that I'm having a bad day . 16 . 27 . 58 
about previous mistakes I have made . 16 . 00 . 55 
that I lack ability . 38 . 17 . 37 
that the conditions (weather, temperature, pitch, atmosphere) 
. 12 . 27 . 36 are not good 
that I'm letting people (e. g. my coach, my parents) down . 34 . 00 . 36 
that I am performing poorly . 30 . 00 . 35 
that I shouldn't make a mistake . 00 . 00 . 
24 
that I shouldn't mess-up . 00 . 00 . 
16 
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Stage 4: Tests of validity 
Method 
In the final stage of this investigation the validity of the modified instrument (TOQS; 
Thought Occurrence Questionnaire for Sports; Appendix D) was tested. In particular, 
evaluation of factorial validity, convergent validity, and discriminant validity was 
attempted. 
Factorial validity refers to the degree to which measures hypothesised to indicate the 
respective factors load on the proper factor. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is 
regarded the most rigorous method for inferring factorial validity. 
Convergent validity refers to the degree to which scores of the tested instrument relate 
to a satisfying degree with measures of identical or similar constructs (Cohen, 
Montague, Nathason, & Swerdlik, 1988). In order to test the convergent validity of the 
scale, measures from other scales were also administered to the sample (Appendix D). 
These scales were the 'negative thinking' subscale from the Test of Performance 
Strategies (TOPS; Thomas et al., 1999), and the Sport Anxiety Scale (SAS; Smith et al., 
1990) that comprises three subscales of 'cognitive anxiety', 'somatic anxiety' and 
'concentration disruption'. 
Two types of discriminant validity were assessed. First, discriminant validity (DV-1) 
was assessed as the degree of relationship between the tested instrument and measures 
of other constructs (Cohen et al., 1988). Findings of small relationships between scores 
of the tested instrument and variables which should not theoretically be correlated 
provide evidence for discriminant validity for the instrument. That is, measures of 
cognitive interference should be lowly or not correlated with measures of constructs that 
are not supposed to be related to experiencing cognitive interference. This type of 
validity was evaluated through examination of correlations between the TOQS and the 
4enjoyment' and 'competence' subscales from the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI; 
McAuley, Duncan, & Tammen, 1989). 
Second, discriminant validity (DV-11) was assessed as the degree to which measures of 
the questionnaire" s subscales are unique and therefore different from each other Bagozzi 
Questionnaire development 50 
(1990). One way to assess this type of discriminant validity is through examination of 
the correlations between latent factors in a confirmatory factor analysis model. If these 
correlations are significantly less than unity, that is correlations are less than 1.00 by an 
amount exceeding twice their respective standard errors, discriminant validity can be 
supported. Further evidence regarding discriminant validity of this type was obtained 
through examination of the correlations between the TOQS subscales and the other 
measures that were administered. Findings of different correlations between a construct 
and the three TOQS subscales would further support this type of discriminant validity. 
Finally, the internal consistency of the three subscales was assessed through the 
calculation of Cronbach's alpha coefficient. 
The 17 items that were retained from the exploratory factor analysis were tested on a 
new sample. The sample consisted of 178 athletes (116 males and 62 females; mean age 
was 21.6 years SD 4.6). The participants were from team sports (n = 125) and 
individual sports (n = 53). There were 10 athletes competing at international level, 28 at 
national level, 53 at regional or county level, 31 at university level and 56 competing at 
club level. 
Results 
T, __ ractorial validity was tested through CFA. It has been suggested by Bentler & Bonnett 
(1980) that the hypothesised factor model should be compared to other models. 
Therefore, four different models were examined. In the first model a one factor solution 
was tested, that is all the items were loaded on one factor. In the second model, a three 
factor solution was tested. In this model the items were loaded on three factors 
according to the results of the exploratory factor analysis. The factors were set 
uncorrelated. In the third model, the three factors were free to correlate 
(also in order to 
assess discriminant validity), while in the fourth model the three 
factors were designed 
to load on a second-order factor, namely an overall cognitive interference 
factor. 
Higher-order factor models follow a structure similar to the first-order factor models, 
however the covariances among the first-order factors are hypothesised to be explained 
by a higher-order construct (in this case cognitive 
interference). Following Bentler's 
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(1995) recommendation, the loading of the first order factors (F I, F2, F3) to the second 
order factor (F4) were constrained to be equal. 
Preliminary analysis gave evidence of multivariate non-normality. Therefore, all models 
were tested using the Robust Maximum Likelihood method which has been shown to 
control effectively for overestimation of chi-square, underestimation of adjunct fit 
indices, and under- identification of errors (Hu & Bentler, 1995). Five indices were 
considered to evaluate the adequacy of the models: the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI), 
the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Robust Comparative Fit Index (R-CFI), the 
LISREL Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), and finally the Standardised Root Mean Squared 
Residual (SRMR). The fit indices for the four models are presented in Table 3.2. Chi- 
square difference tests were computed to examine whether the chi-square values 
differed significantly between the four models. It was revealed that model two was 
significantly better than model I (chi-square difference: 315.43, p<. 05), and model three 
significantly better than model two (chi-square difference: 94.71, p<. 05). Model four 
was also significantly better than model two (chi-square difference: 93.3 1, p<. 05), but 
not from model three (chi-square difference: 1.4, p>. 05). 
Table 3.2 The fit indices for the four alternative CFA models. 
Fit Index Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sattora Bentler scaled X2/ 427.64/. 000 237.86/. 000 161.25/. 003 161.47/. 004 
probability 
NNFI . 596 . 854 . 
927 . 929 
CFI . 
646 . 872 . 
938 . 
938 
R-CFI . 
682 . 
877 953 . 955 
GFI . 
644 . 834 
881 . 
881 
SRMR . 126 . 
210 . 
059 . 061 
Model 1: one factor solution; Model 2: three factors - uncorrelated; 
Model 3: three factors - free to correlate; Model 4: three factors - second order factor 
The factor loadings and the uniqueness for each item in the first-order factors and the 
loadings for the three first-order factors on the second-order factor in the fourth model 
are presented in Table 3.3. All items and factors had high loadings and relatively low 
errors, which in addition to the adequacy of the fit indices support the hypothesis of 
factorial validity. 
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Table 3.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis: The second order factor model. Standardised 
factor loadings (first column) and uniqueness (second column). 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
During competitions I have thoughts 
that I am fed-up with it . 859 . 512 
that I do not want to do this competition 826 . 564 any more 
that I cannot stand it any more 
about stopping 
that I want to get out of here 
that I want to quit 
about what I'm going to do when I go 
home 
. 805 . 593 
. 756 . 655 
. 748 . 663 
. 678 . 735 
. 
852 
. 523 
about what I'm going to do later in the 
day 
about other activities (e. g. shopping, 
having tea, TV) 
about friends 
about personal worries (e. g. school, 
work, relations) 
that I'm not going to win 
that other competitors are better than me 
that I'm having a bad day 
about previous mistakes I have made 
that the conditions (weather, 
temperature, pitch, atmosphere) are not 
good 
that I'm not going to achieve my goal 
Factor I 
Factor 2 
. 811 . 586 
. 800 . 601 
. 
639 
. 769 
. 
628 . 778 
. 
823 . 569 
. 
688 . 726 
. 597 . 
802 
. 524 . 
852 
. 524 . 
852 
. 
467 . 884 
. 746 . 666 
. 
647 . 763 
Factor 3 . 758 . 656 
Factor 1: thoughts of escape; Factor 2: situation-irrelevant thoughts; 
Factor 3: performance worries; Factor 4: cognitive interference 
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Table 3.4 Mean scores for all items. 
Item / (Scale) Content Mean 
During competitions I have thoughts 
TOQS 9 (W) that the conditions (weather, temperature, pitch) are not good 3.599 
TOQS 12 (W) that I'm not going to achieve my goal 3.548 
TOQS 3 (W) about previous mistakes I have made 3.362 
TOQS 15 (W) that I'm not going to win this competition 3.350 
TOQS 17 (W) that other competitors are better than me 3.318 
TOQS 6 (W) that I'm having a bad day 3.147 
TOQS 5 (1) about what I'm going to do later in the day 2.446 
TOQS 13 (E) that I am fed-up with it 2.305 
TOQS 4 (E) that I do not want to take part in this competition any more 2.226 
TOQS 8 (1) about personal worries (e. g. school, work, relations) 2.215 
TOQS 14 (1) about what I'm going to do when I go home 2.175 
TOQS I1 (1) about friends 2.124 
TOQS 7 (E) that I want to get out of here 2.028 
TOQS 10 (E) about stopping 1.879 
TOQS I (E) that I want to quit 1.859 
TOQS 16 (E) that I cannot stand it any more 1.814 
TOQS 2 (1) about other activities (e. g. shopping, having tea, TV) 1.768 
W: performance worries; 1: situation irrelevant thoughts; E: thoughts of escape 
Table 3.5 Means , standard deviations and correlations 
for the TOQS subscales. 
Descriptive statistics Correlations 
Mean S. D. TOQS-E TOQS-I TOQS-W 
Thoughts of escape 2.02 1.01 
(TOQS-E) 
Situation-irrelevant 2.15 1.08 . 39 thoughts (TOQS-1) 
Perfon-nance womes 3.39 1.04 . 47 . 39 (TOQS-W) 
Cognitive 2.52 . 81 . 79 . 
77 . 79 interference (total) 
*p <. 05, ** p< . 
01 
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Convergent and Discriminant (DV-I) validity. Convergent and discriminant (DV-I) 
validity was assessed through examination of the correlations of the three subscales as 
well as the total cognitive interference scores with other scales. The correlations that 
emerged are presented in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 Correlations between the cognitive interference subscales and other scales 
TOPS SAS I SAS 2 SAS 3 IMI I IMI 2 
Negative Cognitive Somatic Concentration Competence Enjoyment 
thinking anxiety anxiety disruption 
TOQS-E . 32 ** . 35 ** . 20** . 45 ** -. 18 -. 27 
TOQS-1 . 13 . 20** -. 03 . 51 -. 16 -. 22** 
TOQS-W . 43 . 40 . 11 . 38 -. 01 -. 09 
TOQS . 38 . 40 . 12 . 56 -. 15 -. 25 
*p<. 05, ** p <. Ol 
TOQS-W, TOQS-E and total interference correlated relatively highly with the 'negative 
thinking' subscale of the TOPS, while the correlation between this particular subscale 
and TOQS-I was low. The correlation between total interference and its three subscales 
with the 'concentration disruption) scale were relatively high, while correlations 
between cognitive anxiety and cognitive interference were higher, compared to those 
between somatic anxiety and cognitive interference. Finally, TOQS-E, TOQS-1, and 
total interference were lowly negatively correlated with 'enjoyment' and 'competence", 
while the correlations between TOQS-W and 'competence' and 'enjoyment' were close 
to zero. Overall, the patterns of correlations that emerged were as expected, thus 
providing support for convergent and discriminant (DV-1) validity. 
Discriminant validity (DV-II). Correlations between the three latent factors were 
obtained from the third confirmatory factor analysis model. Standard error for each 
correlation was used to compute confidence intervals. Accordingly, the correlation 
between TOQS-E and TOQS-I was . 451 
(standard error . 
064, upper bound confidence 
interval . 579), 
between TOQS-E and the TOQS-W was. 591 (standard error. 081, upper 
bound confidence interval . 753), and 
finally, between TOQS-I and TOQS-I was . 
469 
(standard error . 079, upper 
bound confidence interval . 625). Thus, the 
inter-correlations 
between the three latent factors were significantly less than unity, supporting the 
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hypothesis of discriminant validity (the correlations between latent factors in a CFA 
models are different from Pearson's coefficients, since they are corrected for 
measurement error). 
Further evidence regarding discriminant validity (DV-II) for the TOQS subscales 
emerged from their correlations (Pearson's coefficients) with other constructs. TOQS-W 
and TOQS-E correlated with 'negative thinking' from TOPS, and cognitive anxiety 
from SAS, higher than TOQS-1, whereas all three TOQS subscales had similar 
correlations with 'somatic anxiety' and 'concentration disruption' from SAS. 
Furthermore, TOQS-E and TOQS-I had higher correlations with 'competence' and 
cenjoyment' from IMI than TOQS-W. Such indications that the three subscales correlate 
differently to other measures further support this type of discriminant validity. 
Reliability. Finally, calculation of the Cronbach's alpha coefficient revealed satisfactory 
internal consistency for the three subscales. Cronbach's alpha was . 90 for TOQS-E, . 85 
for TOQS-I, and. 78 for TOQS-W. 
Discussion 
The present investigation attempted to develop an instrument to assess cognitive 
interference in sport. In the initial stages of the investigation, including interviews with 
athletes and evaluation of items by individuals from the sport psychology field, it was 
revealed that the types of thoughts sports performers experience seem to be similar to 
those experienced in evaluative situations in educational environments, such as 
examinations. In particular, three categories were identified as described by Sarason et 
al. (1986). The first category included statements that refer to worry and negative self- 
evaluation over performance and competition. The second category was characterised 
by statements irrelevant to the performance or competition, while the third 
included 
statements of withdrawing from the competition. However, the content of the statements 
characterising the first category was relatively different compared to those comprising 
the original TOQ- Considering that an academic examination and a competitive 
performance are similar in that they both include the element of evaluation 
(that can be 
perceived as difficult, challenging, or threatening, depending on the 
individual" s 
perceived adequacy and effectiveness), 
but differ in the nature of the task and the 
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structure of the competition, the above findings seem reasonable. Thus, concerning 
performance worries, there were statements that were quite specific to the nature of 
sport competition, for example, the conditions of the competition, previous mistakes of 
the performer, the opposition. These are elements that cannot be found in test situations. 
The content of the statements characterised as irrelevant thoughts and thoughts of 
withdrawal were similar to those included in the TOQ, and therefore only minor 
modifications were made. 
The stages that followed involved quantitative methods of instrument evaluation. In 
particular, exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess the 
psychometric properties of the TOQS. Although there were specific hypotheses 
concerning the structure of the questionnaire, which would suggest that confirmatory 
analysis could be directly applied, exploratory analysis was preferred at first, since the 
questionnaire included items that had not been tested before. In addition, since the 
questionnaire had not yet reached its final form, exploratory factor analysis would help 
identify items that could possibly be problematic, therefore resulting in further item 
reduction. 
According to expectations, exploratory factor analysis revealed three meaningful 
factors. Furthermore, it indicated that in order to obtain a more statistically sound 
structure some items should be dropped. All 7 items referring to thoughts of escape 
loaded on the first factor. One item which crossloaded ('... I am not interested in this 
competition any more') was dropped, hence six items were retained for further analysis. 
From the six items referring to situation- irrelevant thoughts, five loaded on the second 
factor, while one item ('... about members of my family) did not load on any factor and 
therefore was dropped from the subscale. From the II items referring to performance 
worries, six loaded uniquely on factor three, and these were the items that were retained. 
Three items from the ones referring to performance worries ('... that I lack ability', '... 
that I am letting people down', '... that I am performing poorly') loaded on more than 
one factor. Because the loadings of these three items were moderate to low on any of 
the factors they were also dropped. Finally, two items ('... that I shouldn't make a 
mistake now', '... that I shouldn't mess-up now') did not 
load on any factor higher than 
. 
30 and were dropped. Overall, the factor structure of the questionnaire reflected that of 
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the original TOQ, which indicates that patterns of interfering thoughts under evaluative 
situations are similar. 
Further evidence for the validity of the TOQS emerged from the CFA. From the four 
models testing for factorial validity, the two models which accounted for the 
relationship between the three factors best fitted the data. These models seem to be in 
line with the assumptions of cognitive interference since, in combination with the 
evidence concerning discriminant validity (DV-II), they indicate that each factor 
measures a different aspect of cognitive activity. This, in turn, is the construct that 
explains the association between the factors, that is, it shows that the factors have 
common characteristics as they all include non-task-processing cognitions, therefore 
distractions. 
Evidence to support the psychometric properties of the instrument were finally provided 
through examination of convergent and discriminant (DV-1) validity. Correlations 
between the 'negative thinking' subscale from the TOPS and TOQS-W and TOQS-E 
subscales were relatively high, while the correlation for TOQS-I was lower. 
Considering that this particular subscale comprises distracting thoughts which, however, 
are not negative in nature, the pattern of correlations seems satisfactory. In accordance 
with research in educational settings (Hunsley, 1987; Sarason, 1984; Sarason et al., 
1986) correlations between cognitive anxiety and cognitive interference were higher 
compared to those of somatic anxiety. From the three interference subscales, TOQS-I 
had the lower correlation with cognitive anxiety, which is also in line with the theory's 
assumptions that under evaluative situations cognitive anxiety is related to self- 
preoccupying and self-evaluating tendencies (Sarason, 1984). Finally, high correlations 
were revealed between the TOQS subscales and the SAS 'concentration' subscale 
which is a measure of concentrating ability. Overall, the patterns of correlations that 
emerged provide adequate support for convergent and discriminant (DV-1) validity. 
Conclusion 
There is agreement that cognitive activity during sport has a significant influence on 
performance. In order to better understand the role of cognitive interference, the 
factors 
that generate it, and its effects on performance, measurement instruments are required. 
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This investigation has described the modification of an instrument developed and used 
for purposes of educational research, so that it can be applicable for sport situations. The 
adoption of a multidimensional model might prove useful in examining under what 
circumstances and why different types of thoughts appear in athletes' minds, and what 
their effects are on performance. Overall, the TOQS, an instrument to identify the nature 
and frequency of various thoughts athletes experience during sport performance, 
appears to have promise as a research tool. 
Having established an instrument appropriate to use for sport settings, the investigation 
can progress towards the assessment of the research questions regarding cognitive 
interference. The first issue to be examined involves examination of situational 
antecedents of cognitive interference. 
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Chapter 4. Predicting Cognitive Interference: Situational Factors 
Study 11, - Pre-competition anxiety and discrepancies between performance goals 
and performance as antecedents of cognitive interference 
Introduction 
As already described in the review of literature, research in education has proposed an 
attentional interpretation of the detrimental effects of test anxiety on academic 
performance (Sarason, 1984; Wine, 1971). In particular, cognitive interference, 
described as task-irrelevant, self-preoccupying thoughts individuals experience while 
performing a task, i. e. thoughts which are not related to the execution of the task, have 
been hypothesised to mediate the relationship between test anxiety and performance. 
According to the cognitive interference interpretation, interfering thoughts being a result 
of anxiety impair performance by diverting attention from the task and using up 
resources that otherwise could be applied for task-processing purposes. Attempting to 
provide support for the model researchers investigated relationships between test 
anxiety and cognitive interference and also cognitive interference and performance. 
Sarason & Stoops (1978) examined the relationship between test anxiety and cognitive 
interference on a task presented as an intelligence test. Results indicated that highly test 
anxious individuals experienced higher levels of cognitive interference than lowly 
anxious individuals, being more preoccupied about how poorly they were doing, how 
other people could cope and what the examiners would think of them. Zatz & Chassin 
(1983,1985) reported that during analogue tasks children high in test anxiety 
experienced more task-debilitating cognitions than children low in test anxiety. 
Similarly to research with adults (Gallassi et al., 198 1) such thoughts included 
unfavourable social comparisons, inability to concentrate, and desires to leave the 
situation. Similar results have been reported in a number of other studies (e. g. Bruch et 
al., 1983; Hollandsworth et al., 1979). 
Having established this relationship researchers tried to identify other factors related to 
the appearance of cognitive interference during task performance. Arkin et al. (1982) 
examined the relation between test anxiety, task difficulty and interference. They 
found 
that irrespective of difficulty highly anxious individuals reported experiencing more 
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interference than lowly anxious ones. In addition, they reported that the more difficult 
tasks aroused more interfering thoughts than the easier ones, and that the interaction of 
highly anxious individuals working on the difficult tasks elicited the most interference. 
Zatz & Chassin (1985), examining the effects of classroom environment in relation to 
cognitive interference, reported that highly evaluative conditions were related to greater 
levels of interference. Finally, Hunsley (1987), reported cognitive interference to be 
related to previous experiences, importance of examination, perceived preparation, and 
grade expectation. 
Progressively, research in the area tried to establish the relationship between cognitive 
interference and task performance. Sarason & Stoops (1978), using a digit symbol task, 
reported that individuals experiencing greater amounts of interfering thoughts 
performed more poorly compared to those reporting lower levels of interference. 
Hoffman (1993) reported that in a computer based task, worries related to the task were 
a significant predictor of performance. Similar results have been reported from studies 
examining cognitive interference and performance in examination situations (e. g. 
Paulman & Kennelly, 1984; Zatz & Chassin, 1985). 
However, Klinger (1985) suggested that the direction of the causality in the relationship 
between cognitive interference and performance might be the opposite to the one 
supported, proposing that cognitive interference is a 'reaction to performance'. He 
supported that during the course of an examination and when individuals encounter 
unexpected difficulties, anxiety rises and thoughts about poor performance and 
adequacy to complete successfully the test come to the fore, while task-related problem- 
solving thoughts become fewer. Klinger's proposition seems to be well accommodated 
in Carver & Scheier's (1988) control process model of anxiety described in the literature 
review. In brief, Carver and Scheier suggested that human behaviour follows the self- 
regulatory principle of feedback control. Actions and behaviour are compared to salient 
reference values, and observed discrepancies are countered by adjusting behaviour 
in 
line with the behavioural standards. In more practical terms, when during the execution 
of a task people encounter difficulties, they temporarily 'interrupt' their action and 
assess the likelihood of being able to complete the intended behaviour. 
In the context of 
this process, if discrepancies between goals and behaviour are identified individuals are 
likely to experience worry. This particular approach seems of great interest and 
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applicability in a sport context where individuals are very likely to have and strive for 
specific goals (Jones & Hanton, 1996). Adapting this hypothesis for a sport 
environment, it can be suggested that while competing athletes compare their 
performance progress to existing standards, and most importantly to their expectancies 
and goals regarding their performance and when discrepancies are identified, worries 
regarding perfon-nance and goal achievement are generated. 
Given the theoretical framework provided by anxiety research in education the first 
purpose of this study was to identify situational factors related to the appearance of 
cognitive interference athletes experience while performing. Considering that cognitive 
interference has been introduced as an effect of test anxiety, competitive anxiety was the 
first factor hypothesised to predict cognitive interference. Furthermore, considering 
Klinger's (1985) interpretation and Carver & Scheier's (1988) theoretical propositions 
regarding the relationship between cognitive interference and performance, the study 
also examined the degree to which cognitive interference athletes experience is a 
function of discrepancies between goals and performance. 
Within the sport psychology literature, anxiety has attracted remarkable amounts of 
interest. In particular, the relationship between competitive anxiety and performance has 
been the research question that dominates the field. Several theories have been 
developed and tackled throughout the years, however results have failed to provide 
conclusive results. Thus, cognitive and somatic anxiety, the two components of anxiety 
within the multidimensional anxiety approach, have been found to be positively, 
negatively, or not at all related to perfon-nance (see Review of Literature). The lack of 
consistency in the relationship between anxiety and performance led Parfitt et al. (1990) 
to suggest that anxiety is not necessarily detrimental to performance. Subsequently, they 
proposed that apart from intensity researchers should consider another dimension of 
anxiety, namely the direction of anxiety. This dimension refers to the way athletes 
perceive anxiety symptoms, in particular whether athletes perceive these symptoms as 
facilitative (helpful to performance) or debilitative (detrimental to performance). 
Initial investigation has provided support for the distinction between intensity and 
direction of anxiety, indicating that anxiety can be perceived by athletes either as 
facilitative or debilitative (e. g. Jones & Swain, 1992). Furthermore, research examining 
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the relationship between anxiety direction and performance seems to stress the 
importance of considering further the dimension of anxiety direction. Jones et al. (1993) 
divided a sample of gymnasts into two groups according to performance on the beam. 
Good and poor performers did not differ in the intensity of cognitive and somatic 
anxiety, however the good perfon-nance group reported their anxiety symptoms as more 
facilitative and less debilitative than the poor performance group. Swain & Jones (1996) 
examined the contribution of anxiety intensity and direction as predictors of basketball 
performance. They reported that cognitive and somatic anxiety direction were better 
predictors of performance than cognitive and somatic anxiety intensity respectively. 
Considering these results it could be speculated that direction of anxiety might be 
equally important to intensity in relation to cognitive interference athletes experience 
during competition. Therefore, despite criticism that this development in sport anxiety 
research has received (Burton, 1998; Burton & Naylor, 1997), direction of anxiety was 
considered along with intensity to explore further the usefulness of this dimension. 
Based on these advances regarding competitive anxiety, arguing the importance of 
anxiety direction, the second aim of the study was to identify the role of subjective 
interpretations of anxiety symptoms in relation to pre-competition anxiety intensity and 
cognitive interference athletes experience during sport performance. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical framework on which cognitive interference theory was 
developed, anxiety was hypothesised to be an important predictor of cognitive 
interference. In accordance with research in educational settings (Sarason, 1984; 
Sarason et al., 1986) it was expected that cognitive anxiety intensity will be more 
strongly related to interference than somatic anxiety. Moreover, stemming from the 
propositions of Klinger (1985) and Carver & Scheier (1988) it was hypothesised that 
cognitive interference would be better predicted by discrepancies between expected and 
actual performance, than from pre-competition anxiety. Finally, 
in relation to anxiety 
direction, it was hypothesised that irrespective of anxiety intensity, individuals 
experiencing anxiety symptoms as facilitative would experience 
less interference than 
those interpreting the symptoms as debilitative. 
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Method 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 36 athletes (24 males, 12 females) who took part in a middle- 
distance (2.7 miles) cross-country relay event. The mean age of the sample was 23.14 
years (S. D. 6.46), with an average competitive experience of 6.7 years (S. D. 3.6). 
Instruments 
Anxiety. The CSAI-2 (Martens et al., 1990) was used to measure anxiety. The CSAI-2 
comprises 27 items in three subscales assessing intensity of cognitive anxiety (e. g. "I 
have self-doubts", I am concerned about performing poorly"), somatic anxiety (e. g. I 
feel nervous", "My body feels tense") and self-confidence (e. g. I feel at ease", I am 
confident about performing well"). Participants were asked to rate on a 4-point scale the 
intensity of each of the listed symptoms (I = not at all, 4= very much so). Along with 
the scale assessing intensity of anxiety components, Jones & Swain's (1992) direction 
scale for cognitive and somatic anxiety was administered. Participants were asked to 
indicate on a seven-point scale the degree to which the intensity of cognitive and 
somatic anxiety symptoms they were experiencing was perceived as facilitative or 
debilitative to performance (-3 = debilitative, 0= neutral, 3= facilitative). 
Cognitive interference. The TOQS was used to assess frequency of interfering thoughts 
(for details see Chapter 3). 
Time discrepancy. Athletes' time-goal and final time were recorded and discrepancies 
between them were calculated. 
The instruments used in this study are displayed in Appendix E. 
Procedure 
After the registration for the race athletes were informed about the research project and 
were asked to volunteer. Eight teams comprising four athletes each and four individual 
runners agreed to participate and instructions on how to complete the questionnaire 
were subsequently given. The CSAI-2 along with demographic characteristics and time- 
goal estimations were completed approximately 30 minutes before the start of the event, 
while the TOQS was completed immediately after each runner completed his/her race. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics, reliability coefficients and correlations of the variables are 
presented in Table 4.1. The three cognitive interference subscales were moderately 
correlated to each other. Cognitive and somatic anxiety were moderately intercorrelated 
and they were both negatively correlated to self-confidence. The correlation between 
intensity and direction of cognitive anxiety was negative, while intensity and direction 
of somatic anxiety were uncorrelated. Both cognitive and somatic anxiety direction 
were positively correlated to self-confidence. From the three interference subscales 
'performance worries' correlated to anxiety components higher than 'situation- 
irrelevant thoughts' and 'thoughts of escape'. 
Predicting cognitive interference 
Hierarchical regression analysis was subsequently calculated to reveal the degree to 
which cognitive interference could be predicted from intensity of anxiety and time 
discrepancy (bigger discrepancy scores indicating larger distance from goal). This 
particular type of analysis was preferred because it would allow to investigate the 
relative contribution in explaining cognitive interference variance after accounting for 
variance explained by each set of independent variables. Three separate regression 
models were calculated each one having one of the cognitive interference subscales 
(TOQS-W, TOQS-1, and TOQS-E) as the dependent variable. 
In the first model TOQS-W was the dependent variable (Table 4.2). When anxiety 
components entered the regression before discrepancy cognitive anxiety was a 
significant predictor of interference (adjusted R2=A 0), while somatic anxiety and self- 
confidence were not. The addition of time discrepancy in the second step raised the 
prediction significantly (total-adjusted R2= .4 1). When discrepancy was entered 
first in 
the regression (adjusted R2= . 33), cognitive anxiety could still account 
for a significant 
amount of interference variance (total-adjusted RI = .4 1). 
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Table 4.2 Hierarchical regression analyses for performance worries. 
Predictor F Beta Adjusted R 
step I 
cognitive anxiety intensity 
somatic anxiety intensity 
4.88 * 
. 36 . 10 
did not reach the . 05 criterion 
self-confidence 
step 
performance discrepancies 
did not reach the . 05 criterion 
12.40 ** . 56 . 41 
step 
perfonnance discrepancies 17.05 ** . 59 
step 2 
cognitive anxiety intensity 
somatic anxiety intensity 
. 33 
12.40** . 31 . 
41 
did not reach the . 05 criterion 
self-confidence did not reach the . 05 criterion 
*p<. 05, ** p <. Ol 
In the next model where TOQS-I was the dependent variable (Table 4.3) anxiety 
components when entered first in the equation were not a significant predictor. Time 
discrepancy accounted for a significant amount of variance, but was much lower 
compared to the variance predicted for performance worries (adjusted R2= . 14). 
Table 4.3 Hierarchical regression analysis for situation-irrelevant thoughts. 
Predictor F Beta Adjusted R' 
step I 
cognitive anxiety intensity 
somatic anxiety intensity 
did not reach the . 05 criterion 
did not reach the . 05 criterion 
self-confidence 
step 
did not reach the . 05 criterion 
perfonnance discrepancies 5.09 . 37 . 
14 
p< . 05, 
*p< . 01, 
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Finally, when TOQS-E was the dependent variable (Table 4.4), anxiety components 
were not a significant predictor when entered into the regression first, whereas time 
discrepancy was (adjusted R' = . 29). 
Table 4.4 Hierarchical regression analyses for thoughts of escape. 
Predictor 
step 
cognitive anxiety intensity 
F Beta Ad . usted R j 
did not reach the . 05 criterion 
somatic anxiety intensity 
self-confidence 
step 
performance discrepancies 
did not reach the . 05 criterion 
did not reach the . 05 criterion 
14.22 ** . 55 . 29 
p <. 05, *p<. Ol ** 
Direction of anxiety 
In the second part of the analysis the sample was divide into anxiety direction groups. 
Specifically, following the recommendations of Jones & Swain (1995) athletes having 
positive scores in both cognitive and somatic anxiety direction were included in the 
facilitative group (N=20), while those having negative scores in both cognitive and 
somatic anxiety were included in the debilitative group (N= 11). Subsequently, 
multivariate analyses of variance was calculated to test for differences in cognitive and 
somatic anxiety intensity, and also in the three cognitive interference subscales. 
Regarding anxiety intensity both the multivariate and the univariate effects were non- 
significant, with the two groups having similar mean scores (Table 4.5). 
For the three cognitive interference subscales, the multivariate effect was not significant 
although did show a trend (F= 2.46, p= . 08). Estimates of effect size 
(eta squared: . 21 
for the multivariate effect) encouraged examination of the univariate tests . These 
indicated important trends. In particular, there was a significant univariate effect for 
'performance worries' (F= 6.14, p<. 05). Moreover, in all three subscales the debilitative 
group had higher mean scores than the facilitative group 
(Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.5 Mean scores in anxiety intensity and cognitive interference for the two 
anxiety direction groups. 
Anxiety direction 
Facilitative Debilitative F p 71 
2 
Cognitive anxiety 18.00 19.55 1.68 
. 20 . 05 intensity 
Somatic anxiety 16.95 17.36 . 12 . 73 . 01 intensity 
Performance 11.25 15.73 6.14 . 02 . 18 worries 
Situation-irrelevant 8.05 11.18 2.04 . 16 . 07 thoughts 
Thoughts of escape 8.30 11.73 3.59 . 07 
Discussion 
The correlations between the anxiety intensity components were in accordance with 
findings from previous research (e. g. Edwards & Hardy, 1996; Gould et al., 1984). 
Cognitive and somatic anxiety were moderately positively correlated, and they were 
both negatively correlated to self-confidence. Also in accordance with research 
examining relationships between intensity and direction of anxiety (e. g. Edwards & 
Hardy, 1996; Jones et al., 1993), self-confidence was positively correlated with 
cognitive and somatic anxiety direction, that is the higher the confidence the more 
facilitative the anxiety symptoms and vice versa. 
The relationship between cognitive anxiety intensity and direction was moderately 
negative. Previous research has not revealed consistent results concerning this particular 
relation. Jones et al. (1993) found a low positive correlation (. 19) between cognitive 
anxiety intensity and direction, Swain & Jones (1996) reported the two dimensions to be 
uncorrelated (-. 06), while Edwards & Hardy (1996) found a low negative correlation 
A 0), which seems to suggest that there are other factors moderating the relationship. 
Finally, somatic anxiety intensity and direction were found to be uncorrelated. Edwards 
& Hardy (1996), Jones et al. (1993), and Swain & Jones (1996), found negative 
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relationships that ranged from -. 29 to -. 57, with the largest reported in a sample of 
gymnasts. Considering the type of samples in these studies compared to the present 
sample it could be argued that the result seems interpretable. In particular, the biggest 
correlation was found in a sample of gymnasts, while the two others were reported in 
basketball and netball samples. Basketball, netball and in particular gymnastics are 
sports that involve finer skills compared to running which is a gross skill. Somatic 
symptoms in such sports can be perceived by athletes as more detrimental to the 
execution of fine movements, whereas in running athletes are more likely to desire 
higher levels of physiological arousal which is to a degree related to somatic anxiety. 
Therefore, the fact that somatic anxiety intensity was not negatively correlated to its 
own direction scale is not surprising. 
Anxiety andperformance discrepancies as predictors of cognitive interference 
Regression analysis tested the degree to which anxiety intensity and discrepancy 
between goals and performance could predict frequency of cognitive interference 
athletes experienced during the race. Separate analysis for each subscale, rather than an 
analysis involving total interference scores, would give a better insight into whether 
different types of thoughts have different antecedents. In support of this kind of analysis 
evidence from the study examining the psychometric properties of the TOQS, supported 
the discriminant validity of the three subscales. 
Hierarchical regression analysis was calculated with anxiety intensity and performance 
discrepancy entering the equation first interchangeably in order to examine the relative 
contribution of the predictors. In the case of performance worries, cognitive anxiety, 
when entered first, explained a significant amount of variance. The addition of 
discrepancy in the second step raised the predicted variance. When discrepancy was 
entered first, cognitive anxiety could still add significantly to the prediction. Somatic 
anxiety and self-confidence did not account for significant amounts of variance in any 
of the cases. In accordance with the hypothesis, discrepancy between expectancies and 
performance was a stronger predictor of performance worries than cognitive anxiety. 
However, it is important to note that despite the large amount of variance explained by 
performance discrepancies, cognitive anxiety could contribute to the prediction, which 
means that the two predictors accounted for 
different parts of performance worries. 
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Attempting to interpret this result, it could be suggested that regardless of performance 
quality, cognitive anxiety before the race is translated to worries during the race. 
Furthen-nore, considering that some of the predicted variance was shared between the 
predictors, it appears that in accordance with theoretical conceptualisations of anxiety 
(Martens et al., 1990) cognitive anxiety reflects some anticipation of poor performance. 
Nevertheless, the quality of performance in relation to the expectations is the factor that 
mainly determines the levels of performance worries athletes experience, which seems 
to support Carver & Scheler's (1988) model. In particular, it could be suggested that 
when athletes' performance does not reflect their expectations, or when during the 
competition unexpected difficulties arise, athletes tend to ruminate over performance- 
related, self-evaluative thoughts. 
Somatic anxiety and self-confidence, despite being moderately correlated to 
performance worries, did not contribute to the prediction, which suggests that the 
variance of performance worries explained by these two variables was part of the 
variance explained by cognitive anxiety. However, the relationship between somatic 
anxiety and performance worries was of noticeable magnitude suggesting that in 
contrast to literature in educational settings (e. g. Sarason et al., 1986), in sport, 
physiological condition is of greater importance in influencing cognitive activation 
during performance. 
In subsequent analyses, in contrast to the results obtained for performance worries, 
discrepancies between expected and actual performance was the only significant 
predictor of situation- irrelevant thoughts and thoughts of escape. From these analyses 
two important points can be made. First, that cognitive anxiety is mostly related to 
'performance worries' and, second, that performance discrepancies could account for 
relatively large amounts of variance in 'performance worries' and 'thoughts of escape', 
compared to 'situation- irrelevant thoughts'. 
Concerning the first point, results are in line with findings in the test anxiety/cognitive 
interference literature. Sarason (1984) found test anxiety to be significantly more 
related to 'worry' than 'test- irrelevant thinking'. Subsequently, 
he suggested that in an 
evaluative situation anxiety symptoms are more 
likely to be related to thoughts that 
reflect fears of failure and comparison with others than thoughts 
irrelevant to the 
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situation. Furthermore, in the sport domain, in the initial stage of the investigation 
where the psychometric properties of the TOQS were tested, it was found that cognitive 
anxiety was more strongly related to 'performance worries' than to 'situation- irrelevant 
thoughts '. 
Concerning the second point, similar reasoning can be supported. When discrepancies 
between expected and actual performance are detected it is reasonable that thought 
content would involve matters related to the competition such as worries, consequences 
of failure and frustration which also might result in withdrawing thoughts rather than to 
thoughts not relevant to the event. 
The role of anxiety direction 
Subsequently, the sample was divided into groups according to their interpretation of 
cognitive and somatic anxiety symptoms. The analysis revealed that the facilitative and 
debilitative anxiety direction groups did not differ significantly in levels of anxiety 
intensity. However, fairly strong trends were identified showing differences in the levels 
of cognitive interference, and in particular perfon-nance worries, the two anxiety 
direction groups reported. The fact that the two cognitive anxiety direction groups did 
not differ in anxiety intensity, but did appear to differ in performance worries suggests 
that for athletes perceiving their anxiety states as debilitative, anxiety before the 
competition was translated into cognitive interference during the event, whereas this 
was not the case for those perceiving their anxiety states as facilitative. 
Increases in anxiety levels can be considered a normal reaction to a competitive 
situation. However, as supported in the literature (e. g. Jones et al., 1994; Jones & Swain 
1992; Jones et al., 1993) for some athletes sensations of anxiety are perceived as 
helpful, while for others as detrimental to performance, depending on the interpretation 
of the individual in each situation. Thus, similar levels of anxiety can be regarded as 
facilitative or debilitative by different athletes, but also by the same athlete in different 
situations (Edwards & Hardy, 1996). It can be speculated that when pre-competition 
anxiety is perceived as facilitative, once the competition starts symptoms such as the 
occurrence of worrying thoughts cease. However, when anxiety is perceived as 
debilitative the symptoms persist and might become threatening to performance. 
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Moreover, it can be suggested that perceiving anxiety symptoms as debilitative might be 
by itself a source of worry while competing. Considering these findings in relation to 
the assumption that cognitive interference might be detrimental to performance, the 
results seem to support and justify the view that direction can be equally important to 
intensity in predicting performance. 
Methodological considerations 
Considering recent criticism that the CSAI-2 has received (Burton 1998; Lane et al. 
1999), results involving measures of anxiety using this instrument should be cautiously 
interpreted. One result that should be considered under the light of such criticism is the 
magnitude of the relationship between cognitive anxiety and cognitive interference, and 
in particular performance worries which can be said to be the cognitive element of 
anxiety during competition. In the present study, this relationship was moderate. As 
already speculated, one reason for this might be the fact that once competition has 
started, the cognitive state of individuals may change due to events occurring during the 
game. However, it has to be stressed that Burton (1988) and Lane et al. (1999) argue 
that whether the cognitive anxiety subscale of CSAI-2 is actually assessing anxiety is 
questionable. Based on evidence that cognitive anxiety can be perceived as facilitative 
and considering the content of the subscale which asks athletes to report concern 
regarding upcoming events, they argue that CSAI-2 is not really measuring anxiety, but 
possibly other affective states such as excitement, which therefore explains why anxiety 
as measured through the CSAI-2 can be perceived as facilitative. So, the moderate 
relationship identified between cognitive anxiety and performance worries might be due 
to the limited adequacy of CSAI-2 to assess pre-competition cognitive anxiety. 
Based on the above arguments regarding the operationalisation of anxiety, findings 
regarding the directional interpretations of anxiety, are meaningful only to the 
degree to 
which CSAI-2 measures anxiety, or in relation to whatever it is that 
CSAI-2 measures. 
So, it can be speculated, that athletes perceiving the symptoms 
described by CSAI-2 as 
debilitative, actually experience anxiety which translates into higher 
levels of cognitive 
interference during competition, whereas those perceiving the symptoms as facilitative 
may experience excitement which is related to lower 
levels of cognitive interference. 
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Further consideration of anxiety measurement is necessary for the advancement of sport 
anxiety research, however interpretation of the present results in the light of such 
criticism is meaningful and can also contribute to a better understanding of anxiety 
processes before and during competition. Finally, replication of the present results is 
essential before firm conclusions can be drawn due to sample limitation (size), which 
however are due to the demanding research design necessary to examine such 
hypotheses. 
Conclusion 
In accordance with findings in educational psychology, pre-competition anxiety was 
found to be related to cognitive interference during competition. However, the 
magnitude of the relationship was moderate, indicating that between cognitions before 
and during the event, performance feedback inforination becomes an important 
determinant of cognitive activation. Therefore, that anxiety fails to predict perfon-nance 
consistently might be due to alterations of anxiety states during competition as a result 
of performance and other possible incidents that occur during competition. Much 
remains to be explored regarding cognitive interference, however, it becomes evident 
that expanding anxiety research into what is 'going on' while performing might prove to 
be a fertile research area with important implications for the field of applied sport 
psychology. 
Having found that the relationship between pre-competition anxiety and cognitive 
activation during performance is only moderate, thus partly explaining why the 
literature examining relationships between anxiety and performance has been equivocal, 
in the next chapter an attempt is made to identify how cognitive interference athletes 
experience is linked to performance. 
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Chapter 5. Cognitive Interference and Performance Features 
Study III: Athletes' perceptions of how cognitive interference during competition 
influences concentration and effort. 
Introduction 
Within research focusing on sport performance a great deal of attention has been 
directed at the pre-competition state of athletes. Within this literature, anxiety, which 
describes the somatic and cognitive condition of athletes before the competition, has 
been the dominant research focus. Psychologists have tried to find and explain 
associations between these pre-competition states and performance and, as already 
discussed, results so far have not been consistent. One possible reason for this 
inconsistency is that cognitive and somatic states of athletes can change during 
competition. A single moment of good or bad luck, a crucial mistake, an official's 
decision, or unexpected events can alter athletes' feelings and cognitions dramatically. 
Indeed, the results of the previous study revealed only moderate relationships between 
pre-competition anxiety states and cognitive interference while perfon-ning. It is 
therefore quite understandable that pre-competition conditions sometimes fail to predict 
performance. 
Furthermore, the inconsistency of findings exploring the anxiety/performance 
relationship has been attributed to several methodological limitations. Among them, 
Parfitt et al. (1990) identified that anxiety research in sports has mostly focused on 
global performance measures which might be insufficiently sensitive to anxiety effects. 
They therefore suggested that research should examine effects of anxiety on 
subcomponents of performance. 
Therefore, the importance of studying athletes' cognitions during competition and their 
likely effects on features of performance becomes evident. In one of the 
few attempts to 
examine the relationship between cognitive content during competition and 
performance in sports, Gould, Ecklund, & Jackson (1992) used qualitative methods of 
inquiry to examine patterns of thought occurrence in elite wrestlers, 
'comparing between 
athletes, but also within athletes 
(successful/unsuccessful performances). Successful 
performances were characterised 
by absence of thoughts for some of the athletes while 
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others reported their only thoughts to be related to focusing on strategies and techniques 
that should be applied. In contrast, during unsuccessful performances athletes admitted 
having thoughts that were not related to the task, as well as self-defeating negative 
thoughts. 
As already acknowledged in previous chapters, a great deal of research concerning 
cognitive interference during task performance has been conducted in educational 
psychology, where cognitive interference has been described as task-irrelevant, self- 
preoccupying thinking, including components of worry about performance (Sarason et 
al., 1990). The interest of psychologists in cognitive interference initiated when 
researchers tried to explain the relationship between test anxiety and cognitive task 
performance. Cognitive interference was introduced as a product of test anxiety which 
was responsible for performance decrements observed in test anxious individuals 
(Wine, 197 1). Research evidence supported the relationship between test anxiety and 
cognitive interference (e. g. Gallassi et al., 198 1; Zatz & Chassin, 1983). On these 
grounds, three theories have been developed to explain the relationship between 
cognitive interference, with particular emphasis on worry, and performance, namely the 
cognitive interference theory (Sarason, 1984,1988), the processing efficiency theory 
(Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), and the control process theory (Carver & 
Scheier, 1984,1988). These three theories, presented in details in the review of 
literature, will be now briefly reminded. 
The cognitive interference theory suggests a linear negative relationship between 
intrusive thinking and performance. Interfering thoughts have the effect of lessening the 
individual's effective behaviour by diverting attention from task relevant cues and using 
cognitive resources which otherwise could be used for task-processing activities 
(Sarason, 1984). 
Although considerable evidence has supported the theory's predictions, Eysenck & 
Calvo (1992) suggested that in some cases results have been equivocal. In particular, 
research (e. g. Blankstein, Toner, & Flett 1989; Calvo & Ramos, 1989) has shown that 
although highly anxious individuals report having more interference than those with 
low 
anxiety, performance in some cases has been shown not to be different. Thus, they 
proposed the processing efficiency theory which postulates that worrying thoughts 
limit 
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processing efficiency, but not necessarily perfon-nance effectiveness. In particular they 
suggested that worry is detrimental to the quality of information processing but not 
necessarily to performance, because it might serve a motivational function. In order to 
cope with threat and consequences of poor performance, individuals experiencing worry 
might be led to the allocation of additional processing resources such as effort or 
different strategies which, if successful, increase processing capacity and possibly 
performance. So, in comparison to the cognitive interference assumptions, the 
processing efficiency hypothesis explains how worry might facilitate performance, 
which is a topic that in recent years has received increased attention in the sport 
psychology literature. 
Finally, Carver & Scheier (1984,1988) proposed the control process theory. They 
suggest that human behaviour is regulated in a system of feedback control. People 
establish goals in relation to certain values and use these goals as reference points. 
When intentional behaviour is displayed they monitor themselves with regard to the 
goals and accordingly adjust their actions in the direction of the reference value, i. e. the 
behavioural standard. When, during this process, discrepancies between intended and 
actual behaviour are detected and worries regarding performance and task completion 
are generated, whether the individual's response will be adaptive or not depends on the 
expectancies of the individual of being able to complete the intended action. Carver & 
Scheier (1984) suggested that under evaluative situations whether the worry 
experienced leads to renewal of efforts or to disengagement in terms of effort 
withdrawal depends on the expectancies of individuals to attain their goal. In particular, 
for individuals holding high goal attainment expectancies, worry results in continued 
and renewed efforts, whereas for those holding unfavourable expectancies worry is 
associated with impulses to disengage from the activity. In summary, Carver and 
Scheier's model added the notion of goal attainment expectancies as a moderator of 
whether worry might be facilitative or debilitative, through the effects worry might have 
on subsequent effort. 
The purpose of the present study, therefore, was to explore in a real competition 
situation athletes' perceptions on how different types of thoughts they experience during 
competition, in relation to their goal attainment expectancies, are associated with 
aspects of performance. Once more, it has to be stressed that since the study focuses on 
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a real competition situation the aim was not to interfere with the athletes' environment 
and concentration while performing. Therefore, real effects of such cognitive activation 
were not possible to observe or assess objectively. Subsequently, it was considered that 
the most appropriate and accurate way to assess such effects was through athletes' 
perceptions of the effects of such thoughts. Thus, where in the text references are made 
to effects, these refer to perceived effects according to participants' assessment. In 
particular, the study focuses on the perceived effects of cognitive interference on 
concentration and subsequent effort input. 
Hypotheses 
In relation to the findings from the TOQS development study and the literature 
reviewed above, hypotheses regarding the relationships between the three types of 
thoughts identified in TOQS and performance features were made. In particular, 
concerning performance worries, based on Sarason's (1984), Wine's (1971) and Eysenck 
& Calvo's (1992) propositions it was hypothesised that effects on concentration will be 
negative, while considering Carver & Scheier's (1988) suggestions, effects on effort will 
be moderated by athletes' goal attainment expectancies. More specifically, it was 
hypothesised that for athletes holding high goal attainment expectancies worries would 
be connected to increased effort, whereas for athletes holding low goal attainment 
expectancies these thoughts would be related to decreased effort. Concerning situation- 
irrelevant thoughts and thoughts of escape, considering that they both are cognitions 
unrelated to task execution, it was also hypothesised that effects on concentration will 
be negative, while no theoretical basis existed to hypothesise what the effects of such 
thoughts on effort might be. However, a negative association between thoughts of 
escape and effort was expected due to the withdrawing nature of these kinds of 
thoughts. 
Method 
Sample 
The sample comprised 115 volleyball players (5 8 males and 57 females) who took part 
in a British Universities Sports Association tournament. The mean age of the sample 
was 21.5 years (standard deviation: 2.78). 
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Instruments 
The Thought Occurrence Questionnaire for Sports was used to assess cognitive 
interference and its effects on concentration and effort (see Appendix F). For each of the 
listed items participants were asked to answer three questions (columns) regarding 
'frequency' of thought occurrence, perceived effects on concentration ('distraction'), 
and perceived effects on 'effort'. 
Frequency. To assess frequency of thought occurrence athletes were asked to report on 
a seven-point scale how frequently they experienced the listed thoughts during the game 
(I = never, 7= very often). 
Distraction. To assess the effects on concentration athletes were asked to indicate, for 
the thoughts they reported experiencing in the previous column (i. e. 'frequency' higher 
than 1), the degree to which these thoughts distracted their concentration (I = not at all 
distracting, 7= very distracting). 
Effort. To assess effects on subsequent effort athletes were asked to indicate, for the 
thoughts they reported experiencing in the initial column (i. e. 'frequency' higher than 
1), the degree to which these thoughts affected subsequent effort input (-3 = made me 
give up trying, 0= neutral, 3= made me try harder). 
An option labeled 'not applicable' was included in the columns inquiring about how 
athletes perceived the effects of their thoughts on concentration and effort for athletes 
reporting not having the listed thoughts. Participants were instructed to complete 'not 
applicable' if they had scored. I (i. e. never) in the 'frequency' column. 
Three items were used to assess goal attainment expectancies ('how well do you expect 
to do in this gamew, 'to what extent do you think you can achieve your goalsT, 
'how 
confident do you feel that you can achieve your goals? '). Goal attainment expectancies 
were self-reported on seven-point scales (I = unfavourable expectancies, 
7 
favourable expectancies). 
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Procedures 
After the teams had registered and before the start of the tournament, participants were 
informed about the research project and were asked to volunteer. Nineteen teams (10 
male and 9 female) agreed to participate and instructions on how to complete the 
questionnaire were given to each team separately. Finally, participants were informed 
that the forms were anonymous. The pre-game questionnaire, including demographic 
characteristics and assessment of goal attainment expectancies, was completed 
approximately 30 minutes before the game, while the post-game questionnaire including 
the TOQS was completed immediately after the conclusion of the game. 
Analysis 
Because the focus was on how each type of thoughts was related to performance 
features, athletes reporting not having a particular kind of thoughts at--all (i. e. scoring 
6never' in all items of the subscale) had to be excluded from the respective analysis. 
Therefore, separate analysis for each TOQS subscale had to be performed. In each 
analysis only those players who reported having the certain types of thoughts could be 
included. The fact that not all athletes reported having all kind of thoughts, resulted in 
different sample sizes for each analysis depending on the number of athletes who 
reported having 'performance worries'. (N = 108), 'situation- irrelevant thoughts' (N 
63), and 'thoughts of escape' (N = 59). Calculation of scores for 'distraction' and 
'effort' involved only items for which participants had reported experiencing (i. e. 'not 
applicable' items were excluded). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations were calculated, where appropriate for the whole 
sample (Table 5.1). The three cognitive interference subscales revealed satisfactory 
internal consistency coefficients (see Table 5.2), and so did the measures of goal 
attainment expectancies (alpha = . 72). Performance worries were the 
kind of thoughts 
that most of the athletes reported having (108 out of 115), compared to situation- 
irrelevant thoughts (63 out of 115) and thoughts of escape (5 9 out of 115). Moreover, it 
was the kind of thoughts that appeared most frequently in athletes' minds (mean = 2.60 
within those athletes who reported experiencing performance worries), compared to 
situation-irrelevant thoughts (mean = 2.11 within those athletes who reported having 
Cognitive interference and performance 80 
such thoughts); and thoughts of escape (mean = 1.86 for those athletes who reported 
having thoughts of escape). The three cognitive interference subscales were moderately 
high correlated. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations for the whole sample. 
Descriptive Correlations 
statistics (Pearson's coefficients) 
Mean S. D. 123 
1. TOQS-W 2.50 1.03 (frequency) 
2. TOQS-1 1.61 . 99 . 41 (frequency) 
3. TOQS-E 1.44 . 81 . 52** . 53** (frequency) 
4. Goal attainment 4.67 1.03 -. 13 -. 04 -. 20* expectancies 
p <. 05, p <. Ol 
Table 5.2 Internal consistency coefficients for the TOQS subscales. 
Frequency Distraction Effort 
Performance worries . 73 . 79 . 
68 
S ituation- irrelevant thoughts . 86 . 
84 . 82 
Thoughts of escape . 85 . 
81 . 73 
Performance worries 
As already identified, analysis regarding the perceived effects of each type of thoughts 
on concentration and effort could only include participants who reported experiencing 
such thoughts. One hundred and eight athletes reported having performance worries. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest in this sub-sample are displayed in 
Table 5.3. 
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Table 5-3. Descriptive statistics for performance worries. 
TOQS-W Mean Standard 
deviation 
Frequency 2.60 
. 
98 
Distraction 2.66 1.14 
E ffo rt -0.09 1.25 
Regarding TOQS-W, the hypothesis was that for the high expectancy group participants 
would report worries leading to increased effort, whereas for the low expectancy group 
participants would report worries leading to decreased effort. The sample was divided 
into high (N =5 1) and low (N =5 7) expectancy groups according to median split. 
Subsequently, path analysis was calculated to test the moderation hypotheses. The 
hypothesised model was initially tested separately for the two groups. In both analyses 
'frequency' was introduced as the independent variable, while 'distraction' and 'effort' 
as the dependent variables. For the high expectancy group (Figure 5.1, regular 
characters), 'frequency' was positively associated to 'distraction' and 'effort'. For the 
low expectancy group (Figure 5.1, bold characters), 'frequency' was positively 
associated to 'distraction', however the path connecting 'frequency' and 'effort' was 
negative. 
78 . 71 
DISTRACTION 
FREQUENCY 
33 -. 24 EFFORT 
Figure 5.1 The path model for performance worries. The regular characters represent 
the path coefficients for the high expectancy group and the bold characters 
represent the path coefficients for the low expectancy group. 
The fit indices for the two models (Table 5.3) revealed good fit. Subsequently, multiple- 
group analysis was conducted to test for invariance of regression weights across 
the two 
groups. The paths of the two models were constrained to 
be equal. The LM-test, which 
in the case of multiple-group analysis tests whether 
improvement of fit can be achieved 
if the equality constraints are released, indicated that the constraint 
for the Irequency'/ 
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'effort' path should be dropped (chi-square increment: 8.79, p<. 05); that is, these paths 
were not equal. Finally, the multiple-group model was tested again after dropping the 
constraint for the Irequency'Peffort' path. The fit indices revealed a much better fit 
(Table 5.3). Thus, the moderation hypothesis was confirmed. 
Table 5.4 The fit indices for the path models: Performance worries 
Fit Index High expectancy 
group 
Low expectancy 
group 
Multi- 
sample I 
Multi- 
sample 2 
Chi -Square/probability 0.143/0.70 1.254/. 26 11.82/0.02 2.69/0.44 
NNFI 1.050 
. 982 . 
874 1.007 
CFI 1.000 
. 
994 
. 916 1.000 
GFI 
. 
998 
. 985 . 
937 . 984 
SRMR 
. 013 . 041 . 165 . 059 
* Multi-sample 1: paths constrained; Multi-sample 2: frequency/effort path constrain 
released. 
Situation irrelevant thoughts 
Sixty three athletes reported having situation irrelevant thoughts. Descriptive statistics 
for this sub-sample are displayed in Table 5.5. The same model was tested for TOQS-I, 
only this time no moderating effects were hypothesised. Therefore a single model was 
tested (Figure 5.2). The fit indices indicated satisfactory fit (Table 5.4), however only 
the path connecting 'frequency' to 'distraction' was significant, indicating that these 
kinds of thoughts were not related to subsequent effort. 
Table 5.5. Descriptive statistics for situation irrelevant thoughts. 
TOQS-I Mean Standard 
deviation 
Frequency 2.11 1.11 
Distraction 2.39 1.26 
E ffo rt . 23 
1.04 
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DISTRACTION 
76 
MEQUENCY 
05 
EFFORT 
Figure 5.2 The path model for situation irrelevant thoughts. 
Table 5.6 The fit indices for the path models: S ituational- irrelevant thougths and 
thoughts of escape. 
Fit Index S ituation- irrelevant Thoughts of escape 
thoughts 
Chi -Square/probability 2.173/0.14 1.157/0.28 
NNFI 
. 935 . 992 
CFI 
. 978 . 997 
GFI 
. 978 . 987 
SRMR 
. 049 . 
034 
Thoughts of escape 
As for the TOQS-1, a single model was tested for TOQS-E (Figure 5.3). Once again the 
fit indices indicated that the model fit the data well (Table 5.4). The path connecting 
'frequency' to 'distraction' was positive, whereas the path connecting 'frequency' to 
'effort' was negative. Fifty nine athletes reported having thoughts of escape. Descriptive 
statistics for this sub-sample are displayed in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7. Descriptive statistics for thoughts of escape. 
TOQS-E Mean Standard 
deviation 
Frequency 1.86 . 96 
Distraction 2.65 1.30 
Effort -. 28 . 96 
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Figure 5.3 The path model for thoughts of escape. 
Structural models to examine moderating effects of goal attainment expectancies for 
situation- irrelevant thoughts and thoughts of escape were also tested. Even though such 
effects were not hypothesised, the models were tested in order to examine whether it is 
the kind of thoughts in relation to the expectancies or merely the expectancies that affect 
subsequent effort (if moderating effects were found for all kinds of thoughts it could be 
speculated that it is the goal attainment expectancies that determines effort during sport 
performance, irrespective of the different thoughts individuals experience). The results 
did not support any moderating effects, thus suggesting that the kind of thoughts 
athletes experience is also important in determining effects on effort. However it should 
be mentioned that due to the small number of athletes who reported experiencing 
situation-irrelevant thoughts (N= 63) and thoughts of escape (N= 59), the size of the 
groups that emerged after splitting the samples was rather small. Thus, the interpretation 
of this result should be cautious. 
Discussion 
The study explored athletes' perceptions of how various thoughts they experience 
during competition influence their concentration and subsequent effort input. In order to 
investigate whether different kinds of thoughts, as assessed by the TOQS, affect aspects 
of performance in different ways separate analyses were calculated for each of the 
questionnaire's subscales. This was because not all participants reported experiencing 
all different types of thoughts. Therefore, only athletes who reported having each type 
of thoughts were included in each analysis. 
Cognitive interference and performance 85 
To test the hypothesised relationships structural equation modeling was chosen. One 
limitation of the models that were tested was that they only had one degree of freedom 
(apart from the multiple-group model). As McCallum (1995) suggests models with few 
degrees of freedom tend not to be disconfin-nable, that is there is a small possibility that 
the model can be rejected from the data, i. e. to have bad fit. Subsequently, for a model 
with minimum degrees of freedom finding a good fit is not so meaningful. 
However, it should be stressed that the major aim was to identify whether different 
associations would emerge for the high and low expectancy groups regarding 
'performance worries', and whether different types of thoughts would have different 
relationships to aspects of performance. Given that the models would probably fit 
because of the restriction in the degrees of freedom, the focus was on how the paths 
would differ. Furthermore, the existence of multiple dependent variables necessitated 
the use of structural equation modeling, since regression analysis cannot account for the 
effects of independent variables on more than one dependent variable in each analysis. 
In that respect, structural analysis, which is a recommended method when testing 
moderation hypotheses (Baron & Kenny, 1986), was considered the most robust 
method, and therefore was preferred. 
Performance worries 
Performance worries were found to have different effects on athletes' subsequent effort 
depending on the expectancies of the athletes. Thus, for those having higher 
expectancies towards goal attainment, worry was related to increases in effort, while for 
those having lower expectancies, worry was related to decreases in effort. As Carver & 
Scheier (1988) indicate, giving up effort reflects beliefs whether effort can possibly lead 
to positive outcomes. Carver et al. (1979) conducting an experiment involving 
anagrams, during which participants' self-attention was enhanced, reported that the 
group provided with poor outcome expectancies withdrew from attempts to solve the 
anagram more quickly than the group which had been provided with positive outcome 
expectancies. Subsequently, they suggested that, given a state of self-awareness, which 
is evident in achievement situations involving evaluation 
(Carver & Scheier, 1984), 
individuals having favourable expectancies perceive that more effort can result in 
accomplishment of the attained goal and therefore more effort 
is applied. In contrast, 
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when expectancies are not favourable and individuals perceive they have no control 
over the outcome, worry discourages further effort and is connected with disengagement 
from the activity either physically or mentally, depending on the value placed on 
continuing or discontinuing. 
The relationship between performance worries and subsequent effort that was revealed 
for athletes holding unfavourable expectancies resembles findings in the area of 
helplessness. Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale (1978) proposed that helpless behaviour 
can result from lack of perceived control over outcome. Furthermore, they suggested 
that the impact of uncontrollability on subsequent performance depends on expectations 
of future non- contingency. Similarly, Wortman & Brehm (1975) argued that helpless 
behaviour is displayed when individuals have expectancies of no control for the action. 
Both these approaches are similar to what Carver & Scheier (1988) presents as 
unfavourable outcome expectancies. In the present investigation it was revealed that for 
athletes with lower expectancies towards goal attainment, worrying thoughts were 
related to impulses to disengage from the activity in the form of effort withdrawal. 
In recent research conducted in sport, Jones & Hanton (1996) reported that for athletes 
having high expectancies of accomplishing their goals, anxiety symptoms were 
interpreted as facilitative, while for those having low expectancies anxiety symptoms 
were experienced as debilitative to performance. Considering these results in 
combination with the present study it could be suggested that athletes holding high 
expectancies of goal attainment, thus anticipating 'success', interpret anxiety symptoms 
as facilitative and subsequently perceive worrying thoughts as warnings that trigger 
more effort (part of the facilitation perception), while for those experiencing anxiety as 
debilitative, worry represents signs of anticipated 'failure' (which is the way anxiety 
was initially perceived) resulting in withdrawal of effort. 
Performance worries were also positively related to how distracting these thoughts 
were. Research in educational settings has repeatedly shown cognitive interference to 
be 
negatively related to performance. Thoughts that are not related to the execution of the 
task have been considered to be detrimental to performance because cognitive resources 
are misused. Instead of thinking how a situation can 
be faced and a task successfully 
executed, individuals ruminate over self-evaluative thoughts that are not 
helpful towards 
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task completion. Eysenck (1992) supported that interfering thoughts occupy part of the 
working memory, thus deteriorating the processing efficiency of the individual. 
Performance worries were found, for athletes holding high expectancies of goal 
attainment, to have both positive and negative effects on performance features, thereby 
supporting Eysenck's (1992) proposition that worry lessens individuals' processing 
efficiency, but might also serve a motivational function. However, this result raises a 
number of questions for which the answers are yet clear. What is the overall effect for 
athletes experiencing worries as a motivational boost, at the cost of concentration 
disruption? Is it possible that increases in effort can balance or overcome performance 
deficits due to decreased attention, and if so in which cases and under what 
circumstances? One possible factor determining whether it is the positive motivational 
effects or the negative aftentional effects that are more influential is the nature of the 
specific sport. One would expect the impact of attentional disruption and additional 
effort to depend on the demands of the sport. 
Another factor influencing how detrimental cognitive interference can be to 
performance is the performance level of the athletes. When the fine skills involved in 
the game are mastered and athletes can executed them relatively automatically, it would 
be expected that cognitive interference effects on performance are less compared to 
athletes who need to devote part of their attention to successfully executing such skills. 
In this study no measure of athletes' expertise was included and therefore no indications 
concerning this assumption can be made. However, future research should examine the 
degree to which this parameter is important in determining the magnitude of the effects 
cognitive interference has on performance. 
Situation-irrelevant thoughts 
The same model was applied to test the relationship between situation- irrelevant 
thoughts and performance. S ituation- irrelevant thoughts were found not to be related to 
athletes' subsequent effort input. The relationship between frequency of thoughts and 
concentration disruption was strong, which once again showed that how distracting 
thoughts that athletes experience during competition are to performance is a matter of 
how frequently such thoughts are experienced. 
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Research in educational psychology examining the relationship between cognitive 
interference and performance has mostly focused on total interference scores rather than 
examining each type of thoughts separately. Such analysis gives an overall picture 
regarding the relationship, but fails to show whether different kind of thoughts have 
different relationships with performance. However, in the few studies examining the 
effects separately, it has been found that performance worries and thoughts of escape 
are more predictive of performance than situation- irrelevant thoughts (Bruch, 
Kaflowitz, & Kuethe, 1986; Hoffman, 1993; Miculiner, 1989). Researchers have 
concluded that self-deprecatory thoughts are more influential in terms of performance. 
However, the present results indicate the need to further explore the role of such 
thoughts. Once again it can be suggested that the occurrence of such thoughts and 
subsequent effects on performance is likely to depend on the demands of the activity. 
Thus, for example, in sports where concentration is not highly important, such as long 
distance running, these thoughts might be usefully distracting by shifting attention from 
unpleasant bodily sensations which might hamper performance (Sachs & Sachs, 198 1). 
Thoughts of escape 
From all the athletes who participated in this study, 59 reported having thoughts of 
escape. These athletes were included in the analysis exploring how such thoughts may 
affect performance. The relation between frequency of thoughts of escape and 
subsequent effort was negative. The more the athletes experienced thoughts of escape 
the more effort was abandoned. 
Carver & Scheier (1986) argues that when individuals experience impulses to disengage 
from an activity, whether withdrawal will be behavioural or mental depends on the 
context of the activity. Thus, when the environment allows for overt withdrawal 
individuals will disengage from the activity, however when the environment is such that 
actual withdrawal is negatively valued and criticised withdrawal will occur at a mental 
level and can also take the form of abandoned efforts. In the social context of sport, 
which was the setting of this study, participation for its own sake 
is highly valued. 
Furthermore, within higher levels of competition withdrawal is often punished as an act 
of disrespect to the purpose of sport. Therefore, overt withdrawal 
is not socially 
acceptable. In accordance to this reasoning, the 
findings of the investigation suggest that 
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when athletes experience cognitive impulses to disengage from an event, such impulses 
are expressed in the form of effort abandonment. 
Finally, as was the case for performance worries, frequency of thoughts of escape were 
also related to concentration disruption, which once more confirms the hypothesis that 
off-task thinking might be responsible for performance decrements by diverting 
attention from the task to be performed and using resources that could be applied for 
task-related constructive purposes. 
To date, research in sport has ignored the role of such thoughts which seem to be a 
serious threat to performance. Further research to explore why individuals come to a 
state where they want to escape a situation, and whether there are trait characteristics 
that make athletes prone to such cognitions looks very appealing and might also prove 
to be very useful in enhancing our understanding of dysfunctional sport behaviour. 
Conclusion 
Researchers (e. g. Klinger, 1985) have occasionally argued that the direction of causality 
in the relationship between cognitive interference and performance is not from 
interference to performance, but from performance to interference. However, the results 
of the present study, having examined athletes' perceptions of effects of cognitive 
interference to aspects of performance, indicate that cognitive interference influences 
performance suggesting that a bi-directional relationship is more likely. Moreover, it 
was indicated that different kinds of thoughts can have different effects on performance 
features. Further research is required to support the present findings and to explore 
whether the relationship between cognitive interference and performance varies, as one 
would expect, according to the attentional demands of the specific sport. 
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Chapter 6. Cognitive Interference and Motivational Orientations 
Study IV: Cognitive interference during competition among athletes with different 
goal orientation profiles. 
Introduction 
Findings from Chapter 4, where possible situational antecedents of cognitive 
interference were examined, revealed that discrepancies between the goals athletes set 
and performance are major determinants of intrusive thoughts athletes experience, 
therefore suggesting that cognitive interference is a goal-related process or experience. 
The degree to which the goals individuals establish are controllable or achievable, and 
therefore the degree to which discrepancies between goals and performance may occur, 
is likely to depend on the nature of the goals. In this study a goal perspectives approach 
to cognitive interference will therefore be attempted. 
Goal perspectives in sport 
To explain differences in behaviour a vast amount of research in sport psychology 
has been devoted to the examination of motivational processes. Within this body of 
research achievement motivation has been given considerable attention. One of the 
main theories in this domain is the 'goal perspectives theory' (Nicholls, 1984,1989), 
which has proved to be valuable in explaining cognitions, affect and behaviour 
individuals display in achievement settings (Dweck, 1992). According to the theory, 
two main kinds of achievement orientation have been identified in terms of the way 
people define success. One concentrates on learning, mastery and self-improvement, 
where the task is the major focus (task orientation), whereas the other focuses on 
normatively-based accomplishment and social comparison, where the self and the 
presentation of the self are the points of reference (ego orientation). Furthermore, 
according to the theory, perceptions of competence are of particular importance for 
individuals displaying a high ego orientation (Nicholls, 1984,1989). In general, task 
orientation, in comparison with ego orientation, especially in the case of low 
perceived competence, has been shown to be connected with more adaptive patterns 
of cognitions (Duda & Nicholls, 1992; Hom, Duda, & Miller, 1993; 
Walling & 
Duda, 1995), affect (Boyd, Callaghan, & Yin, 1991; Duda, Chi, Newton, Walling, 
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& Catley, 1995; Duda & Nicholls, 1992), and behaviour (Graham & Nolan, 1991; 
Solmon & Boone, 1993). 
In the sport psychology literature one of the performance aspects that has been 
related to achievement motivation is anxiety. According to the goal orientations 
theory predictions, task orientation/task oriented individuals should relate negatively 
with anxiety, whereas ego orientation/ego oriented individuals (in particular those 
with low perceptions of competence) should relate positively to anxiety. However, 
results have not been consistent. As Hall & Kerr (1997) indicate, the reason might 
lie in the different ways researchers have conceptualised and measured the two 
constructs of goals and anxiety. Vealey & Campbell (1988) examined relationships 
between achievement goals and anxiety in relation to competition using a uni- 
dimensional measure of anxiety (SCAT) and Ewing's (198 1) technique to assess 
goals, which requires participants to recall the meaning of success on a previous 
occasion of their own choosing. They found a negative association between task 
orientation and anxiety, and no relation between anxiety and ego orientation. Gould, 
Ecklund, Petlichkoff, Peterson, & Bump (199 1), using the same technique to assess 
goals, but a multidimensional measure of anxiety (CSAI, children version) reported 
that achievement goals failed to predict pre- or post-task state anxiety. However, the 
results of these studies can be criticised for evaluating achievement goals in relation 
to past competitive experiences rather than to the upcoming competition, which led 
Gould et al. (199 1) to highlight the need for more accurate assessment of goal 
orientations. 
Swain & Jones (1992), using the Sport Orientation Questionnaire (SOQ), reported a 
negative relation between pre-competition cognitive anxiety and orientation towards 
'goal' (focus on personal standards), as compared to orientation towards 'win' 
(focus on winning). However, Martin & Gill (199 1) did not support any relations 
between the SOQ subscales and cognitive anxiety. 
A possible justification for the lack of consistency for the above findings is provided 
by advancements in goal orientation theory and assessment (Duda & Nicholls, 
1992; Duda & Whitehead, 1998) that provides a more sound conceptualisation of 
goal orientation and highlights the 
importance of perceived competence as an 
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important moderator between goals and cognitions, affect and behaviour. In relation 
to these advancements, Hall & Kerr (1997) found that, for low perceived 
competence athletes, ego orientation (measured 30 minutes prior to competition) 
was positively related to cognitive state anxiety two days, one day and 30 minutes 
prior to competition, whereas the relation between task orientation and cognitive 
anxiety (measured with the same temporal pattern) was negative. However, for the 
high competence group the results did not show consistent patterns. Overall, what is 
of more interest is that from all studies examining goal orientation in relation to 
anxiety only the latter (Hall & Kerr, 1997) has tested the hypothesis that perceived 
competence moderates the relationship between ego orientation and anxiety. 
Integrating cognitive interference and goal orientation 
Considering the self-centered character of ego orientation in comparison to the 
task-centered character of task orientation, and the self-preoccupying nature of 
cognitive interference as opposed to a task-related focus, a link between 
achievement goal orientation and cognitive interference seems plausible and worthy 
of testing. 
Dweck (1989) and Kanfer & Ackerman (1989) have proposed that an ego 
orientation, through increasing the likelihood that individuals focus too much 
attention on developing attributions regarding ability, detracts from task 
performance. Cognitive activities of ego oriented individuals use up resources that 
otherwise could be applied to the task, therefore hindering task performance. 
Moreover, taking into consideration the way perceived competence influences ego 
oriented individuals' cognitions, it might be suggested that performance of ego 
oriented individuals with low perceived ability, compared to those with high 
perceived ability, would be more negatively affected by the cognitive activities 
brought about by an ego goal orientation. 
Diener & Dweck (1980), experimenting using paper and pencil tests, asked 
participants to verbalise their thoughts during task performance. Ego oriented 
children, contrary to task oriented ones, engaged in task irrelevant verbalisations, 
usually of as el f-aggrandi sing nature. Hoffman (1993) examined the relationship 
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between ego orientations, cognitive interference and performance. Ego orientation 
was found to be related to task-relevant worries, but no effect was indicated for 
thoughts irrelevant to the task. However, measures of task orientation were not 
included, and thus comparisons were not possible. In addition, perceived 
competence was not tested as a moderator of the relationship. 
In the sport context, Newton & Duda (1993), experimenting with students across three 
bowling games, examined the relationship between goal orientation and performance 
cognitive content. The only significant result that emerged was that in one of the three 
games task orientation was found to be negatively correlated with performance worry, 
and positively correlated with keeping one's concentration. The lack of consistency 
across the three games was attributed to the small sample size and the non-competitive 
environment in which the games took place. Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
measures of cognitive content were based on single-item responses. 
Finally, in relation to the content of this project, Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle (in press) 
examined relationships between dispositional goal orientations, perceived competence, 
and tendencies to experience cognitive interference in sports based on a retrospective 
measure of tendencies to experience cognitive interference (asking how often during 
competitions athletes generally experience certain thoughts). The results revealed that 
within participants with lesser perceived competence ego orientation was positively 
associated with thoughts of escape, whereas task orientation was negatively related to 
such thoughts. Furthermore, within athletes with higher perceptions of competence, task 
orientation was negatively related to thoughts of escape, while the relationship 
between 
thoughts of escape and ego orientation was also negative, though small 
in magnitude 
and non- significant. However, in this particular study cognitive 
interference was 
assessed through the original TOQ (Sarason et al., 1986). Psychometric evaluation of 
the instrument revealed limited validity thus allowing further analysis regarding only 
the two of the three instrument subscales ('task- irrelevant thoughts' and 
'thoughts of 
escape'). 
Based on the modified instrument a similar study was 
designed for the purposes of this 
investigation. In contrast to Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle (in press), where cognitive 
interference tendencies were assessed based on past experiences, the present study 
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involved evaluation of cognitive interference in relation to events just completed. 
Furthermore, because of the immediate responses related to cognitive interference it was 
decided to replace measurements of general perceived competence with competition 
outcome, a more situationally relevant variable, whose importance in relation to 
fluctuation in cognitive patterns ego oriented individuals display have been supported 
(e. g. Diener & Dweck, 1978; Diener & Dweck, 1980). As Duda (1993) points out 
regardless of whether a task or an ego orientation prevails, highly task or ego oriented 
individuals can be considered competitive. However, task in contrast to ego oriented 
athletes would probably differ in the way they approach competitive situations and also 
in terms of the objective of the competitive experience. Despite the fact that they both 
are interested in winning, it is the relevant importance of the competitive outcome in 
relation to the competitive process, and the psychological devastation associated with 
losing that possibly discriminates psychological responses between task and ego 
oriented individuals. 
Factor analytic studies on the TEOSQ have supported the orthogonality, in contrast to 
the bipolarity, of task and ego orientations (Duda & Nicholls, 1992). Subsequently, as 
Hardy (1997) suggests, studies are required to examine the interactive effects of task 
and ego orientations. As Hardy (1997, p. 283) argues, "making comparisons between 
subjects who are ostensibly high in task orientation against subjects who are ostensibly 
high in ego orientation ... does not make a 
lot of sense theoretically". Considering 
Hardy's proposition, but also manifestations regarding the importance of outcome 
within ego orientation, an attempt was made to account for the interactive effects 
between goal orientations and outcome. 
Thus, with regard to goal orientations profiles, self-referenced and comparative goal 
groups were created. The self-referenced goal group was operationalised as comprising 
participants with high task and low ego orientations, whereas the comparative goal 
group comprised participants with low task and high ego orientations. 
Subsequently, 
cognitive interference scores from the groups were compared under conditions of 
different game outcomes, i. e. winning and losing. 
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Hypotheses 
In accordance with the predictions of goal orientations theory it was hypothesised that: 
(a) the comparative group in the losing situation will experience higher levels of 
cognitive interference than the comparative group in the winning situation and the self- 
referenced group in either the winning or the losing situation, 
(b) there will be no differences in cognitive interference between the comparative group 
in the winning situation and the self-referenced group in either the winning or the losing 
situation, and 
(c) there will be no differences in cognitive interference between the self-referenced 
group in the winning and losing situation. 
Method 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 71 volleyball players (50 males and 21 females) who took part 
in the finals of the British Universities Sport Association league. Each team would play 
at least four games within a period of three days. The mean age of the sample was 23.07 
years (standard deviation 2.98). 
Instruments 
Cognitive interference. The Thought Occurrence Questionnaire for Sport was used to 
measure frequency of interfering thoughts (see Chapter 3 for details). 
Goal orientations. The Task and Ego Orientation in Sport Questionnaire (TEOSQ; 
Duda & Nicholls, 1992) was used to assess dispositional goal orientations. The TEOSQ 
is one of the most widely used instruments in the field of sport psychology the last few 
years, and has shown remarkable psychometric properties. Duda & Whitehead (1998) in 
a review of studies using the questionnaire report over 50 published studies in which 
internal consistency coefficients for the task and ego subscales were over . 70. 
Furthermore, the factorial validity of the instrument has been supported in a number of 
studies (e. g. Duda, 1989; Duda, Olson, & Templin, 1991), through exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis. 
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The TEOSQ comprises 13 items and two subscales measuring 'task orientation' (e. g. 'I 
feel most successful in volleyball when I do my very best', ' ... I learn a new skill by 
trying hard'), and 'ego orientation' (e. g. '... I am the best', '... I am the only one who 
can perform a skill'). Ratings were made on five point scales (1= strongly disagree, 5= 
strongly agree). 
The instruments used in this study are displayed in Appendix G. 
Procedures 
In order to increase the possibility that reasonably balanced winning and losing 
conditions could be obtained, but also in order to test the consistency of the results, 
cognitive interference was assessed over three games. Therefore, athletes were asked to 
complete the TOQS immediately after the conclusion of three games. The TEOSQ was 
completed independently of the competition context. In particular, the questionnaire was 
distributed to the team captains who were instructed to administer them to the players 
during that evening at the team residency. This was deemed appropriate in order to 
minimise possible bias in the questionnaire completion from events (e. g. team 
performance, outcome) during the first day of the competition. Even though it has to be 
acknowledged that such effects could not be controlled, the structure of the competition 
did not allow for the questionnaire to be completed before the start of the games. 
Analysiv 
In order to test the hypotheses MANOVA with planned comparisons was used. This 
particular analysis was preferred since specific hypotheses regarding differences 
between the groups existed, in which case planned comparisons is the most appropriate 
analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Means, standard deviations and Cronbach's alpha internal consistency coefficients for 
all variables are presented in Table 6.1. In accordance to previous research 
(e. g. Duda & 
Nicholls, 1992; Fox, Goudas, Biddle, Duda, & Armstrong, 1994; Goudas, Biddle, & 
Fox, 1994) task and ego orientations were essentially orthogonal (r--- . 08). Correlations 
between the three measures of cognitive interference are presented in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics for all variables 
Variable Descriptive statistics Internal 
consistencv 
Mean Standard Cronbach's 
deviation alpha 
Task orientation 2.87 1.03 . 72 
Ego orientation 3.93 . 51 . 86 
TOQS-W game 1 2.51 1.03 . 71 
TOQS-W game 2 2.52 . 94 . 78 
TOQS-W game 3 2.54 . 98 . 74 
TOQS-1 game 1 1.62 . 69 . 70 
TOQS-I game 2 1.42 . 55 . 69 
TOQS-I game 3 1.40 . 62 . 81 
TOQS-E game 1 1.55 . 83 . 86 
TOQS-E game 2 1.54 . 87 . 90 
TOQS-E game 3 1.55 . 83 . 85 
Table 6.2 Correlations between the three cognitive interference measures. 
game I game 1 game 2 
to to to 
game 2 game 3 game 3 
TOQS-W . 
23 . 19 . 
17 
TOQS-1 . 42** . 
53** . 60** 
TOQS-E . 60** . 
64** . 
67** 
*p<. 05, ** p<. Ol 
The three TOQS-W measures were lowly inter-correlated indicating that frequency of 
performance worries during the three games fluctuated considerably within individuals. 
The three TOQS-1 and TOQS-E measures revealed high inter-correlations suggesting 
that frequency of situation irrelevant thoughts and thoughts of escape remained 
relatively stable across the three games. 
Finally, correlations between goal onentations and cognitive interference scores 
in the 
three games are presented in Table 6.3. Task orientation correlated negatively with 
TOQS-W in all three games (although the magnitude of the correlation in game 2 was 
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very small), was lowly negatively correlated to TOQS-1 in game 1, but uncorrelated in 
games 2 and 3, and was also negatively correlated to TOQS-E in all three games. Ego 
orientation was positively, but rather lowly, correlated to TOQS-W in games I and 3 
and uncorrelated in game 2, negatively, but again lowly, correlated to TOQS-I in game 
I and uncorrelated in games 2 and 3, and finally positively correlated to TOQS-E in all 
three games (once more the relationship was rather weak in two out of the three games). 
Table 6.3 Correlations between dispositional variables (N =7 1). 
Ego Task 
TOQS-W 1 
. 11 -. 23 * 
TOQS-W 2 -. 01 -. 08 
TOQS-W 3 . 17 -. 28* 
TOQS-1 1 . 29* -. 11 
TOQS-1 2 . 02 -. 01 
TOQS-1 3 -. 06 -. 01 
TOQS-E 1 . 22 -. 34** 
TOQS-E 2 . 15 -. 29* 
TOQS-E 3 . 16 -. 26* 
* p<. 055 ** p<. Ol 
Planned comparisons 
Subsequently, in relation to the hypotheses and based on participants' scores on task 
and ego orientations, self-referenced and comparative groups were created by median 
split. The self-referenced group comprised athletes scoring high on task orientation and 
low on ego orientation (N= 2 1), whereas the comparative group comprised athletes 
scoring low on task orientation and high on ego orientation (N= 18). The two sub- 
samples were further divided in relation to the outcome of the three games. In order to 
test the specific hypotheses, MANOVA with orthogonal planned comparisons were 
calculated for each of the three games. The design for the planned comparisons is 
presented in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4 The planned comparisons design. 
Comparison Conditions 
Group I 
High task/low ego 
Win 
Group2 
High task/low ego 
Lose 
Group 3 
Low task/high ego 
Win 
Group 4 
Low task/high ego 
Lose 
Total 
(2) 
(3) 
x (2) 
(1) x (3) 
(2) x (3) 
* Numbers in parentheses identify three planned comparisons: 
(1) Low task/high ego - Lose vs High task/low ego - Win, High task/low ego - Lose, Low task/high 
ego - Win; 
(2) Low task/high ego - Win vs High task/low ego - Win, High task/low ego - Lose; (3) High task/low ego - Win vs High task/low ego - Lose. 
The first analysis involved TOQS scores obtained after the first game. The results 
revealed a significant multivariate effect (F= 2.15, p<. 05). The univariate tests showed 
significant effects for TOQS-E (F= 6.18, p<. 05), but non-significant effects for TOQS- 
W (F= 1.69) and TOQS-1 (F=. 55). Planned comparisons confirmed the hypothesised 
differences for TOQS-E indicating that the comparative group in the losing condition 
reported higher levels of thoughts of escape than the comparative group in the winning 
condition and the self-referenced groups in the winning and losing conditions, and also 
that among the latter three groups no significant differences existed. The results from 
the first planned comparisons are presented in Table 6.5. 
The analysis regarding the second game revealed a multivariate effect that approached 
significance (F= 1.8 1, p= . 
07), however estimation of effect size was such that further 
examination of the analysis was considered appropriate (eta squared =. 14). The 
univariate tests revealed significant effects for TOQS-W (F= 3.02, p<. 05) and TOQ-E 
(F= 2.98, p<. 05), but not for TOQS-1 (F=. 85). The planned comparisons confirmed the 
hypothesised differences for TOQS-E, but not for TOQS-W where the comparative 
group in the losing condition did not differ from the rest of the groups. Furthermore, the 
comparative group in the winning condition reported higher levels of worry than the 
self-referenced group in the winning and losing condition, and the self-referenced group 
in the losing condition reported higher levels of worry than the self-referenced group in 
the winning condition. The results for the second game are presented in Table 6.6. 
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The analysis regarding the third game revealed a significant multivariate effect (F= 
1.99, p<. 05). The univariate tests revealed significant effects for TOQS-E (F= 5.15, 
p<. 05), effects that approached significance for TOQS-W (F= 2.69, p=. 06), and non- 
significant effects for TOQS-1 (F= .5 7). The planned comparisons confirmed the 
hypothesis for TOQS-E and TOQS-W indicating that the comparative goal group in the 
losing situation scored higher than all the other groups in TOQS-E and TOQS-W. At the 
same time no differences emerged between the rest of the groups. Despite the fact that 
the univariate effect for TOQS-W only approached significance the results of the 
planned comparisons were considered due to the magnitude of the effect size (eta 
squared = . 19). However, this particular result should be interpreted cautiously and also 
in relation to the results of the previous analyses. The results of the third analysis are 
displayed in Table 6.7. Mean scores for all groups in all games are displayed in Table 
6.8. 
Table 6.8 Cognitive interference scores for goal groups in each of the three games. 
Game I Group I Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
TOQS-W 12.61 17.64 14.57 17.56 
TOQS-I 6.98 8.36 8.79 8.69 
TOQS-E 7.22 8.73 9.07 13.09 
Game 2 
TOQS-W 14.33 15.75 15.50 14.88 
TOQS-1 6.61 7.94 6.42 7.71 
TOQS-E 7.06 8.50 8.55 13.12 
Game 3 
TOQS-W 12.06 15.06 16.35 17.59 
TOQS-1 6.56 7.69 7.55 6.23 
TOQS-E 7.89 8.37 8.95 12.00 
* Group 1: High task/low ego - Win; Group 2: High task/low ego - Lose; Group 
3: 
Low task/high ego - Win; Group 4: Low task/high ego - Lose. 
Discussion 
Stemming from findings obtained when situational antecedents of cognitive interference 
were considered, which suggested that cognitive interference 
is a goal-related 
experience, the present study attempted to 
identify whether goal orientations are 
connected to tendencies to experience 
interfering thoughts. Consistent and at the same 
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time strong correlations for the three games were revealed only between task orientation 
and thoughts of escape (negative relationship). Thus, finiher analysis considering the 
interactive effects between goal orientations and game outcome could give a better 
insight into the relationships between goal orientations and cognitive interference, but 
also to examine the importance of outcome in influencing these relationships. 
Perfonnance worries 
Only in one of the three analyses were the predictions regarding performance worries 
confirmed. A possible explanation for this finding is that performance worries are a 
function of the specific goals individuals establish. Indeed, in Chapter 4 it was found 
that discrepancies between goals and performance was the best predictor of interfering 
thoughts. Thus, individuals adopting different goals may experience similar levels of 
worries, however the source of these worries can be different. For example, for 
individuals adopting self-referenced goals worries might be the result of discrepancies 
between targeted and actual performance levels, whereas for individuals adopting 
comparative goals worries might be the result of discrepancies between targeted and 
actual result/outcome. In this study athletes' perceptions of performance quality were 
not included, therefore it is not possible to speculate further on this point. 
Nevertheless, having found that performance worries are not necessarily detrimental to 
performance, depending on expectancies of goal attainment (Chapter 5), it could be 
argued that it is the response to such worries that might differ between individuals 
adopting different goals. Within task orientation goal attainment is more controllable in 
comparison to ego orientation. This is due to task goals being related to one's individual 
performance, whereas ego goals also depend on performance of others. According to 
Carver & Scheier (1984) the response to worry depends on perceptions of control over 
outcome. Therefore, within task orientation, where goals are more controllable 
individuals might respond to worry with increased effort, whereas within ego 
orientation, where goals are less controllable, individuals' response to worry might 
be 
effort withdrawal. 
Situation-irrelevant thoughts 
The predicted patterns regarding situati on- irrelevant thoughts were not confirmed 
in any 
of the analyses. In most of the research 
in educational psychology total cognitive 
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interference scores have been the focus of attention. Thus, there are few indications as 
to whether different kinds of thoughts are related to different personality dispositions. 
The few studies reporting results separately for each of the TOQ's subscales have 
examined cognitive interference relationships with situational variables and 
performance (e. g. Miculiner, 1989). Considering that such thoughts have not been 
previously studied it remains of interest to further explore their role in sport 
performance. 
Considering that situation irrelevant thoughts might be detrimental to performance in 
some sports, especially those involving maximum concentration and continuous 
attention to external stimulus (e. g. tennis), but might also be neutral or even helpful in 
others (e. g. running; Sachs & Sachs 198 1), it is likely that such thoughts might either be 
unintentionally emerging and therefore not wanted, or deliberately recalled and used as 
coping strategies in difficult situations (Sachs & Sachs, 198 1). In the first case the 
occurrence of such thoughts might be related to characteristics like the tendency to 
experience 'cognitive failures' (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982), a 
personality characteristic referring to lapses of attention and processing, such as absent- 
mindedness, that was not included in the present study, whereas in the second case it is 
a matter of psychological skill training. 
Thoughts of escape 
Analysis regarding thoughts of escape confirmed the predicted relationships with 
remarkable consistency. In particular, it was shown that when game outcome was 
unfavourable individuals holding comparative goals suffered significantly more 
thoughts of escape than those holding self-referenced goals, whereas when game 
outcome was favourable, no differences between individuals with comparative and self- 
referenced goals emerged. 
In accordance to these findings, research in educational settings 
has shown that for ego 
orientation outcome is an important determinant of cognitions and 
behaviour (Dweck, 
1992). Diener & Dweck (1978,1980), in experiments involving cognitive tasks, 
examined thought content under conditions of success and 
failure in relation to goal 
orientation. Under the success condition all participants reported 
their thoughts to be 
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related to problem-solving strategies. Under the failure condition ego oriented 
participants engaged in negative self-evaluative cognitions, whereas task oriented 
participants focused again on problem-solving strategies and instructions to sustain 
effort and concentration to the task. 
Carver & Scheier (1986) argued that when goal attainment appears unlikely and 
individuals perceive they have no control over behavioural outcome, they tend to 
withdraw from further efforts towards the goal. They went on to suggest that when 
physical withdrawal from the setting is not socially sanctioned, i. e. when withdrawal is 
negatively valued as it is the case in sport, disengagement impulses are likely to be 
expressed psychologically, rather than overtly. In research conducted to examine these 
hypotheses mental disengagement was indicated through performance decrements (e. g. 
Carver & Scheier, 1982), but also off-task thinking (e. g. Diener & Dweck, 1978). 
Furthermore, consistent with this reasoning and the results of the present study, Gallassi 
et al. (198 1) found that during a test situation mental disengagement was expressed, as 
reported retrospectively, in the form of frequent thoughts concemed with escaping from 
the situation. 
Previous research (Hatzigeorgiadis & Biddle, in press) examining relationships between 
goal orientations and tendencies to experience cognitive interference in sports based on 
a retrospective measure (asking how often during competitions athletes generally 
experience certain thoughts) revealed that within individuals with lesser perceived 
competence ego orientation was positively related to tendencies to experience thoughts 
of escape (in contrast to task orientation which was negatively related to such 
tendencies), whereas within individuals with higher perceptions of competence ego 
orientation was not related to E-thoughts (task orientation was again negatively related 
to such thoughts). However, the present results provide further insight regarding 
cognitive patterns of ego oriented individuals. Competence within an ego orientation 
is 
judged in terms of outcome, which justifies the similar results of the two studies. 
However, despite the high relationship that should exist between judgements of one's 
competence within an ego orientation and normative evaluation of outcomes, 
feeling 
competent does not guarantee achieving your goal in all situations. 
Based on this 
assumption, it could be suggested that even for 
individuals with high competence, 
negative patterns of cognitions are 
likely to occur when having a bad day, or when the 
opposition is better and the outcome 
does not match the goals of the individual. 
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From a broader perspective, the above results support the notion that task orientation is 
associated with cognitive stability, while ego orientation has been described as more 
'fragile'. These differences in cognitive patterns could be attributed to the way 
individuals with different goals understand achievement. For task orientation, where 
achievement is defined in terms of effort, learning, personal improvement and mastery, 
individuals can have greater control over their goals. In contrast, for ego orientation, 
where achievement is defined in terms of non-native comparison and outperforming 
others, individuals' control over goals is less. Outcome, when judged in a 
winning/losing distinction depends on factors outside the individual, such as the 
performance of the opposition and, in the case of team sports as in the present 
investigation, on the performance of other individuals within the team, and the team as a 
whole. The lack of control over outcome denotes that within ego orientation 
discrepancies between goals and outcomes are more likely to occur. Such discrepancies 
were found in the previous study (Chapter 4) to be the major determinant of 
withdrawing thoughts individuals experience while performing. 
Conclusion 
As one would expect, and the research as presented in Chapter 4 has demonstrated, 
interfering thoughts during competition are mostly a function of what is going on in the 
competition. It is not the dispositional characteristics of individuals that trigger such 
thoughts, but the cognitive frame of mind of the individual during competition and 
quality of performance that generate them. However, the findings from this study 
suggest that goal orientations play an important role in determining whether thoughts of 
escape are likely to be experienced, indicating that under unfavourable situational 
conditions individuals with lower task and higher ego orientation are more prone to 
experiencing withdrawal cognitions. Despite the absence of a consistent association 
between goal orientations and performance worries and situation- irrelevant thoughts, 
results regarding the relationships between ego orientation and thoughts of escape are 
in 
line with literature suggesting that individuals adopting comparative goals are more 
inclined to motivationally maladaptive cognitions due to dependency on uncontrollable 
factors such as competition outcome. 
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Chapter 7. General Discussion 
Thoughts that athletes experience while performing have been identified by athletes and 
psychologists working in sport as an important feature of performance. Despite its 
significance cognitive content during sport performance has not attracted much attention 
in the sport psychology literature. The purpose of the present investigation was to 
explore the role of thoughts athletes experience while performing which are not related 
to the execution of the task to be performed. Stemming from literature in test anxiety, 
cognitive interference in educational settings, and sport anxiety, key research questions 
were formulated. In the initial stages of the inquiry an instrument to assess cognitive 
interference in sport was developed. Subsequently, based on the instrument that 
emerged, relationships between cognitive interference, sport anxiety, performance, and 
motivational orientations were examined. 
The results revealed significant associations between pre-competition anxiety and 
cognitive interference. However, it was found that the best predictor of cognitive 
interference is what is 'going on' during competition, that is quality of performance in 
relation to goals athletes have. Furthermore, according to athletes' perceptions, it was 
identified that thought content while performing influences concentration levels and 
subsequent effort. Finally, relationships between goal orientations and tendencies to 
experience withdrawing thoughts were revealed. An overview of the results of the 
individual studies is presented in Table 7.1. Overall, the findings suggest that cognitive 
interference is a topic worthy of investigation which requires further attention and 
research directed towards it within sport psychology. 
In this final chapter of the thesis the results of the individual studies are revisited. In an 
attempt to integrate these results, and guided from the existing literature in cognitive 
interference, a conceptual model regarding the role of thoughts athletes experience 
during sport performance is proposed. 
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General discussion III 
A conceptual model for cognitive interference and performance 
The most interesting and possibly important aspect of the investigation involved 
examination of the relationship between cognitive interference and performance. Since 
the interest in cognitive interference grew out of research on test anxiety it is not 
surprising that a focus on worry, the cognitive element of anxiety during task 
performance, can be detected in the literature (McLeod, 1996). Even though other 
thoughts athletes experience might also be important, this focus seems justifiable to a 
degree since, as it was revealed in all of the studies of the present investigation, worries 
about performance are the most common type of thoughts individuals experience while 
performing. Given that focus, theories regarding relationships between cognitive 
interference and performance are mostly related to these particular type of thoughts 
individuals experience while performing. Consequently, the hypotheses of the 
investigation based on these theories were more suitable and applicable to performance 
worries rather than to the other kinds of thoughts under investigation, i. e. situation 
irrelevant thoughts and thoughts of escape. Subsequently, the nature of the investigation 
regarding these latter kinds of thoughts was mostly exploratory. 
Early research in educational settings focused on the relationship between worry and 
performance in cognitive tasks and findings supported the hypothesised relationship. 
The demonstration of such an association does not provide direct evidence that 
interfering thoughts cause performance deficits. Indeed, it was argued (Klinger, 1996) 
that the causal nature of the association might even be in the reverse direction, with 
individuals experiencing difficulties to complete a task tending to worry as a 
consequence of poor performance. However, later research (e. g. Naveh-Benjamin, 
199 1) gave evidence that worry does affect performance through findings that direct 
manipulation of the former could serve to modify the latter. Nevertheless, Carver & 
Scheier (1988), in their control process model of anxiety, suggested that human 
behaviour is regulated in a system of feedback control. They argued that cognitive 
interference is generated due to performance deficits individuals identify while working 
on a task, that is cognitive interference is fundamentally a function of performance. 
Based on the above propositions the investigation attempted to explore how cognitive 
interference and performance are related in the sport context. On one hand, performance 
was found to be the best predictor of cognitive interference, and in particular 
performance worries athletes experience during competition. On the other 
hand, based 
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on athletes' perceptions it was revealed that worry affects important aspects of 
perfon-nance, such as concentration and effort. In an attempt to account for the present 
findings, but also based on existing literature and theories, a conceptual model 
representing the relationship between performance worries and sport performance will 
be presented. 
At this point it is important to note that the proposed model is not solely a product of the 
studies conducted within the present investigation, but rather a hypothesised model of 
the relationships between worry and performance. that can account for the findings, and 
also a conceptual representation of hypotheses which can help create new research 
questions. The model that will be described is relevant to this particular type of intrusive 
thinking, namely performance worries. Additional considerations regarding the two 
other types of thoughts that were investigated are presented in a later section of the 
discussion. 
Stemming from the findings in cognitive interference (e. g. Klinger, 1985; Sarason, 
1984) and the control process model of anxiety (Carver & Scheier, 1988), and in 
accordance to the results of the present investigation, it seems that the relationship 
between performance worries and performance is reciprocal, that is performance levels 
determines thought content and thought content affects performance. However, rather 
than suggesting that one can cause the other, it seems more appropriate to hypothesise 
that the relationship between performance worries and performance can be presented in 
'closed system' (Figure 7.1). 
Cognitive 
nterference 
Performance 
Figure 7.1 A closed model of cognitive interference and performance. 
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Having examined the role of variables that proved crucial in determining this 
relationship a more comprehensive model is proposed. This model is presented in 
Figure 7.2 and a description will now be attempted (numbers in parentheses refer to text 
and paths in Figure 7.2). If it is assumed that athletes enter a competition with specific 
goals (0a), as identified by Jones & Hanton (1996), during the process of performing 
(0b) they automatically evaluate their progress towards, and their chances to reach, 
these goals (even if specific targets are not set, athletes intuitively know their 
capabilities and therefore performance standards exist to which present performance can 
be compared; Carver & Scheier, 1988). When such comparisons take place (0) the 
distance between desirable/expected and actual performance is identified, i. e. possible 
discrepancies are detected. If no discrepancies are found (I a), according to Carver & 
Scheier, 1988), the comparative process is interrupted until a later occasion or 
terminated (I al). If discrepancies from goals are identified (I b), thoughts, essentially of 
a self-evaluative nature (as identified in Chapter 4), regarding such deficits occur (I bl). 
Such thoughts (2), being unproductive in terms of the task processes were found in 
Chapter 5 to be detrimental to concentration (2a). Such effects have been attributed to 
the fact that cognitive resources that could be used for task-processing purposes are 
misused (Sarason, 1988). That is what Eysenck & Calvo (1992) in their cognitive 
approach to interference described as reductions in storage and processing capacity of 
the working memory devoted to the task. In addition, the occurrence of such thoughts is 
likely to influence subsequent effort input of the individuals (Chapter 5). In this 
instance, the expectancies of athletes to attain the pursued goals can be considered 
crucial. Thus, when goal attainment expectancies are relatively high (2bl), efforts will 
be renewed or even increased (2cI) in order to reduce the identified deficits and reach 
the desired goals. In contrast, when goal attainment expectancies are low (2bll), and 
individuals feel they have little or no control over behavioural outcome (Carver 1988), 
efforts will be reduced or abandoned (2cII)- 
In the case of low expectancies the effects of worry are detrimental to both 
concentration (3a) and effort (3b) and consequently to performance. However, in the 
case of high expectancies, effects of worry are detrimental to concentration 
(3a) but 
beneficial to effort (3b). Subsequently, the effects on performance depend on the 
demands of the activity (Eysenck 1992), that is the nature of the sport (4), but also on 
the abilities of the individual (4) in terms of effort (capacity) and concentration 
(skill). 
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For example, in team sports increases in individual effort do not necessarily result in 
increased performance because that also depends on the performance of the rest of the 
team. Furthermore, in some sports concentration is more important than in others and 
therefore the beneficial effects of additional effort can be overpowered by the 
detrimental effects on concentration. Finally, in sports involving direct competition 
perforrnance of the opposition might not allow for improvements. Thus, depending on 
such factors performance (5) might improve, decrease or remain unaffected. 
Subsequently, the cycle might repeat itself (0, Oa, Ob) until the goal is reached or 
abandoned, or when the event is completed. 
Additional considerations 
A first issue that should be considered is the possible relation between the size of 
discrepancies between desirable and actual performance, goal attainment expectancies, 
and subsequent effort. Duval et al. (1992) argues that important determinants of these 
relationships are the size of the identified discrepancies and the perceived rate of 
progress towards the goal. Specifically, they argued that when the rate of actual-to- 
desirable discrepancy reduction is adequate relative to the size of the discrepancy, 
efforts to reach the desirable goal will be renewed. In contrast, when the rate of progress 
towards the goal in inadequate in relation to the size of the discrepancy the dominant 
behavioural response will be withdrawal of effort. Thus, it can be argued that large 
discrepancies might lead to greater effort increases than small discrepancies, when 
progress towards the goal is satisfactory. In contrast, lack of progress in a large 
discrepancy situation will result in effort abandonment, but this might not be necessarily 
the case in a small discrepancy situation, where the goal is still visible, i. e. can be still 
perceived as attainable. 
As it becomes apparent, expectancy of goal attainment is a process rather than a 
fixed/stable characteristic. Despite the fact that in the respective study (Chapter 5) goal 
attainment expectancies due to practical difficulties were measured before the 
competition, they could still account for differences in responses to performance deficits 
and subsequent worries. Possible explanations for this finding might be (a) that athletes 
perceptions before the game were accurate and based on knowledge of their own and 
their opponents' capacity, (b) that pre-game perceptions in some cases might be strong 
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enough to overpower the progress of the game (an explanation that appears very 
adaptive in the case of positive expectancies, but maladaptive in the case of negative 
expectancies), or (c) that the actual size of the relationships that emerged may be larger 
when expectancies during the process of the game could be assessed. Overall, even 
though the role of the magnitude of discrepancies and the rate of progress towards the 
goal are not possible to evaluate during real competition situations, alternative 
methodologies can be employed to further investigate their role. 
The role of anxiety intensity and direction 
Another issue to consider is the role of pre-competition anxiety in such a model. 
Relationships between anxiety and performance worries were moderate. On the one 
hand, the relationship can be described as large enough to suggest that pre-competition 
anxiety leads to worry. Stemming from the results of the study investigating the 
relationship between pre-competition anxiety and cognitive interference during 
performance (Chapter 5), it could be suggested that cognitive anxiety is probably the 
most important pre-competition predictor of cognitive interference and in particular 
worry. Based on these findings, anxiety could be placed in the model as an exogenous 
variable contributing to the generation (prediction) of cognitive interference. However, 
this was not considered appropriate since it is quite likely that anxiety might be related 
to, or interact with, several other constructs included in the model (e. g. goal attainment 
expectancies; Jones & Hanton, 1996), a possibility that was not examined in the present 
investigation. 
On the other hand, the relationship can be described as small enough to justify 
inconsistencies in the anxiety/performance relationship. Considering that the strongest 
predictor of cognitive interference was performance deficits identified by athletes, it is 
likely that anxiety states are subject to changes once competition has started. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that anxiety research focusing on pre-competition states of athletes 
has failed to come up with reliable results in the anxiety/performance relationship. This 
of course does not mean that pre-competition anxiety research should be 
underestimated, however more emphasis should be placed on how anxiety translates to 
cognitions during competition. 
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The relationship between somatic anxiety and performance worries was smaller 
compared to cognitive anxiety, however it was larger than the magnitude of the 
relationship that has been identified in educational research (e. g. Sarason, 1984; Sarason 
et al., 1986). Considering the nature of sport this is not surprising. Test situations 
involve almost exclusively cognitive processes and abilities, whereas sport is a 
combination of cognitive and somatic skills. The somatic state of the athlete is 
important in the process of performing and therefore athletes' thoughts are also 
concerned with bodily sensations, since these might be crucial in determining 
performance. Even though originally multidimensional anxiety theory predicted that 
relationships between somatic anxiety and performance are weaker that those between 
cognitive anxiety and performance, contemporary research has in some, although few, 
instances revealed somatic anxiety to be a better predictor of performance (e. g. Edwards 
& Hardy, 1996; Gould et al., 1987). In relation to the present findings, an important 
research question arises regarding what happens to somatic anxiety symptoms once 
performance has been initiated and how such symptoms influence thought content 
during performance. 
In congruence with previous studies, highlighting the need to incorporate the dimension 
of anxiety direction into sport anxiety research, this dimension was of some importance 
in predicting levels of cognitive interference. In particular, it was revealed that athletes 
perceiving their anxiety symptoms as facilitative reported less interfering thoughts than 
those perceiving their symptoms as debilitative. Burton (1998) questions whether 
anxiety can really be facilitative and argues that if by definition anxiety should be 
considered as negative affect, it is likely that researchers are simply mislabeling as 
anxiety other positive emotions such as challenge and excitement. Thus, the problem 
seems to lie in the conceptualisation of anxiety. 
Considering the recent criticism anxiety measurement in the form of CSAI-2 has 
received (Bur-ton, 1998; Burton & Naylor, 1997; Lane et al., 1999; see review of 
literature for a more detailed presentation), the above results should be cautiously 
interpreted. Further research in the field should reconsider the conceptualisation of 
anxiety and clearly discriminate between components and correlates of sport anxiety. 
Based on such advances, relationships between pre-competition anxiety, cognitive 
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interference and its effects on athletes' effort/performance can be further explored and 
better understood. 
Searching beyond 'worry' 
As already noticed, in relation to the present findings, the above model can only account 
for the type of thoughts described as performance worries. However, as Sarason et al. 
(1996b) argues, while much research has been devoted to worries and the worrying 
process, cognitive interference may be a superordinate category of cognitions of which 
worries are an important but not the sole part. 
Situation irrelevant thoughts. Relationships involving situation- irrelevant thoughts were 
weaker in all studies. One possible reason for the lack of magnitude in these 
relationships is the distributional characteristics that were obtained in measures of 
frequency of situation-irrelevant thoughts. Generally, the range of responses in these 
measures was quite restricted (low means and small standard deviations), which 
according to Tabachnick & Fidell (1996) can deflate relationships with other measures. 
It could be argued that this does not seem a very reliable explanation, since the thoughts 
of escape subscale, for which similar distributional characteristics were revealed, related 
significantly higher to other measures. However, this does not reject the above 
argument since it is possible that the relationships that emerged for thoughts of escape, 
despite their magnitude, were also deflated. 
Thus, regarding situation irrelevant thoughts it can only be stated that according to 
athletes' perceptions they are detrimental to concentration. The moderate to high 
correlations that were revealed between this and the two remaining TOQS subscales can 
be attributed to the fact that they all are thoughts not related to performance processes. 
Thoughts of escape. The patterns of relationships that emerged for thoughts of escape 
were closer to those of performance worries than to situation irrelevant thoughts. 
Thoughts of escape can be said to be generated when unrecoverable discrepancies 
between goals and performance are identified and the individuals feel they have little or 
no control over the outcome. Such thoughts were found to be detrimental to 
concentration and effort. Performance worries and thoughts of escape correlated 
highly. 
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As with situation irrelevant thoughts one reason is that they both are non-task related. 
However, it can also be suggested that worry can lead to escape. Continuous reminders 
of deficits and constant worry (i. e. rumination) might result in perceptions of loss of 
control and mental withdrawal (Miculiner, 1996). Considering the lack of research 
regarding such thoughts, Sarason et al. (1996b) questions whether thoughts of escape 
are merely correlates or products of worry, and argues for the need to broaden the 
concept of cognitive interference beyond worry so that such seemingly important 
aspects of cognitive content can be further investigated. 
The role ofgoal orientation 
Goal orientations have been hypothesised to be related to different patterns of 
cognitions, behaviour, and affect (Duda, 1993). Attempting to fit goal orientations into 
an integrating model it could be hypothesised that when ego orientations prevail larger 
discrepancies between goals and performance, and consequently worries about 
performance, are more likely to occur. This is because, according to the theoretical 
framework, goals are normatively evaluated and therefore are less controllable. This 
prediction was not confirmed by the present data. A possible explanation is that 
discrepancies from goals can also be large when task orientation is highly salient 
because task oriented individuals have been shown to choose more challenging goals 
(Nicholls, 1984,1989). Therefore, the source of worry might differ, however the 
frequency can be similar. However, research on goals has shown that task orientation is 
related to more effort and persistence compared to an ego orientation (Duda, 1993). 
Therefore, it can be argued that it is the response to such worries in terms of effort that 
might differ since within a task orientation goal attainment expectancies can be higher 
because goals are more controllable. In that respect, it would be interesting to 
investigate the role of goal orientations in relation to performance discrepancies and 
goal attainment expectancies. 
The finding that under unfavourable situational conditions (losing) athletes holding 
comparative goals experienced significantly more thoughts of escape than athletes 
holding self-referenced goals, appears to provide indirect support for the above 
proposition, indicating that maladaptive cognitive responses are more likely to occur 
within ego oriented athletes. 
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Conclusion 
The present investigation expands sport performance research. The topics of the 
investigation are not new in psychology but have been largely ignored in sport 
psychology. Considering the lack of previous research on this specific topic 
methodological choices that were made can be criticised and limitations can be 
identified. Furthermore, it is understandable that a single investigation cannot establish 
clear conclusions. 
Limitations 
Measurement restrictions. One limitation of the present investigation involves the 
assessment of thought content, the major issue under examination. This limitation is not 
specific to this project, but rather global when it comes to assessing cognitive activation 
since all possible thought sampling methods have in common a reliance on self-reports 
(Klinger, 1978). Furthermore, in field studies, when thoughts individuals have during 
task performance need assessing, memory and the ability of individuals to be aware of 
the several thoughts they experience also become part of the problem. Attempting to 
reduce the effects of the above limitation, thought content was assessed as close to the 
conclusion of the competition as possible. 
Lack of evidencefor causality inferences. Another important shortcoming is the lack of 
methodological strength to support direction of causality in the identified relationships. 
However, once more it should be emphasised that since the purpose of the investigation 
was to explore relationships in field, without interfering with the competitive 
environment, methodological designs to examine causality were not applicable. Thus, 
within the frame of the present investigation, inferences regarding causality can only be 
supported theoretically. 
Sample limitations. Finally, the results of the present investigation need replicating and 
expanding due to sample limitations. On the one hand the samples that were employed 
were quite specific in that all participants were university students. On the other hand, it 
can also be argued that samples were not homogeneous, since athletes representing 
different competition levels, and is some cases different sports, participated in the 
studies. Considering that the nature of the different sports might play a crucial role in 
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determining some of the identified relationships, the above issues limit the 
generalisability of the findings to the specific samples that were used. Finally, in some 
of the analyses sample sizes were rather small. Nevertheless5 it has to be stressed that all 
of the identified limitations are common in sport psychology. Access to sport samples in 
a major problem researchers face when the research designs involve assessment 
pre/post-competition (or both as in the case of this investigation). 
Contribution to the literature 
Despite the above limitations, such an investigation could give a preliminary insight and 
stimulate further research and debate, into the role of cognitive content during sport 
performance. Summarising how the present investigation contributes to the sport 
psychology literature, it is argued that: 
9 It provides a new instrument to retrospectively assess thought content during sport 
performance. 
0 It contributes to the transition from pre-competition anxiety research to research 
investigating cognitive states of athletes while performing. 
* It identifies possible reasons for the inconsistency in the anxiety/perforinance 
relationship. 
9 It identifies possible mechanisms through which thought content during competition 
affects performance. 
* It proposes a conceptual model that promotes further research that can be fruitful 
both on theoretical and applied levels. 
Future directions 
Future research directions can evolve through examination of the identified limitations. 
First, regarding the assessment of thought content during competition, alternative 
methodologies can be employed to strengthen the results obtained from post- 
competition questionnaires. Such designs could employ a more ideographic approach, 
which may involve stimulated recall through the use of videos and in-depth interviews. 
Second, regarding methodological inadequacy to infer causality, it is suggested that 
once relationships in field studies have been established, experimental research can 
contribute to explore issues of causality. Such research may not take place 
in the real 
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competition environment but could help identify whether theoretically based 
propositions hold, and will also contribute to a better understanding of mechanisms 
through which various effects take place. 
Third, regarding sample characteristics, studies to replicate and confirm the identified 
relationships are also essential. Considering that in the proposed conceptual model the 
nature of the specific sport is crucial in determining relationships between cognitive 
interference and performance, sport specific research is necessary. Such research can 
help identifying how relationships differ in relation to sport context and enhance our 
understanding of links between the investigated constructs. 
Finally, future research could consider relationships between constructs that were 
included in this investigation, which however were not examined in relation to each 
other (e. g. anxiety and goal orientations in relation to goal attainment expectancies and 
(effects of interfering thoughts on effort) responses to interfering thoughts; see section 
on additional considerations for more details). Examinations of such relationships could 
result in a more comprehensive understanding, but also in further extensions 
(improvements), of the proposed model. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A 
The original Thought Occurrence Questionnaire (TOQ). 
While performing I think about: very 
never often 
I how poorly I am doing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. what someone will thing of me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. how I should be more careful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. how well others can do on what I am trying to do 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. difficult what I am doing is 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. level of ability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. the purpose of what I am doing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. how I would feel if I were told how I performed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. how often I feel confused 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. other activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. members of my family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. something that makes me feel guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. personal worries 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. something that makes me feel tense 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. something that makes me feel angry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. something that happened earlier in the day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. something that happened in the recent past (e. g. in the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
last few days) 
19. something that happened in the distant past 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. something that might happen in the future 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. stopping 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. how unhappy I am 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. how hard it is 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. how I cannot stand it any more 1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 
25. about quitting 1 2 3 4 
5 6 7 
26. running away 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 
27. taking something (e. g., pills, a drink) to make it easier 1 2 3 4 
5 6 7 
28. going to bed or to sleep 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX B 
Instrument used in Stage 2 (cgntent analysis) of the TOQS development. 
QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT 
We are trying to construct a questionnaire regarding thoughts athletes experience during 
competitions. Please complete the following form after reading the instructions 
provided below. Your help will be greatly appreciated. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is a list of thoughts that might go through athletes' minds during sport 
performance. 
Please categorise the items that follow into the four given categories according to 
their nature by ticking the appropriate cell. 
If you think that some items do not fall in any of the categories tick the column 
labeled 'none'. 
If you think that some items fit to more than one category, please indicate so by 
ticking more than one columns. 
CATEGORIES Thoughts related Thoughts not Thoughts of None 
to the related to the withdrawing from 
competition competition. the competition. 
(performance, 
ITEMS outcome). 
During sport performance I have thoughts 
1. that I shouldn't mess-up now 
2. that this is a horrible experience 
3. about other activities (e. g. 
shopping, TV, having tea) 
4. that everyone is passing me 
5. that some competitors look really 
strong today 
6. that I'm not interested in this anymore 
7. that I'm not going to achieve my goal 
today 
8. about personal worries 
9. that I cannot stand it anymore 
10. that I'm performing poorly 
11. that I want to get out of here 
12. that the conditions (e. g. temperature, 
pitch, atmosphere) are not good 
13. that I'm letting people (e. g. coach, 
parents) down 
14. that I'm going to finish way down the 
field 
Thoughts related 
to the 
competition 
(performance, 
outcome). 
Thoughts not 
related to the 
competition. 
Thoughts of 
withdrawing from 
the competition. 
None 
15. about members of my family 
16. that I'm having a bad day 
17. that I will not bother trying anymore 
18. that I shouldn't make a mistake now 
19. about stopping 
20. about what I'm going to do later in the 
day 
21. that I'm disappointing everyone 
22. about previous mistakes I have made 
23. that I'm fed-up with it 
24. that I'm not in a position to beat them 
today 
25. about friends 
26. that I'm not going to do this 
competition anymore 
27. that the weather is really bad 
27. that other competitors are better than 
me today 
28 that I want to quit 
29. that I'm very unlucky 
30. about what I'm going to do when I go 
home 
31. that it's getting too hard 
32. that I'm in agony 
33. that the last time I tried I failed 
A that there is not much I can do 
35. that I hate this competition 
36. that I lack ability 
37. that I'm not going to win today 
Thank you very much for your co-operation. 
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APPENDIX C 
Stage 3 (Exploratory Factor Analysis) of the TOQS development 
SPORTS QUESTIONNAIRE 
A number of statements that athletes have used to describe their thoughts during 
competition are listed in the following page. Read each statement and then circle the 
appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate how often you experience 
such thoughts during competition. 
Some athletes feel they should not admit such thoughts, but such thoughts are 
actually quite common, even among professional athletes. To help us better 
understand these reactions we ask you to share your true reactions with us. There are, 
therefore, no right and wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any of the 
statements, but choose the answer which represents how you usuall react. 
e You may find some of the statements quite similar. Please do not let this disturb you, 
and treat each one individually. 
Thank you very much for your co-operation. 
I agree to participate in this research project. 
After reading the above statement please tick this box ........... 
gender (circle appropriately): male female 
sport: 
date of birth: 
years participating in sport: 
current level (circle appropriately): international national 
regional club 
university 
recreational 
During competition I have thoughts 
almost very 
never often 
1. that I shouldn't mess-up now 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. that I want to quit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. about members of my family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. that I am performing poorly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. that I do not want to do this competition any more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. about personal worries (e. g. school, work, relations) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. that I'm not going to achieve my goal today 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. that I lack ability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. that I want to get out of here 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. about what I'm going to do later in the day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. that I'm letting people (e. g. my coach, my parents) down 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. that the conditions (weather, temperature, pitch, 
atmosphere) are not good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. that I'm not interested in this competition anymore 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. about other activities (e. g. shopping, having tea, TV) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. that I shouldn't make a mistake now 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. about stopping 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. about previous mistakes I have made 1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
about friends 
that I'm having a bad day 
that I am fed-up with it 
that I'm not going to win today 
about what I'm going to do when I'll go home 
that other competitors are better than me today 
that I cannot stand it any more 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
Thank you very much for your co-operation. 
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APPENDIX D 
Instruments used in Stage 4 (Validation) of the TQQS development. 
SPORTS QUESTIONNAIRE 
A number of statements that athletes have used to describe their thoughts and 
reactions before or during competition are listed in the following pages. Read each 
statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to 
indicate how often you usually experience such thoughts or reactions before or 
during competition. 
Some athletes feel they should not admit such reactions to competition, but such 
reactions are actually quite common, even among professional athletes. To help us 
better understand these reactions we ask you to share your true reactions with us. 
There are, therefore, no right and wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on 
any of the statements, but choose the answer which represents how you usuall react. 
9 You may find some of the statements quite similar. Please do not let this disturb you, 
and treat each one individually. 
Thank you very much for your co-operation. 
I agree to participate in this research project. 
After reading the above statement please tick this box ........... 
gender (circle appropriately): male female 
sport: 
date of birth: 
years participating in sport: 
current level (circle appropriately): international national 
regional club 
university 
recreational 
During competition I have thoughts ... 
never 
very 
often 
I that I want to quit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. about other activities (e. g. shopping, having tea, TV) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. about previous mistakes I have made 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. that I do not want to take part in this competition any 
more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. about what I'm going to do later in the day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. that I'm having a bad day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. that I want to get out of here 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. about personal worries (e. g. school, work, relations) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. that the conditions (whether, temperature, pitch, 
atmosphere) are not good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. about stopping 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. about friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. that I am not going to achieve my goals today 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. that I am fed-up with it 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. about what I'm going to do when I'll go home 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. that I am not going to win this competition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. that I cannot stand it any more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. that other competitors are better than me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I- 
n M 
0 0 v t S d e 
0 e r 
a M r Y t e a 
W t M 
a h eS US 
a 10 C0 
t v h 
While competing, I worry about making mistakes or failing to come 
through 1 2 3 4 
essure on myself by worrying how I will perform 
- 
1 2 3 4 
3.1 thing about and imagine what will happen if I fail or screw-up 11 21 31 4 
4.1 worry quite a bit about what others think about my performance 11 21 31 
Before or during competition ... 
a 
In 
Me 
0V 
Se 
tr 
S 
0 
M 
e 
t 
I 
M 
e 
S 
0 
f 
t 
e 
n 
aa 
11 
MW 
0a 
SY 
tS 
1.1 feel nervous 1 2 3 4 
2. During competition, I find myself thinking about unrelated things 1 2 3 4 
3.1 have self-doubts 1 2 3 4 
4. my body feels tense 1 2 3 4 
5.1 am concerned that I might not do as well as I could 1 2 3 4 
6. My mind wanders during competition 1 2 3 4 
7. While performing, I often do not pay attention to what is going on 
- 1 2 3 4 
8.1 feel tense in my stomach 1 2 3 4 
9. Thoughts of doing poorly interfere with my concentration during 
competition 1 2 3 4 
10.1 am concerned about choking under pressure 1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
12.1 feel my stomach shrinking 1 2 3 4 
orming poorly 13.1 am concerned about perf 1 2 3 
4 
14.1 have lapses of concentration during competition because of nervousness 1 2 3 
4 
1 2 3 4 
16.1 am worried about reaching my goal 1 
2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 
18.1 am concerned that others will be disappointed in my performance 
1 2 3 4 
19. In s 
L 2 3 4 
20. I'm concerned I will not be able to concentrate 
21 m,, b,. nrt nminds 
1 
I 
2 
2T 
3 
3 
4 
4j 
In this part of the questionnaire you are asked to indicate to what degree you agree or disagree with the 
statements listed below. 
strongly 
disagree 
strongly 
agree 
1. 1 am pretty skilled in my sport 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. 1 enjoy my sport very much 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. 1 am not very happy with my level of competence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. After playing my sport for a while I felt pretty competent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My sport is fun 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. 1 would describe my sport as very interesting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. 1 am satisfied with how good I am in my sport 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
S. I think I am pretty good in my sport 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. While playing, I think about how much I enjoy it 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Thank you very much for your co-operation. 
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APPENDIX E 
The instruments used in Study 11 of the investigation. 
SPORTS QUESTIONNAIRE 
You are about to complete a set of questionnaires concerning sport competitions. You will be asked to 
answer some questions before the race starts (pre-race) and some after the race is completed (post-race). 
The questions involve statements that athletes have used to describe their thoughts and reactions before 
or during competition. Some athletes feel they should not admit such reactions to competition, but such 
reactions are actually quite common, even among professional athletes. To help us better understand 
these reactions we ask you to share your true reactions with us. There are, therefore, no right and wrong 
answers. 
# It is important for us to have your registration number on all of the questionnaire pages, so that we 
can match the information we get from the pre-race questionnaire with those of the post-race 
questionnaire. However, we would like to assure you that all the information will be kept confidential. So 
please feel free to answer the questions in the most honest way possible. 
Thank you very much for your co-operation. 
I agree to participate in this research project. 
After reading the above statement please tick this box ........... 
PRE-RACE 
Please complete the first page of the form, and read carefully the instructions before completing 
the questionnaire in the second/third page. 
REGISTRATION NUMBER: 
gender (circle appropriately): male female 
date of birth: 
years of competitive experience: 
current level (circle appropriately): international national 
regional club 
university 
recreational 
What is your personal time-goal for the upcoming competition: 
PRIE-RACE 
A number of statements that athletes have used to describe their feelings and thoughts before competition 
are given below. Please complete the questionnaire after reading carefully the instructions: 
Column one: In this column you are asked to indicate the degree to which you experience such feelings or thoughts right now - at this moment. 
1= not at all; 2= somewhat; 3= moderately so; 4= very much so 
Column two: In this column you are asked to indicate whether you regard these feelings and thoughts 
stated at the left as positive or negative in relation to your upcoming performance. 
very negative, 0= unimportant/neutral, +3 = very positive 
COLUMN ONE li`., COLUMN TWO 
(M % ý W W E 
> 
-, ý ., 
E > 
1. 1 am concerned about this competition 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
2. 1 feel nervous 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
P, 1 1 feel at ease 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
4. 1 have self-doubts 1 2 3 4 
All 21ý. -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
5. 1 feel jittery 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
6. 1 feel comfortable 1 2 3 4 
IM 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
7. I am concerned that I may not do as 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 well in this competition as I could 
8. My body feels tense 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 1 0 +1 +2 +3 
9. 1 feel self-confident 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 1 0 +1 +2 +3 
10. 1 am concerned about losing 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 
0 +1 +2 +3 
I feel tense in my stomach 1 2 3 4 
$0 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
2. 1 fleel secure 1 2 3 4 V" -3 -2 
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 
3, 1 am concerned about choking under 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 0 1 +2 +3 
pressure 
COLUMN ONE F, COLUMN TWO O 
4WX 
*0 too 
> 
14. My body feels relaxed 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
15 1 am confident I can meet the . 
challenge 
1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
16. 1 am concerned about performing 
poorly 
1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
17. My heart is racing 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 1 0 +1 +2 +3 
18. 1 am confident about performing well 1 2 3 4 " ý9fflR -3 -2 1 0 1 +2 +3 
19, 1 am concerned about reaching my 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 1 0 1 +2 +3 goal 
20. 1 feel my stomach sinking 1 2 3 4 5 -3 -2 1 0 1 +2 +3 
21. 1 feel mentally relaxed 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 1 0 +1 +2 +3 
22. 1 am concerned that others will be 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 disappointed with my performance 
23. My hands are clammy 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
24. 1 am confident because I mentally 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 picture myself reaching my goal 
25. I am concerned I wont be able to 1 2 3 4 z 
W. al, 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 concentrate 2- 
26. My body feels tight 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 1 0 +1 +2 +3 
ý7. 1 am confident of coming through 1 2 3 4 -3 -2 1 0 +1 +2 +3 
under pressure 
POST-RACE 
Please remember to complete your registration number. 
REGISTRATION NUMBER: 
A number of statements that athletes have used to describe their thoughts during competition are listed in 
this page. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to 
indicate how often you experienced such thoughts during this race. 
During the race I had thoughts ... very 
never often 
1. that I want to quit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. about other activities (e. g. shopping, having tea, TV) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. about previous mistakes I have made 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. that I do not want to take part in this race any more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. about what I'm going to do later in the day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. that I'm having a bad day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. that I want to get out of here 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. about personal worries (e. g. school, work, relations) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. that the conditions (whether, temperature, pitch, 
atmosphere) are not good 2 3 4 5 
6 7 
10. about stopping 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. about friends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. that I am not going to achieve my goals today 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. that I am fed-up with it 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 
14. about what I'm going to do when I'll go home 1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 
15. that we are not going to win this race 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 
16. that I cannot stand it any more 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 
17. that other runners are better than me 1 2 
3 4 5 6 7 
Thank you very much for your co-operation. 
Appendices 158 
APPENDIX F 
The instruments used in Study III of the investigation. 
SPORTS QUESTIONNAIRE 
You are about to complete a set of questionnaires concerning sport competitions. You will be asked to 
answer some questions before the game starts (pre-game) and some after the game is completed (post- 
game). 
* The questions involve statements that athletes have used to describe their thoughts and reactions before 
or during competition. Some athletes feel they should not admit such reactions to competition, but such 
reactions are actually quite common, even among professional athletes. To help us better understand 
these reactions we ask you to share your true reactions with us. There are, therefore, no right and wrong 
answers. 
It is important for us to have your date of birth on all of the questionnaire pages, so that we can 
match the information we get from the pre-race questionnaire with those of the post-race questionnaire. 
All the questionnaires you are going to complete are anonymous, so please feel free to answer the 
questions in the most honest way possible. 
Thank you very much for your co-operation. 
I agee to participate in this research project. 
After reading the above statement please tick this box ........... 
PRIE-GAME 
GENDER: 
DATE OF BIRTH: 
YEARS PARTICIPATING IN COMPETITIONS: 
1. How well do you expect to do in this game 
not at all well very well 
1234567 
2. To what extent you think you can achieve your goals 
to a small extent to a great extent 
1 
3. How confident do you feel that you can achieve your goals 
not at all confident very confldent 
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APPENDIX G 
The instruments used in Study IV of the investigation. 
SPORTS QUESTIONNAIRE 
You are about to complete a set of questionnaires. You will be asked to complete a form three times 
after the conclusion of games (post-game) , and another one 
independently of competition time (form 
A). 
it is important for us to match the information we get from all the questionnaire, so please do not 
forget to complete your date of birth on all the forms you complete. 
The questionnaires are anonymous and therefore confidential. So we would like to ask you to answer 
the questions in the most honest way possible. Remember that there are not right or wrong answers. 
Do not spend much time on any of the questions and simply choose the answer that better represents 
you. 
We count on your help, thank you very much for your co-operation. 
I agree to participate in this research project. 
After reading the above statement please tick this box ........... 
FORM A 
Please remember to complete your DATE OF BIRTH 
DATE OF BIRTH: 
GENDER: 
Please read each of the following statements listed below and indicate how much you agree with each statement by circling the appropriate number. 
strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neutral, 4= agree, 5= strongly agree 
I feel most successful in volleyball when: 
1.1 am the only one who can perform a skill 123 
2.1 learn a new skill and it makes me want to practice more 123 
3.1 can do better than my team-mates 12345 
4. Other players cannot do as well as me 12345 
5.1 leam something that is fun to do 12345 
6. Other mess up and I do not 123 
7.1 learn a new skill by trying hard 12345 
8.1 work really hard 1234 
9.1 score the most points 12 
10. Something I leam makes me want to go and practice more 12345 
11.1 
am the best 123 
12.12. A skill I leam really feels right 2345 
13.13 3 
POST-GAME 
* Please remember to complete your DATE OF BIRTH 
DATE OF BIRTH: 
A number of statements that athletes have used to describe their thoughts during competition are listed 
in the following page. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the 
statement to indicate how often you experienced such thoughts during this game. 
During the game I had thoughts ... very 
never often 
1. that I want to quit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. about other activities (e. g. shopping, having tea, TV) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. about previous mistakes I have made 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. that I do not want to take part in this game any more 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. about what I'm going to do later in the day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. that I'm having a bad day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. that I want to get out of here 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. about personal worries (e. g. school, work, relations) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. that the conditions (temperature, pitch, atmosphere) are 
not good 
4 5 6 7 
10. about stopping 1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 
11. about friends 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 
12. that we are not going to achieve our goals today 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 
13. that I am fed-up with it 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. about what I'm going to do when I'll go home 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. that we are not going to win this game 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. that I cannot stand it any more 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. that other teams are better than us 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
